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ABSTRACT 
 
In this dissertation, I argue that moods can be intentional states, that is, they can be about
something.  I make this case by exploring the moods that underlie two psychopathological 
diagnoses: depression and borderline personality disorder (BPD).  The view that moods can 
be intentional is counter to dominant positions in both philosophy and medicine. 
 This project has three elements.  First, I critically examine current medical approaches to 
depression and BPD.  I distinguish two dominant models of medical practice and argue that 
many medical practitioners within both models (implicitly) deny the potential intentionality 
of moods.  This results in a widespread medical mischaracterisation of depression and BPD. 
 Second, I argue that the intentional features of those moods that underlie depression and 
BPD can be appreciated when one assumes the role first of ‘affective reconstructor’ and then 
of ‘affective interlocutor.’  Affective reconstructors explore the origins of someone’s mood 
with the aim of identifying its intentional object(s).  If an intentional object is found, one can 
assume the role of affective interlocutor.  In that role one actively engages with the mood 
experiencer, carefully considering whether those intentional object(s) fit appropriately with 
the mood. 
 Third, once the moods that underlie depression and BPD are seen as potentially 
intentional, I argue that they may be ‘moral moods.’  I use case studies of sufferers of 
depression and BPD, particularly the character of Sophie (from William Styron’s novel 
Sophie’s Choice) and Lilah, a composite of several patients diagnosed with BPD.  I argue 
iii
that their moods are responses to moral violation.  Non-intentional accounts of moods, either 
philosophical or medical, will fail to acknowledge the moral dimension of these moods.  I 
argue that this is a substantial failure, both for Sophie and Lilah and also for those around 
them, who will miss the opportunity to fully understand their experiences. 
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CHAPTER I 
MOODS AS INTENTIONAL STATES 
 
In this dissertation, I will be offering a partial analysis of mood.  Within the philosophical 
literature there has been very little discussion of moods.  Among those who have taken a 
position, however, the dominant position is that moods are non-intentional mental states.  I 
will be arguing against this view.  On my view, moods can be intentional, at least sometimes.  
In addition to their potential intentionality, moods are also a very complex phenomenon, with 
many different facets and variable manifestations.  As a result of this complexity, I will not 
attempt to provide a complete account of moods.  I will argue, however, that recognition of 
the potential intentionality of moods has several benefits.  Significantly, it allows us to 
appreciate the moral place that moods can occupy in our lives. 
 
1. Introduction 
There are many proposals as to which affective phenomena should count as moods.  Here 
are some suggestions: depression (gloominess), irritation (grumpiness), anxiety, cheerfulness, 
boredom, buoyancy, peacefulness, satisfaction, stressfulness, charmed, listless, contentment, 
agitation, euphoria, loneliness, reflectiveness, pensiveness, and uneasiness.1 There is very 
little consensus about which of these should be included.  The first two, however – 
depression and irritation – are almost always accepted as paradigmatic examples of moods.  I 
 
1 This list recalls Paul Griffiths observation about emotions.  He notes that any effort to list emotions results in 
an extraordinarily heterogeneous set of examples.  He argues that there is no single identifiable psychological 
state captured by the folk psychological category, ‘emotion.’ (Griffiths 1997.) 
2will be focusing on these, particularly as they relate to the psychopathological diagnostic 
categories, depression and borderline personality disorder.  I will be presenting case studies 
of these two diagnoses, and I will argue that both of these cases can be significantly 
characterised in terms of moods.  I will further argue that current dominant understandings of 
these psychopathologies – both medical and philosophical – do not fully capture these 
phenomena. 
Why might an examination of mood be philosophically interesting?  To begin, there has 
been a large amount of recent philosophical interest in the emotions.  But despite the many 
similarities between moods and emotions, relatively little attention has been paid to moods.  
A search of the Philosopher’s Index, for example, shows 1745 matches for “emotions” as a 
subject, but only 32 for “moods.”2 Within psychology and psychiatry, emotions and moods 
are often simply conflated, with fear treated as interchangeable with anxiety or sadness 
interchangeable with depression.  One possible reason for this confusion and relative silence 
with respect to moods may be because they are, in some respects, phenomenally more 
difficult to characterise than emotions.  Despite this challenge, however, I think moods are 
worth exploring because they significantly affect our lives.  In some respects, these effects 
are similar to the effects that emotions can have, but there are significant differences as well. 
An additional question about my dissertation might arise about my use of cases of 
psychopathological diagnoses to illuminate moods, which are not in themselves seen as 
pathological.  One reason for using psychopathological cases is that this is where the 
preponderance of empirical work on mood has been focused.  Further, I will argue that one of 
the results of my account of moods (that they are sometimes intentional states) is that 
 
2 Search conducted on May 1, 2006.  The search for “moods” as subject excluded the discussion of moods 
related to logic and the philosophy of language. 
3depression and BPD often should not be understood as pathologies that are different in kind 
from typical mood experiences.  In fact, both depression and BPD can be seen as intentional 
and intelligible responses to life experiences, at least sometimes.  Many diagnosed cases of 
depression and BPD are not well-characterised as pathological at all (at least under certain 
definitions of pathological).  Instead, they are species of normal responses to particular 
(traumatic) environments. 
In this chapter, I will discuss current philosophical accounts of mood.  As I mentioned, 
although there has been relatively little philosophical exploration of mood, what exists has 
been strongly dominated by non-intentional accounts.  This is the position that I will be 
arguing against.  In section 2, I will explore some of the challenges that arise when 
characterising the intentionality of moods.  In section 3, I will present some of the other 
features of moods that need to be kept in mind when developing an account of moods.  Then, 
in section 4, I will discuss some intentional accounts of moods and I will explain why their 
analyses are inadequate.  In section 5, I will focus on the work of some philosophers who 
have offered non-intentional theories of mood.  I will argue that these theories do not 
adequately capture several of the significant features of moods.  Finally, in section 6, I will 
offer a brief summary of my own view, although the full case for that position will be made 
only over the following chapters.  In those chapters, I will show how non-intentional 
accounts of moods (both philosophical and medical) affect our understanding of depression 
and borderline personality disorder.  I will argue that in both cases, the non-intentional 
account is mistaken.  I will use these case studies to argue that moods can at least sometimes 
be intentional states.  Further, I will argue that in virtue of their intentionality, some cases of 
depression and BPD can also be either intelligible or moral or both. 
42.  Moods and intentionality 
There is a general presumption among many philosophers that the way to make the 
distinction between emotions and moods is that emotions are intentional, moods are not.  
Although there have been many philosophers of late who have enthusiastically endorsed 
strongly cognitive and intentional accounts of the emotions, there is very little philosophical 
support for a cognitive and intentional account of moods (despite the many similarities 
between emotions and moods).  Martha Nussbaum, for example, a strong proponent of 
cognitive accounts of the emotions, makes comments like the following: “Philosophers, 
psychologists, and anthropologists generally agree that [paradigm emotions] are distinct, in 
important respects, from bodily appetites such as hunger and thirst, and also from objectless 
moods….”3
In many cases, this claim is considered so self-evident that it is not accompanied by an 
argument.  It is taken as given.4 For this to be legitimate, one would assume that the view 
had widespread support.  But quick reflection of our folk psychology shows that this is not 
the case.  In our folk psychology, moods are clearly understood as at least sometimes 
intentional.  When someone says, “I feel grumpy today” we will typically ask why.  
Sometimes the response will be a non-intentional explanation:  “I slept poorly”; “I skipped 
breakfast.”  But in other instances, the response will be intentional:  “I had a fight with my 
husband”; “My boss criticized me unjustly.”  Here, the responder cites her experience with 
her spouse or boss not merely as having caused her mood, but serving as a kind of 
justification for her mood.  The normative underpinning provided by such responses is a 
 
3 Kahan and Nussbaum March 1996. 
4 See, for example, Carroll 2003. 
5hallmark of intentionality.  Because we sometimes take ourselves to be able to justify our 
moods, we must be considering moods to have intentional content.  In our folk psychology, 
moods can sometimes be about something.  Thus, it seems to me that persons offering a non-
intentional account of mood face a burden of explaining why our folk psychological account 
is so misguided.  This is a not a burden that I have seen philosophers who discuss mood 
typically acknowledge.5
Eric Lormand offers one of the only non-intentional accounts of moods that argues for the 
non-intentional position.6 He describes three features of moods that he thinks set moods 
apart from emotions.  These three features lead him to postulate three conditions that he 
thinks any account of moods has to meet.  He then considers four intentional theories of 
moods and argues that none of them meet these conditions.  Ultimately, I will argue that 
Lormand is mistaken – notably, of course, because he fails to consider my intentional account 
of moods.  But I happen to agree in many respects with the observations Lormand makes 
about moods. 
Lormand’s first condition is linked to the intentionality of moods, and I will now discuss it 
at some length.  Lormand observes that moods do not seem to manifest intentionality in the 
same way that emotions do.  On his view, one is not euphoric about some thing in the same 
way that one is angry about some thing.  This produces Lormand’s first condition: the 
 
5 If I am able to establish that depression and irritability are sometimes intentional, my opponents might simply 
argue that all my success shows is that depression and irritability are sometimes not moods.  I think the burden 
will be on my opponents to explain why depression and irritability should be ejected from the mood pantheon.  
Of course, I face a burden of explaining how the distinction between moods and emotions ought to be made, if 
at all, if not through non/intentionality. 
6 Lormand 1985. Claire Armon-Jones offers another.  I will discuss her central objection to designating moods 
as intentional states in section 4. 
6“Intentionality Condition.”  According to Lormand, an account of moods will have to explain 
this at least apparent difference between moods and emotions. 
I think the way to respond to the “Intentionality Condition” is to make a distinction 
between two kinds of intentional objects for mental states (or at least two kinds of objects 
that have the appearance of being intentional objects).  They can either be part of or divorced 
from the causal history of a mental state.  Objects that are part of the causal history of the 
state I will call occasioning intentional objects.  For example, Kate may be pushed when 
entering the subway and become angry.  The subway-pushing or subway-pusher is (at least 
part of) the cause of Kate’s anger,7 and is thus its occasioning intentional object.  Objects 
divorced from the mental state’s causal history I will call immediate (apparent) intentional 
objects.  These are the objects that a preexisting affective state gets attached to.  For example, 
Kate may enter a classroom irritated, and then focus her irritation on the chalkboard, which 
the previous instructor did not erase.  The unerased chalkboard is the immediate (apparent) 
intentional object of Kate’s irritation. Central to understanding moods is appreciating this 
phenomenon of extant moods taking on additional immediate intentional objects.   
We need to keep this distinction clear, because there is a tendency when evaluating moods 
and emotions to compare the occasioning intentional object of an emotion with the 
immediate (apparent) intentional object of a mood.  This results in the intentionality of 
emotions seeming to be more discrete and pronounced than the intentionality of moods, but 
 
7 It is a challenge to work out the precise details of how intentional objects enter into a causal chain that 
produces a mental state.  This is especially the case with intentional objects where the object does not exist.  I 
will not attempt to engage that debate here.  For my purposes, all I need is the uncontroversial claim that 
intentional objects can constitute at least part of the cause of some mental states. 
7the comparison is improper.8 It seems to me that Lormand’s analysis gets off the ground by 
comparing the immediate (apparent) intentional objects of a case of euphoria with the 
occasioning intentional object of a case of anger.  When we imagine the cases, we start by 
imagining being euphoric and think about how that euphoria extends to other immediate 
(apparent) objects around us – the sky is bluer, the faces of friends more pleasing, etc. than 
they would seem to us were we not euphoric.  But then we turn to anger.  And rather than 
imagine being angry and extending that anger to objects around us, we imagine becoming 
angry and the occasioning intentional object of that just-caused anger. 
This is very common.  In discussions of emotions, most commentators only discuss cases 
where the intentional object is the occasioning cause (e.g. someone is angry at or about the 
situation that brought the anger into existence; someone is afraid of the thing that caused their 
fear).  Lormand is quite correct – there is a big difference between the objects that get taken 
up within an extant mood and the object that is part of the cause of an anger episode.  The 
taken-up objects of euphoria are not as intentionally pointed as the occasioning object of 
anger is.  This difference, however, becomes substantially less pronounced if we take cases 
of immediate (apparent) intentional objects of emotions. 
The challenge, however, for the intentional theorist of moods, is to show that emotions, 
like moods, can take immediate (apparent) intentional objects.  I think this is clearly the case.  
Consider Donald Dutton and Arthur Aron’s experiment in Capilano Park.9 They placed an 
attractive female interviewer in three interview sites: (a) low wooden bridge; (b) suspension 
bridge over a deep gorge; and (c) outdoor clearing where people who had walked over the 
 
8 In this dissertation, I am primarily concerned to establish that moods can have occasioning intentional objects, 
but this will only be accomplished in later chapters. 
9 Dutton and Aron 1974. 
8suspension bridge 10 minutes earlier would pass by.  She asked men in each of these settings 
some questions, and asked them to complete a narrative.  The subjects on the suspension 
bridge created narratives that included more sexual content than subjects in the other 
experiment conditions.  Further, at the end of the interview, the interviewer gave the men her 
phone number and told them that they could call her if they wanted to know more about the 
experiment.  The men who encountered the interviewer on the suspension bridge were 
considerably more likely to call that those men who were interviewed in the other experiment 
conditions. 
It seems likely that the subjects on the suspension bridge took themselves to be 
experiencing sexual arousal and thought that the intentional object of this arousal was the 
attractive interviewer.  Further, the subjects likely believed not only that their arousal was 
directed at the attractive interviewer, but that her presence actually created the arousal in the 
first place.  This looks like a mistake.  There is a broad acceptance that the men are in fact 
simply mischaracterising their fear.  Their emotional state was not, in fact, caused by the 
attractive interviewer, but rather by being on a suspension bridge over Capilano Gorge.  The 
occasioning intentional object of their emotional state was not the interviewer, but the Gorge.  
Thus their affective state is, in light of its causal and intentional history, fear – not sexual 
arousal.10 Using my distinction, the interviewer is merely an immediate (apparent) 
intentional object which gets ‘picked up’ by the men’s already extant emotion.  On my view, 
as the fear arousal picks up the interviewer as an immediate (apparent) intentional object, it 
becomes a more complicated affective state, with elements of both fear and sexual attraction. 
 
10 This phenomenon of getting our emotion wrong is characterised by David Pugmire as a “factitious emotion.”  
See Pugmire 1998. 
9It seems likely that the ‘error’ that happens on the Capilano suspension bridge is at least 
partly due to the novelty of the situation.  Most of the time, we are unlikely to 
mischaracterise our emotions in such a dramatic way.  But a similar kind of phenomenon can 
be observed in a more everyday scenario.  Consider Kate, who is having a serious fight with 
her spouse in the car, a fight that she desperately wishes was not happening.  She stops at a 
gas station and the attendant appears thoughtless or rude.  Although she did not take herself 
to be angry during the fight, she now becomes angry at the attendant. 
When asked, Kate might insist that her anger was only related to her experience with the 
attendant.  She will certainly make intentional avowals with respect to the attendant.  But her 
anger is really about the fight.  Psychoanalytic theory has many resources for explaining 
what is going on in these sorts of cases, particularly by appealing to defense mechanisms.  
Perhaps Kate has a deep aversion to seeing herself as someone who is angry at a loved one.  
She thus denies that the fight with her spouse leads her to be angry.  But despite her denial, 
her anger is still there, simmering along.  She encounters the attendant before she is able to 
fully suppress or dismantle it.  She enters that moment experiencing an anger she cannot or 
will not acknowledge toward an occasioning intentional object she will not admit is so 
situated within her emotion.  Then a suitable anger object presents itself.  Voilá – she is 
angry at the attendant. As with the Capilano Gorge case, in a sense, the attendant is the 
intentional object of Kate’s anger, but only the immediate (apparent) intentional object.  The 
actual occasioning intentional object is her spouse / the content of their fight / etc.  To the 
extent that Kate denies the occasioning of her anger with the fight, she is mistaken. 
I should acknowledge that another interpretive possibility with the Capilano Gorge 
experiment is that there is no real mistake; there are simply two separate emotions.  One is 
10
fear of the Gorge, the other is attraction to the interviewer.  The men perhaps do not 
recognize that they are experiencing two emotions, but this is a different kind of mistake than 
taking themselves to be experiencing a different emotion than the one that they are actually 
in.  With this interpretation, there is no need to posit immediate (apparent) intentional 
objects.  There are simply two separate occasioning intentional objects to go with the two 
separate emotions.  This seems possible to me.  But I do not think this interpretation will 
work in the Kate case.  The possibility of two separate emotions has some plausibility when 
there are two types of emotions involved.  With Kate and the gas station attendant, however, 
it seems odd to claim that Kate is simultaneously experiencing two distinct tokens of anger.  
Consider the person in a rage who stomps around the house picking up different household 
items, yelling that the ugliness of each one is infuriating.  It seems pretty clear that such a 
person does not acquire a new token of the rage emotion.  Instead, she is in a rage as a result 
of some occasioning object and that rage takes on immediate (apparent) intentional objects as 
she stomps around. 
When we are careful to compare only immediate (apparent) intentional objects of both 
moods and emotions, the difference in intentionality is considerably less pronounced.  Let us 
return to Lormand’s example of euphoria.  Let is imagine that Kate is euphoric, and upon 
seeing an acquaintance she gleefully launches into conversation.  She is euphoric about 
meeting up with this person, even though under other, more typical, conditions, she is only 
slightly fond of this acquaintance.  As observers, there is a sense in which her affective state 
is not directed toward the acquaintance in a particularly pointed way. 
But I think the Capilano Gorge experiment establishes what we already know first-hand 
about emotions – emotions, too, can come into existence with one intentional object and then 
11
pick up other intentional objects along the way (and even become transformed into other 
emotions as this happens).  It seems to me that the intentionality found between Kate’s mood 
and the acquaintance is very similar to the intentionality found between Kate’s emotion and 
the attendant.  Here we are contrasting two cases of immediate (apparent) intentional objects, 
and we do not find a substantial difference between moods and emotions.  A failure to 
appreciate this distinction between occasioning and immediate (apparent) intentional objects 
contributes to mischaracterising moods as always non-intentional. 
Notice, however, that I label immediate intentional objects only apparently intentional.   
This is because I find their intentional status uncertain.  There is a kind of intentionality, but 
it is not clear to me that an intentional object wholly divorced from a mental state’s cause can 
truly count as an intentional object of that mental state.  I am sympathetic to the view that if 
this were the sum of the intentionality of moods, then it is at least not intentional in the same 
way that an emotion can be intentional, with respect to its occasioning intentional object.  I 
am not sure what sort of evidence or argument could establish the interviewer (in the 
Capilano Bridge case) or the attendant (in the case of Kate and her fight with her spouse) 
either as fully an intentional object or fully not an intentional object.  Robert Gordon, for 
example, argues that something can count as an intentional object of an emotion (and by my 
extension, mood) only if it plays a role in the emotion’s causal history.11 He considers the 
example of a father coming home already angry.  Upon arriving home, he discovers Junior 
has destroyed a role of film.  According to Gordon, the father can only be said to be angry at
Junior if Junior’s actions were enough to make the father angry in the first place, without the 
already extant anger.  But I am not sure emotions or moods can be differentiated so finely.  
 
11 Gordon 1987, 47-48. 
12
Going back to the example of Kate’s anger at the gas station attendant, perhaps Kate would 
normally become mildly angry at behaviour of the type manifested by the attendant.  But if 
she had not been angry at her spouse, her affective response to the gas station attendant 
would have had some similarity to, and several marked differences from, what she actually 
experienced.  I am not sure how to separate the two angers out.  Claire Armon-Jones, 
conversely, explicitly rejects this causation requirement, and insists that emotional 
intentionality need not be linked with an emotion’s causal history.12 Because of these 
difficulties, I intend to remain agnostic on this question of whether or not immediate 
intentional objects are truly intentional. 
At this point, all I have attempted to show is that both moods and emotions can take 
immediate (apparent) intentional objects and further that the intentionality found with respect 
to these objects is similar in both.  But I have granted that emotions routinely have 
occasioning intentional objects (in addition to sometimes taking immediate (apparent) 
intentional objects).  I have also granted that the intentionality found with occasioning 
intentional objects is sharper and more pronounced than that with immediate (apparent) 
intentional objects.  Thus, if moods do not have occasioning intentional objects in the way 
that emotions do, then Lormand’s original point will stand: theories of moods will have to 
explain a significant difference in intentionality between moods and emotions. 
Unlike most emotions, moods routinely do not have discrete start and end points.  
Emotions may often be experienced as isolated phenomena.  They are often intense, but also 
often brief, responses to specific and limited arousal conditions.  Moods, however, are often 
less intense and more longstanding.  They are less episodic and they are less often the result 
 
12 Armon-Jones 1991, 50-60. 
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of easily identifiable arousal conditions.  At this point there might be a temptation to think 
that an often-used distinction from the philosophy of emotions literature, between formal and 
particular intentional objects, might map on to my distinction between occasioning and 
immediate intentional objects.  The feature of an object / event that brings an emotion into 
existence is its formal object.  The object / event itself is the emotion’s particular object.  For 
example, with emotions, a case of fear might have “a snake” as its particular object, and 
would have “threatening objects and events” as its formal object.  Someone might be tempted 
to think that, with moods, my immediate (apparent) intentional objects are particular objects 
and my occasioning objects are formal objects.  On this account, moods would come into 
existence purely in response to formal objects (depression coming about through a sense of 
loss, for example).  This would seem to preserve the sense that moods don’t really come into 
existence in response to particular events or objects.  
This, however, would be a mistake.  I think, with emotions and moods, both occasioning 
and immediate intentional objects are species of particular objects.  I think many people feel 
that moods in fact do not have occasioning intentional objects.  But it is my contention that 
there are simply differences in the way that moods and emotions are connected with 
occasioning intentional objects.  Moods are typically not the result of exposure to discrete 
objects or events.  I think that moods are sometimes the product of accretions of exposure to 
intentional objects or events – a kind of affective build-up. 
This is why their occasioning intentional objects can be hard to identify.  By the time we 
recognise that we are experiencing a mood, the objects / events that occasioned the mood are 
already behind us.  This is in contrast with emotions where we typically experience the 
formation of the emotion just as we experience the occasioning intentional object.  I contend 
14
that even in cases where someone says that there is no reason for her mood state, we can 
often engage in a process I will call “affective reconstruction.”  In this process we take an 
apparently non-intentional mood state and go over the experiences the mood experiencer has 
gone through.  Often, in reconstructing this history, the many small intentional objects that 
led to the creation of the mood will come into focus.  This means that rather than a single 
intentional object, often there will be many intentional occasioning objects for intentional 
moods. 
I will argue for this position more thoroughly in my later case study discussions of 
depression and BPD.  It seems clear to me that both depression and BPD can be caused by 
exposure to bundles of occasioning intentional objects.  But identifying these bundles 
requires a rich appreciation of the causal history of the mood states.  Figuring out the causal 
history of someone’s depression or irritation / depression mood blend (which underlies a case 
of BPD) can sometimes be complicated, and the “affective reconstruction” required can be 
daunting.  But it is possible, often, to figure out just what intentional states led to someone’s 
moods, even when those moods are typically designated pathological. 
Throughout this dissertation, I will aim to be careful about whether or not an intentional 
object is occasioning or immediate.  Non-intentional theorists of mood focus on immediate 
(apparent) intentional objects, argue that they are not, in fact, intentional objects, and then go 
on to claim that they have thereby shown that moods are non-intentional.  I think they are not 
entitled to this conclusion, simply because I think they have disregarded moods’ occasioning 
intentional object.   
 
15
3.  Additional important features of moods 
Lormand offer two more conditions on theories of moods in addition to his “Intentionality 
Condition,” explored in the previous section. The first of these I endorse, while I will argue 
against his third condition as mischaracterising the phenomenon.  Lormand observes that 
moods are very pervasive.  They seem to influence a greater range of a mood experiencer’s 
experience than do emotions.  This produces the “Pervasiveness Condition.”  This seems 
exactly right.  To borrow the metaphors of other philosophers, moods typically “colour”13 
and “frame”14 our experience in a much more global way than emotions do.  (As Lormand 
has observed, “some of the finest philosophical poetry” has been written in an effort to 
characterise this global effect of moods.15) Another way of putting this is that moods take up 
many more immediate (apparent) intentional objects than emotions.  Of course, emotions can 
extend in this way.  As I argued, after the fight with her spouse, Kate takes the gas station 
attendant as an immediate (apparent) intentional object of her anger.  But often we are able to 
contain our emotions, keeping them focused only on their occasioning intentional object.  
Moods are almost never so constrained.  The mood someone experiences almost always 
extends over many of the experiencer’s surrounding objects.  Here I think Lormand is quite 
correct.  This is one of the significant features of moods that makes them worth considering 
independent from emotions.  Any account of moods will have to be able to accommodate this 
feature. 
 
13 Ryle 1963, 96. 
14 William Morris 1989, Mood: The Frame of Mind.
15 Lormand 1985, 389. 
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Finally, we come to Lormand’s condition on theories of moods that I think is misguided.  
Lormand discusses the way that moods enter into explanations of behaviour.  He claims that 
when someone says “He kicked the dog because he was in a bad mood,” they are offering a 
purely causal explanation.  In this case, the dog-kicking is motiveless – the bad-mood dog-
kicker does it for no reason.  He was simply caused to do the kicking by his bad mood.  This 
is supposed to be in contrast with emotions in explanations.  In the case of an emotion being 
employed in an action explanation, someone might say that the dog-kicker was afraid that the 
dog would bite his sister, or angry that the dog bit his sister – in both cases, his emotion (fear 
or anger) hooks up with practical motivations (prevent the biting, punish the biting) in the 
explanation and leads him to kick the dog.  Moods, according to Lormand, do not get 
employed in this way.  This leads Lormand to create the “Explanation Condition.”  A theory 
of moods, on Lormand’s view, has to accommodate this difference in how moods and 
emotions get deployed in action explanation. 
Here, I do not accept even a superficial account of this distinction between moods and 
emotions.  First, I think that Lormand gets off to a bad start with his dog-kicking example.  In 
this culture, anyone kicking a dog has a lot of explaining to do, bad mood or no.  So let us 
change it to door-slamming.  “He slammed the door because he was in a bad mood.”  There 
is certainly a sense in which bad moods cause us to behave in all kinds of ways, including 
door slamming.  But so do emotions.  Anger certainly causes us to slam doors.  We may 
angrily slam a door because we wish to communicate our anger to another. 
But we may also have no reason, no practical motivations that produce the door-
slamming.  So when someone says, “I slammed the door because I was angry,” we may ask 
why.  The answer might be related to aims held by the agent, or it might simply be, “I was 
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just really mad.”  And that will be the end of it.  In fact, Peter Goldie argues that “…no 
genuine expression of emotion is done as a means to some further end.”16 Of course, this 
type of explanation will not cover any action the person performs while experiencing an 
emotion.  If a person bursts into yodeling and, when asked why, responds “I was just really 
mad,” more explanation will be needed.  Different emotions have different actions that can 
be explained in a final way by appeal to an emotion.  Anger will typically produce actions 
that have some component of violence.  Sadness often produces crying.  Positive emotions 
can play out in the same way.  Happiness may hook up with practical motivations and lead us 
to kiss a loved one.  But it can just as easily cause such behaviour with no additional end in 
mind.  No intention to kiss the loved one is needed, nor belief that some practical goal will be 
thereby achieved.  You can simply be happy and find yourself unexpectedly, happily, 
pressing your lips to your sweetheart’s cheek.17 
Additionally, there is no shortage of practical motivations served by mood-induced 
behaviour.  Anyone who has spent an afternoon with a bored teenager knows that a sigh is 
rarely simply caused by her mood.  Her mood of boredom has several associated goals, 
notably, to be entertained.  The teenager is communicating her mood and that goal and doing 
so in a way that is quite likely to inspire surrounding adults to respond to her.  Thus, it seems 
to me that both moods and emotions can enter into explanations in a purely causal way, and 
both moods and emotions can enter into explanations as part of an account of practical 
motivations.  So when we consider various theories of moods, I will not be holding them 
accountable to Lormand’s “Explanation Condition.” 
 
16 Goldie 2000, 25. 
17 Rosalind Hursthouse makes essentially this same point in her paper, “Arational Actions.”  (Hursthouse 1991.) 
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4.  Intentional theories of moods 
In light of the discussion of the previous sections, I think an account of moods will have to 
be able to say something about their intentionality, linked both with occasioning intentional 
objects and immediate (apparent) intentional objects.  Further, the account will have to 
accommodate the pervasiveness of moods.  Moods also often seem to be of longer duration 
and lesser intensity than emotions – this, too, should find a place in a fully adequate account 
of moods.  Lormand discusses four types of intentional accounts of moods, and I agree with 
him that there are serious problems with each of the intentional accounts he considers.  Let 
me present them, and quickly run through their shortcomings. 
The first two theories do not seem to really get off the ground at all, and it is not clear to 
me that anyone actually endorses them.  First, there is what Lormand calls the Duration 
Theory: “Moods are simply prolonged emotions.”  Here the central problem is thinness.  
While there is something right about the central observation – most moods last longer than 
most emotions – it does not grapple with any other features of moods.  This account makes 
no effort to say anything about either intentionality or pervasiveness. 
Second, there is what Lormand calls the Summation Theory: “Moods are sums of 
conscious emotions.”  According to Lormand, Wayne Davis is a proponent of this position.18 
I find this the strangest account of moods.  To my mind, it fails before it even gets off the 
ground because it so completely ignores so much of the experienced phenomenon of moods.  
While it is certainly the case that if one is experiencing the emotion, happiness, for example, 
one’s mood is typically going to be positive.  Conversely, if one is afraid, then one’s mood is 
typically going to be negative.  But there is no necessary connection between them.  It is 
 
18 Davis 1981 actually argues that moods are the sums of all conscious mental states, not just emotions.  But I 
do not think this difference matters to the criticisms I and Lormand have for Davis’ analysis. 
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possible for someone experiencing profound depression to have a moment of happiness, 
without their underlying depression being eroded.  Emotions and moods influence each other, 
but they can come into existence and persist independently.19 Additionally, as Lormand 
points out, this theory cannot accommodate the “Pervasiveness Condition,” which rests on 
the observation that the mood someone is in effects, in substantial ways, much of how she 
then sees the world.  This causation runs opposite to the direction proposed by the 
“Summation Theory,” which holds that moods follow already extant mental states.  
Third, there is what Lormand calls the Precondition Theory: “Moods are necessary for 
emotions.”  This account has a little bit more substance as well as some actual proponents, 
primarily among psychologists.20 Vincent Nowlis and Brian Parkinson et al., for example, 
argue that moods are pre/dispositions to have emotions.21 William Morris and Paul Ekman 
argue that the main function of moods is to “alter the threshold for excitation of particular 
emotions.”22 Here, too, as with the “Duration Theory,” I think there is a central accurate 
observation.  Moods do seem to incline us to move more easily into emotions.  In fact there 
are patterns to such inclinations.  Being irritated can incline one to become angry, being 
depressed can incline one to become sad.  This account, however, is surely not exhaustive. 
 
19 I should point out that this is not the criticism that Lormand uses against the “Summation Theory.”   Lormand 
rejects the “Summation Theory” because it fails to meet his “Explanation Condition.”  As I do not think the 
“Explanation Condition” should be employed, I will not discuss his analysis. 
20 Lormand claims that Martin Heidegger holds this kind of view.  I am not convinced that this is the best 
interpretation of Heidegger.  For Heidegger, moods “disclose ways of mattering” (1972, 137), which is 
considerably more complicated than Lormand’s “Precondition Theory.”  (See Quentin Smith 1981 for a 
discussion.)  I have opted, however, not to discuss Heidegger’s analysis in this dissertation.  Heidegger places 
moods at the center of his analysis of what it is to be human.  Thus, understanding Heidegger’s analysis of 
moods requires understanding his full metaphysical account of human beings and the world they inhabit.  This 
task was beyond the scope of my project here. 
21 Nowlis 1963 and Parkinson et al. 1996. 
22 Ekman 1994, 57.  See Morris 1999 for corroborating analysis. 
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First, we can have moods that persist for long periods of time without leading to any 
additional emotion.  These moods are phenomenally experienced and seem occurrent, rather 
than dispositional.  Second, sometimes the relationship between an emotion and a mood runs 
the other way.  Moods often seem to be the ‘leftovers’ of an emotion, such that anxiety 
persists after an episode of fear.  Finally, if the idea behind the “Precondition Theory” is the 
strong claim that experiencing a mood first is necessary in order to experience an emotion, it 
clearly fails.  It would mean that for someone to become afraid of something, she would have 
to be in the predisposing mood.  But what of waking up to a loud noise and immediately 
being afraid?  Does this mean she was sleeping anxiously prior to the emotion?  Perhaps she 
went through a very brief anxiousness prior to entering the full emotion state of fear?  It 
looks like one would have to be in every mood simultaneously and constantly to account for 
our ability to enter into a wide range of emotions very suddenly.  While there is a link 
between many emotion episodes and moods, the claim that moods predispose us to have 
emotions is not the only context in which moods are experienced.  So we need some way of 
making sense of moods independent from emotions, which this theory cannot accommodate. 
Fourth, there is what Lormand calls the Generalization Theory: “Moods are general 
emotions.”  This position is the most important intentional account that has been offered.  
The idea is simply that the intentional object(s) of a mood state is very general.  It has been 
held by Anthony Kenny, 23 Robert Solomon, and, more recently, by Jose Arregui.  For each 
of them, moods are not sharply distinguished from emotions.  The central difference is 
simply that unlike emotions, a mood’s intentional object is the whole world.  Kenny, for 
example, writes that “…pointless depression is not objectless, and the objects of depression 
 
23 It is worth noting that Kenny has changed his position on moods and intentionality in later works.  In The 
Metaphysics of Mind (1989, 57) he argues that moods have only inadequate intentional objects. 
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are the things which seem black.”24 Solomon writes that “…moods are about nothing in 
particular, or sometimes they are about our world as a whole.”25 Arregui claims that “…the 
object of moods is the world as a whole evaluated in a determinate way, that is, under a 
determinate description.”26 
I think Solomon, Kenny and Arregui are focusing on what might be immediate (apparent) 
intentional objects and setting aside concern with occasioning intentional objects.  It seems 
clear to me that the whole world or a person’s total experiences generally cannot serve as the 
occasioning intentional object of a mood.  Instead, a mood exists and the whole world is seen 
in light of it.  The mood feature that I think they are concerned with is the way that moods 
“colour” or “frame” a mood-experiencer’s entire experience, as I discussed when presenting 
the “Pervasiveness Condition.”  Solomon writes that certain moods “[cast] happy glows or 
somber shadows.”27 Lormand rightly disparages this metaphorical characterization – more 
detail is needed.  First, I will present Lormand’s criticism of the “Generalization Theory,” 
and explain why I am not convinced by his critique.  Then I will present Claire Armon-
Jones’ criticism, and again argue that her analysis misses the mark.  Finally, I will present my 
own concerns with the “Generalization Theory.” 
Lormand begins his criticisms of the “Generalization Theory” by arguing that it fails to 
meet his “Explanation Condition.”  As I have already argued, however, this condition is not 
one that theories of moods should be subjected to.  In addition to this worry, Lormand argues 
 
24 Kenny 1963, 61. 
25 Solomon 1976, 173. 
26 Arregui 1997, 407. 
27 Solomon 1976, 173. 
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that the “Generalization Theory” cannot accommodate the moods’ lack of “cognitive 
penetrability.”  The basic observation is that a person can change her beliefs associated with 
the (apparent) general intentional objects of her mood but not see any change in her actual 
mood state.  Lormand’s observation here is accurate.  If Kate is depressed and takes 
everything around her e.g. the weather, the facial expression of others she sees, as objects of 
her depression, a change in those objects, even a change that results in a change in Kate’s 
beliefs, will not end her depression.  The weather could improve, people could smile, and 
Kate could recognise each of these alterations, but her depression will likely persist.  But this 
is no way to draw a distinction between moods and emotions, as lack of cognitive 
penetrability is also a feature of many emotions.  If you are home alone and hear a noise that 
you think is a possible intruder, you may well become afraid, call a friend and get him to 
come over with a baseball bat.  When you then discover that the noise was an opossum 
rooting through leaves in your front yard, you know immediately that you do not have reason 
to be afraid.  But your fear will not go away so quickly.  You will continue to have an 
elevated heart rate, continue to have sweaty palms, and continue to jump at other unusual 
noises. 
Importantly, even though you fully endorse the claim that there never was an intruder and 
there was only ever an opossum, you will continue to surreptitiously look in the bushes when 
your friend is not looking.  You know there is no intruder to discover.  You do not hold any 
representational content that continues to endorse the possibility that an intruder is present.  
But a simple belief change does not disengage your fear, and you will continue to manifest 
certain behaviour, namely, continued investigation into the possibility of a threat, even when 
your beliefs give you grounds for certainty that such investigations are not needed. Thus it 
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seems clear that recalcitrance or lack of cognitive penetrability is not a feature exclusive to 
moods.   
Further, it should be pointed out that the phenomenon of ‘recalcitrant emotions’ is a 
standard objection to strongly cognitivist positions on the emotions.  In a strong cognitivist 
account of the emotions, emotions just are beliefs or judgements.  A theory like this will 
indeed have problems explaining recalcitrance.  According to Lormand, under the 
“Generalization Theory,” moods too are constituted by and reducible to beliefs and desires 
about the whole world.  If this is the view, then it does look like moods should cease to exist 
once those constituting beliefs and desires cease to exist.  But there is nothing in the 
“Generalization Theory” by itself that commits a theorist to also hold that moods are 
constituted by beliefs and desires regarding those general object(s).28 Different theories of 
emotions handle the issue of recalcitrance differently, typically starting with not treating 
emotions as reducible to or equivalent with associated beliefs.  I do not see why the same 
plurality of options that exist for intentional theorists of emotions do not also exist for 
theorists of moods.  Thus, I am not convinced that Lormand’s criticisms are decisive against 
the “Generalization Theory.”   
Claire Armon-Jones also provides criticisms of intentional theories of moods, and they are 
primarily directed at arguments that fit (roughly) in the “Generalization Theory” camp.29 She 
discusses cases where someone describes her mood as “depressed about everything.”  For 
Armon-Jones, a mental state can only be intentional if the objects of the state can be 
 
28 I should acknowledge that the version of the “Generalization Theory” offered by Solomon (in his 1976 book, 
The Passions) and possibly Kenny and Arregui are open to the ‘cognitive penetrability’ argument Lormand 
gives.  My point here is simply that there is nothing in the “Generalizability Theory” per se that requires being 
open to this objection. 
29 Armon-Jones 1991, 61-65. 
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described independently of the state itself.  She insists that if the depression truly is ‘about 
everything,’ then the person “…is not depressed about any particular thing or things, which is 
surely a case of depression without object.”30 
Of course, often, someone who is depressed will often say, “I’m depressed about 
everything” or “Everything is depressing to me.”  But saying it does not make it so.  When 
pressed, the depressed person can typically identify many things that they are depressed 
about, but more, they can identify things they are not depressed about.  This is not actually 
something that Armon-Jones denies.  She acknowledges that someone may say that they are 
“depressed about everything,” when in fact she is depressed only about things related to her 
personal life. This kind of depression does count as intentional for Armon-Jones, since 
objects related to the depression sufferer’s personal life can be described independently of 
the sufferer’s depression.  But she claims that most instances of depression are indeed about 
everything, and thus, about nothing at all.  But again, as with Lormand, I think Armon-Jones 
is led to her position by considering only cases of a mood’s immediate (apparent) intentional 
objects, rather than looking for a mood’s occasioning intentional object.  It is true that moods 
can end up playing a role in how a mood-experiencer perceives the ‘whole world.’  In such a 
mood, ‘everything’ is taken as the mood-experiencer’s immediate (apparent) intentional 
object.  But this only happens once a mood exists.  It says nothing about how that mood 
comes to be. 
Of course, I have already discussed some reservations I have with considering immediate 
(apparent) intentional objects intentional at all.  Divorced as they are from the mood’s causal 
history, they have a kind of borrowed intentionality that puts their intentional status in 
 
30 Ibid. 63. 
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question.  Since versions of the “Generalization Theory” are focusing on immediate 
(apparent) intentional objects (ignoring the mood’s occasioning intentionality), they are 
subject to these worries about the extent to which these states are fully intentional, at least in 
the way that emotions are intentional. 
But in addition to these worries, I think the “Generalization Theory” faces another 
problem, related to a criterion of intentionality needed to distinguish it from causation – the 
possibility of misrepresentation.  A state that is exclusively non-intentionally caused cannot 
misrepresent its cause.  But an intentional state has to be able to misrepresent its intentional 
object.  I am not sure how an intentional object like “the whole world” can be 
misrepresented.  It seems to me that in order for misrepresentation to be possible, there needs 
to be a particular object that can be investigated.  This concern, coupled with the worries 
about the specificity of the intentionality possible with immediate (apparent) intentional 
objects, makes me unwilling to endorse a “Generalization Theory” for moods. 
 
5.  Non-intentional theories of moods 
Eric Lormand’s argument in favour of non-intentionality is an argument by elimination.  
He provides his three “conditions of adequacy” that he thinks theories of moods must meet.  
He then considers four intentional accounts of moods and argues that each fails to meet at 
least one of the conditions.  But under my analysis, one of Lormand’s conditions – the 
“Explanation Condition” – should be completely eliminated. Further, I substantially recast 
his “Intentionality Condition” in light of the distinction between occasioning and immediate 
(apparent) intentional objects.  With this new set of conditions, Lormand fails to eliminate 
one of the intentional accounts of moods that he presents, which means he has failed to show 
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that moods must be non-intentional.  Of course, I have provided my own reasons why the 
“Generalization Theory” is inadequate.  I aim to show in my remaining chapters that the 
intentionality of moods is not best captured by positing general intentionality, but rather can 
be found in a thorough exploration of the causal origins of at least some moods. 
Lormand does provide a positive non-intentional account of moods.  He claims that 
moods set the parameters of which of our intentional states (beliefs, desires, and emotions) 
become active.  For Lormand, moods are the sieve through which intentional states pass, and 
different moods “catch” different intentional states, although with respect to how that 
mechanism works Lormand is forced to remain silent.   He is sure, however, that such a sieve 
is not, itself, intentional.  I do not actually wish to take issue with the ‘sieve’ proposal per se.  
It seems to me, as Lormand acknowledges, that making this case requires substantial 
empirical data tracking each of these mental states in an effort to sort them out.  These data, 
as yet, simply do not exist.  It is worth noting, however, that this proposal focuses on how 
moods work once they exist.  This theory is an effort to grapple with Lormand’s 
“Pervasiveness Condition.”  But this account does not grapple with how moods come into 
existence, and it seems to me that it is not incompatible with moods being intentional, 
particularly with respect to the possibility of having occasioning intentional objects.  It seems 
possible that part of the mechanism of such a sieve might be linked to representations linked 
with such an occasioning intentional object.  There is nothing in Lormand’s analysis that 
rules this possibility out. 
I think similar claims are true of other substantial theories of moods recently offered by 
philosophers.  Laura Sizer, for example, begins presenting her theory of moods by saying: 
“By moods, I mean generalized, nonspecific affective states like melancholy, ennui or 
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ebullience.”31 Sizer’s starting point basically presupposes moods’ non-intentionality, which 
is to beg the question with which I am concerned.  Her theory is computational, arguing that 
moods bias cognitive operations.  In broad outline, it is quite similar to Lormand’s view, and 
is concerned primarily to explain how moods affect other mental states once the mood exists 
(that is, to explain moods’ pervasiveness).  But again, this focus is on moods already in 
existence.  It does not address how a mood state comes into existence, and is not 
incompatible with a mood having an occasioning intentional object.  Finally, Paul Griffiths, 
too, simply assumes that moods are non-intentional, and then goes on to argue for an 
evolutionarily adaptive function fulfilled by extant moods.32 In remaining silent about the 
manner in which moods arise, Griffiths’ view, too, does not rule out an intentional analysis of 
moods with respect to occasioning intentional objects. 
 
6.  Final caveats 
In making the case for moods as potentially intentional states, I will be emphasising 
cognitive content.  Intentional objects are linked to representational content like beliefs, 
judgements or construals.  Thus, if moods are intentional, they become candidates to be 
understood in ways like emotions are understood within cognitive theories.  There may be a 
temptation to assume that I am arguing for a strong cognitive account of moods, similar 
perhaps to cognitive accounts of emotions offered by Robert Solomon and Martha 
Nussbaum, where emotions are equated with their associated beliefs.  This is not at all the 
view I wish to propose.  Moods, even intentional ones, are not reducible to beliefs or any 
 
31 Sizer 2000, 744. 
32 Griffiths 1997, 248-257. 
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other kind of exclusively cognitive events.  Moods include many elements – including 
cognitions, feelings, physiological components, and behavioural tendencies.  My emphasis 
on cognitions should not be taken as an effort to reduce moods to cognitions. 
Recall an argument from Lormand I presented earlier against mood intentionality, due to a 
lack of ‘cognitive penetrability’ found in moods.  I think Lormand’s rejection of an 
intentional account of moods is partly due to his own endorsement of a strongly cognitive 
account of the emotions.  Lormand worries about the lack of moods’ “cognitive 
penetrability” – that is, you can change the beliefs associated with the apparent intentional 
objects of moods but not see any change in the mood state.  This is true.  But on my view, 
this lack of full cognitive penetrability only establishes that moods are not exclusively 
cognitive.  Moods have many components and once a mood has come into existence, often 
the elimination of a single one of its components, e.g. its associated beliefs, will not be 
enough to discontinue the mood. 
Lormand thinks that this lack of cognitive penetrability is a signal of mood’s non-
intentionality.  There are several problems with this position.  First, as a way to distinguish 
non-intentional moods from intentional emotions, it does not work, as many emotions are 
also cognitively impenetrable (this was my point in the earlier discussion about fear that 
arises as a result of the noise of an opossum in the yard).  Second, there is considerable 
cognitive penetrability with moods.  I will cover this evidence in more detail in the 
depression and BPD chapters, but there is strong evidence that exclusively cognitive 
therapies have considerable therapeutic efficacy, and even more when combined with 
pharmaceutical interventions. 
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In this light, let me say some things about the connection between moods and rationality 
or reasonableness.  Those who are willing to consider emotions as having a cognitive 
element often talk about emotions being ir/rational or un/reasonable.  The same is often said 
about moods.  Kate’s irritation may be declared to be reasonable or unreasonable.  This 
ascription to emotions and moods is certainly part of our folk psychology.  But I think this 
ascription is misleading, both in the case of emotions and moods.  Let me first try to explain 
why I think the ascription is so common, and then I will explain how I think it can lead us 
astray. 
First, as I mentioned earlier, when an affective state is seen to have an intentional object, it 
becomes identified with representational content.  Thus, if moods are intentional, they 
become candidates to be understood in ways like emotions are understood within cognitive 
theories.  As soon as we start talking about the beliefs that are partly constitutive of an ‘anger 
episode’ or a ‘depression episode,’ we invoke epistemological considerations.  Is the 
emotion’s / mood’s concomitant representational content justified?  If yes, then the emotion / 
mood is rational.  If no, then the emotion / mood is irrational.  Talking in terms of cognitions 
like beliefs opens the door to normative evaluation, captured in terms like ir/rational or 
un/reasonable.33 
The worry is that terms ir/rational or un/reasonable, once attributed to emotions and 
moods, make emotions and moods fundamentally cognitive.  But while I will argue for a 
cognitive feature to some moods, and I accept that emotions, too, have a cognitive feature, 
they certainly are not exclusively cognitive states.  As I just argued, emotions and moods 
have many non-cognitive elements.  Instances in which anger might be warranted will be 
 
33 This is a problem I think is found in Patricia Greenspan’s work.  See for example, Greenspan 2003. 
30
considerably different from instances in which a concomitant anger-belief, like “Paul just did 
something unjust to me” might be warranted. 
Peter Goldie has a similar worry.  He argues that philosophers that take a cognitive 
position about the emotions end up endorsing an “add-on theory” of the emotions.  They 
characterise the intentionality of emotions in terms of beliefs or desires or perceptions.  Then, 
to capture the phenomenology of emotions, they “add-on” other emotion features like 
feelings.  Goldie insists that “an adequate account of an emotion’s intentionality, of its 
directedness towards the world outside one’s body, will at the same time capture an 
important aspect of its phenomenology.”34 The same is true with moods and concomitant 
mood beliefs.  Deciding whether or not someone’s depression is warranted is a very different 
investigation from deciding whether or not someone’s belief “The world is a disappointing 
place and I’m a disappointing person” is warranted. 35 
Although I worry about the use of assessments of ir/rationality or un/reasonableness with 
moods (and emotions), I do think that moods (and emotions) can be normatively evaluated.   
There are standards of fit that can be applied to the relationship between a mood and its 
object, but they are not the same standards as those applied to a belief / object pair.  In many 
instances, these standards are not especially mysterious.  When we learn of someone being in 
some mood, we can ask why they are in that mood.  We then assess whether or not their 
response has adequate justificatory force.  I think these standards primarily come to us from 
our folk psychology, although they are not easily fully specified.  I will be discussing ‘fit’ 
between specific moods and their objects in my case discussions of depression and BPD. 
 
34 Goldie 2002, 242. 
35 Aaron Ben Ze’ev endorses a similar position.  See Ben Ze’ev 2003. 
31
Another way to put this is the common locution that a mood either is or is not 
‘appropriate.’ This strikes me as preferable to the assessment of a mood’s reasonableness or 
rationality (for the reasons just discussed).  I wish to point out, however, that ‘appropriate’ 
can be assessed along several dimensions.  Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson have argued 
that there are three distinct senses of ‘appropriate’ for emotions.36 First, emotions can be 
fittingly ‘appropriate,’ that is, an emotion can fit with its intentional object.  There is a rough 
fit found between negative events and negative emotions, and between positive events and 
positive emotions.37 But fit is typically more finely differentiated.  For example, Jessica 
might learn that her spouse is having an affair or that a loved one has died.  For Jessica, both 
the affair and the death are negative events.  But we think the negative emotion of jealousy 
fits with the affair as its intentional object, while grief fits the death as its intentional object.  
On the positive side, Jessica might receive both a good grade and a lovely gift.  Both are 
positive events for Jessica.  The positive emotion of pride fits with a good grade as its 
intentional object, while it typically would be misplaced if it took the lovely gift as its 
intentional object.38 This possibility of fit between emotions and intentional objects is 
signaled by many adjectives.  Someone may describe an object or event as ‘enviable,’ 
‘pitiable,’ or ‘saddening.’  In those cases, the speaker is claiming that envy, pity, or sadness 
were among the responses that would have been fitting in response to seeing those objects or 
experiencing those events, even if the speaker did not herself experience those emotions. 
 
36 D’Arms and Jacobson 2000. 
37 There can be exceptions to this general rule. 
38 Of course there might be cases where jealousy fits with a death and pride with receipt of a lovely gift.  But for 
this to be plausible there would need to be rather curious circumstances to make these emotion / object pairings 
fitting.  The explanation of the circumstances would need to show how the fit arises. 
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Second, emotions can be prudentially ‘appropriate,’ that is, experiencing that emotion 
serves some prudential goal.  Consider a case of a person whose employer treats her badly.  
Becoming angry at such treatment could be a fitting response.  If, however, she cannot afford 
to quit the job or antagonize her employer, and she finds being angry without acting on that 
anger very uncomfortable, then her anger may be prudentially inappropriate.  All things 
considered, we can imagine a situation where someone ought not experience anger out of 
prudential considerations, even though her anger might fit its intentional object. 
Finally, emotions can be morally ‘appropriate,’ that is, they are morally appropriate to 
experience, all things considered.  Imagine a case of a toddler hitting you intentionally (not 
accidentally).  In general, there is good fit between being intentionally hit and becoming 
angry.  But in this case with this particular toddler, you know that while the child did intend 
to hit you, she did not intend the harms that come with being hit.  She is sufficiently young 
that she does not truly appreciate what it means to hit someone.  In a case like this, even 
though there is a fit between you being intentionally hit and you becoming angry, if you 
actually become angry there is a lack of moral appropriateness in your anger.  Your anger is 
fitting, and we may even sympathise with it.  But if you experience anger, it signals your 
failure to appreciate the child’s position, and as such is not fully morally appropriate.  I 
believe these same distinct types of assessment can happen with moods.  Moods, too, can be 
fittingly, prudentially and morally appropriate, as I will explore in my later chapters. 
As a final point, I wish to make clear that, in addition to not believing that moods are 
exclusively cognitive, I also do not think that all moods or all instances of some particular 
mood are intentionally caused.  It seems clear to me that one may become irritated 
exclusively as a consequence of a headache – there is no occasioning intentional object.  
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Further, although this irritated mood will inform how you see the world, you may well never 
take up any particular things in the world and have them as full-blooded intentional objects 
of that irritation.  This does seem to establish that some moods are non-intentional. 
But I would also like to point out that this feature of moods does not establish a route to a 
distinction between moods and emotions, as there are similar cases with emotions.  Consider 
stubbing your toe on the small and easily overlooked stool in your kitchen when you are in a 
rush to get out the door and to the airport.  One common response is to become angry, 
immediately.  Those who endorse a strongly cognitivist account of emotion insist that one 
becomes angry about something.  But in a case like this, what are you angry about?  The 
strong cognitivist might insist that you are angry about stubbing your toe.  But clearly your 
anger exists prior to any thoughts about toe-stubbing.  In fact, you are more likely to be angry 
at the stool.  You will almost certainly look angrily at the stool and perhaps even say some 
angry things in its general direction.  But it is unlikely that you truly take yourself to be angry 
at the stool.  Your anger needs an object and so you mistakenly reach out and grab one.  But 
actually, your anger does not have an intentional object, at least not a particular intentional 
object – it is caused in the absence of intentionality.39 
As I have argued, moods elude easy characterisation relative to emotions in several 
respects, notably with regard to their intentionality and their pervasiveness.  As I have 
discussed, moods take up many more immediate (apparent) intentional objects than emotions 
typically do.  They constitute our way of seeing the world much more broadly than emotions 
typically do.  This, I think, is the primary distinction between moods and emotions.  It seems 
 
39 Those who argue for the distinction between formal and particular objects may consider even this stool-
caused anger to be intentional in a formal sense (see e.g. Prinz 2004).  But I will not be concerned with formal 
intentional objects in this dissertation. 
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to me that this is a difference in degree, rather than a difference in kind.  Thus it seems to me 
that moods are more like emotions than the non-intentional mood account acknowledges.  
Despite this lack of a sharp distinction between emotions and moods, however, I think the 
difference is striking enough that moods warrant their own exploration. 
CHAPTER II 
MEDICAL APPROACHES TO DEPRESSION 
 
Depression, as I mentioned in my introductory chapter, is one of the paradigmatic 
instances of a mood.  Additionally, depression is considered a ‘mood disorder’ and is 
currently the most commonly diagnosed psychiatric disorder.  According to the experts, the 
prevalence of diagnosable depressive disorders in North America is staggering.  Researchers 
estimate that North Americans have about an 18% chance, over a lifetime, of suffering a 
major depressive episode, and another 6.5% chance of suffering dysthymia (a chronic 
depressed affective state, less intense than found in major depressive disorder, that persists 
over years).1 These prevalence rates are considerably higher than any clinician would have 
estimated early in the last century. 
In the previous chapter, I argued that philosophical accounts of moods often deny that 
moods can be intentional.  In this chapter, I will explore how medicine denies intentionality 
to the mood that is diagnosable depression.  Given that the limits of diagnosable depression 
are expanding rapidly, this means that a lot of depression (broadly understood) is now or will 
be soon taken to be non-intentional within medical practice.  This means that the mood of 
depression is under pressure to be seen as non-intentional from two directions, philosophical 
and medical. 
 
1 Kessler et al. 1994. The odds for women are substantially higher: 21% and 8%, respectively.  For men, it’s 
13% and 5%. 
36
1. Worries about pathologisation 
Why is the diagnosis and prevalence of depression on the rise?  Most people believe that 
this is the result of a greater level of awareness about depression among both clinicians and 
the general public.  In fact, however, the increase in the diagnosis rate is largely the result of 
the pathologisation of moods that would have previously been considered low moods in the 
normal range.  (For my purposes, to pathologise a phenomenon is to subsume it under current 
mainstream medical practice and treat it as a medical disease.)  Evidence for this claim can 
be found in the manual used to diagnose psychiatric disorders in North America, the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. The DSM is the central diagnostic 
authority on mental disorders in North America.  Currently in use is the DSM fourth edition, 
text revision, or DSM-IV-TR. It contains nine diagnostic symptoms of depression:  
(1) depressed mood 
(2) decreased pleasure in typically pleasurable activities, including sex  
(3) poor appetite / weight loss or increased appetite / weight gain 
(4) insomnia or hypersomnia 
(5) psychomotor agitation / retardation 
(6) fatigue 
(7) negative self-assessment 
(8) trouble concentrating / indecisiveness 
(9) suicidal ideation 
 
For a diagnosis of major depressive disorder, a patient must suffer five of the possible 
nine symptoms, which must include either symptom (1) or (2), and these symptoms must 
have been present every day, almost all day, for at least two weeks.2 Many criteria that were 
used to limit which people could count as pathologically depressed in earlier editions have 
been either loosened or removed all together.   
 
2 APA 2000.  
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But most people, clinicians and the public more broadly, are confident that drawing a 
distinction between normal low mood and depression is a straightforward enterprise.  Such a 
distinction would protect our everyday ‘blue’ states from being designated disease states, 
and, so long as this is secure, there is little aversion toward having much or most low mood 
pathologised.  I intend to show, however, that currently there is a strong push within medical 
practice towards blurring the distinction.  Once we understand how medical practice 
currently works, we can see why more and more cases of low mood that once were 
considered normal are now being understood as pathological instances of depression.   
In sections 2 and 3 of this chapter, I will explain how the pathologising process is led by a 
dominant approach with current medical practice, what I will call Medical Model A.  
Medical Model A emphasises physiological causation and treatment.  In sections 4-6, I will 
explore the features of Medical Model A that I think significantly explains why the 
diagnostic rate for depression has increased so dramatically.  In section 7, I will also explore 
a second model of medical practice, Medical Model B, which makes room for environmental 
effects on physiological pathologies.  Throughout the chapter, I will argue that the ultimate 
result of both of these current medical practices is an implicit denial of intentionality to an 
increasing number of instances of depression / low mood states.  I will not assume that these 
medical models take a position with respect to the general intentionality of moods.  I will 
argue, however, that once depression becomes subsumed by these medical models under a 
diagnosis, that is, once depression is seen as pathological, then it is no longer engaged with 
as an intentional state.  This is primarily the result of the treatments associated with both of 
these models, which do not incorporate engagement with intentional features of the 
phenomena they aim to eliminate.  I think this ends up being consistent with our ‘folk 
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medicine,’ in which diseases are not intentional, in both senses of ‘intentional.’  If you have a 
disease, your symptoms are not under your control, that is, they are not intended.  
Additionally, there is a general presumption that diseases are not intentional in the sense that 
I have been discussing, that is, diseases are not about anything.  To the extent that these 
models purport to and are taken to provide a full account of the pathological phenomena they 
subsume, this clinical practice of non-engagement is tantamount to a denial that the state has 
an intentional component at all.  I will argue that broad pathologising of low moods/ 
depression is a mistake.  It both mischaracterises moods and potentially undermines fully 
morally adequate responses to the suffering encountered with depression. 
Before I delve into my analysis, however, I need to explain how I will use certain terms.  
'Depression' is commonly used to designate both a pathological state (linked to the medical 
diagnosis of depression) and a sad mood.  For clarity, I will use the term 'depression' for what 
is commonly now considered a pathological state, as contrasted against what I will call 
‘normal low mood.’3
2.  Medical Model A:  The physiological version of the low mood/ depression distinction 
The prototypes for medical diseases are (apparently) clear-cut pathologies like diabetes or 
cancer.  According to Ian Hacking, in the current medical climate “the names for real 
illnesses have objective, individuated referents; scientific metaphysics and popular science 
alike demand that the referent is biochemical, neurological, organic, something that could in 
 
3 It might seem more natural to use the term ‘sadness’ here, rather than the cumbersome ‘normal low mood’ 
locution.  Sadness, however, is commonly used for both emotion and mood states.  I wish to remain clear that 
my concern is with mood. 
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principle be isolated in the laboratory.”4 What Hacking is describing in this quote is what is 
commonly referred to as the ‘medical model.’  The ‘medical model’ is the set of beliefs held 
by medical practitioners and educators about what a disease is, what the roles of various 
medical practitioners are, what the goals of treatment should be, and what counts as a cure.  
Because the practice of medicine in this culture is so large, there is considerable 
heterogeneity within the medical model.  In this section, I will discuss one such model, 
Medical Model A.  The influence of Medical Model A is substantial among the clinicians and 
researchers who analyse psychopathologies.   
Within Medical Model A, clinicians and researchers understand diseases exclusively as 
physiological pathologies.  For example, according to a recent volume on disease and its 
origins used by a variety of medical schools, “the cause of disease comprises either a 
[physical] event that overwhelms homeostatic mechanisms (an extrinsic cause) or one that 
undermines them (an intrinsic cause).”5 These pathological events will typically manifest 
themselves in physiological symptoms.  Different causes will result in different symptoms 
and the aim of diagnosis is to provide a taxonomy that aligns symptoms and causes through 
explication of a common physical causal mechanism.  Treatment should ideally be directed at 
that underlying intrinsic or extrinsic pathology.  On this model, mental diseases are 
physiologically grounded brain malfunctions that result in unpleasant psychological states. 
Establishing this physiological underpinning also establishes the non-volitional quality of 
the disease in question.  This is important in a variety of respects, notably because, as I 
mentioned earlier, there is a link within our folk medicine between disease and lack of 
 
4 Hacking 1998, 10. 
5 Scriver et al.  2001-2005. 
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responsibility.6 On the dominant cultural view, having a medical disease confers certain 
privileges on the sufferer.  To have a medical disease is to abdicate certain responsibilities — 
it is not your fault that you are unwell, and because you are unwell, you do not face the same 
obligations that you would otherwise have to meet.  This privilege ought only to be bestowed 
upon those who really cannot help their condition.  If a mental disease has an underpinning in 
physiological malfunction, then surely its symptoms are not under conscious (or 
unconscious) control and medical doctors are the right kind of experts to respond to it. 
Sometimes, questioning the legitimacy of characterising a particular psychological 
phenomenon as a mental disease is intended to ensure that the phenomenon is not the product 
of (sub)conscious efforts by patient, physician or community at large.  This is, for example, 
largely the motivation behind raising critical questions about the diagnosis of multiple 
personality disorder.  There is a desire to be certain that neither sufferer nor doctor nor mass 
hysteria is ‘making it up.’ There is also a need to ensure that the unpleasant psychological 
state in question is not simply a normal part of being a person.  This is the motivation behind 
questioning diseases like attention deficit disorder.  Calling very active and inattentive 
children (typically boys) ‘sick’ worries many, since we think it is part of normal human 
variation for at least some children, notably boys, to be very active and inattentive.  In 
additional to non-volitionality, typically diseases are considered to be pathologies that are 
beyond the scope of normal, or reasonable, human experience. 
 
6 There are, of course, exceptions to this view.  Smokers with lung cancer are clearly considered to have a 
disease but they may still be held responsible for it.  I do not believe, however, that persons who are seen to 
have clear cases of mental disorders are in this category.  To the extent that some non-clinicians do hold persons 
with, say, schizophrenia, responsible for their symptomatic behaviour, I think it is because they are not seeing 
the phenomena exclusively as a disease. 
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Both low mood and current cases of diagnosed depression certainly qualify as unpleasant 
psychological states, but many instances seem to be states that are normal, an ordinary part of 
human experience.  Everyone experiences a low mood sometimes, and moreover, as I 
mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, the prevalence of diagnosable depressive 
disorders in North America is staggering.  I think the sheer normalcy of low mood / 
depressed experiences should prompt skepticism about whether or not many of these are 
genuinely pathological phenomena.   
This idea that mental diseases are only real if they are malfunctions grounded in 
physiology or materially caused rests on the commitments currently held by Medical Model 
A.  Further, Medical Model A demands that practitioners ought to aim to eliminate mental 
disorders by fixing those deviant physiological causes, and the elimination of physiological 
dysfunction is best accomplished through material, namely, pharmaceutical, intervention.  As 
the cause of the disease is material, so too must be its cure.  A common unwarranted 
corollary to this position is the idea that if there is a material treatment for an unpleasant 
psychological state, then there can be confidence that this psychological state is a mental 
disease.  Treatment in this instance just means that the unpleasantness of the psychological 
state is eliminated. 
It is my contention that these (implicit) beliefs are evident in the expansion of depressive 
diagnoses.  Further, I believe that this expansion has been fueled by the advent of new anti-
depressant pharmaceutical interventions.  In order to establish this claim, I must first show 
that depressive diagnoses have in fact been expanding, and then show that there is reason to 
believe that availability of new drug therapies has motivated it. 
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3. The remarkable expansion of depressive diagnostic categories 
The claim that the pathologisation of depression is expanding to encompass more 
‘normal’ variants thereof is not one that requires much argument.  Convincing evidence is 
found in an examination of the various editions of the DSM. The first edition, published in 
1952, did not gain universal acceptance among either clinicians or researchers, and while the 
second edition, DSM-II, published in 1968, had more success, it also did not become the 
diagnostic device of choice.7 It was the third edition, DSM-III (1980) that became 
established as the singular source of psychiatric classification for North American 
practitioners.  Its organisers wanted it to be the central voice in American mental health 
diagnostic practice, and they have succeeded in making it so.  A large number of specialists 
from a wide variety of theoretical camps were consulted during its creation, and a lot of work 
went into ensuring that the manual kept as neutral a face as possible on established disputes 
within the discipline.  Its current use by everyone from Freudians to biochemists is proof of 
its success in this regard.  The most recent editions, the revised third edition, DSM-III-R 
(1987), the fourth edition, DSM-IV (1994), and the text-revised fourth edition, DSM-IV-TR 
(2000), are essentially unrivalled. 
A simple tally of the number of depressive diagnostic categories across the DSMs (these 
are any disorders whose primary symptom is considered to be anhedonia) will begin to 
demonstrate their proliferation.  Where DSM-II had four, DSM-III had eight.  DSM-III-R 
added another two distinctions within the DSM-III categories, and DSM-IV replaces an “and” 
with an “or”, in order to decrease diagnostic narrowness, and builds in flexibility to time 
limits so that people are not arbitrarily excluded. 
 
7 Use of the first edition of the DSM was quite limited.  Very few copies still exist and I was unable to gain 
access to one.  As a result, the progression that I will trace through the DSMs will begin only with DSM-II. 
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Of course, it is not enough that the number of categories increases.  I also need to establish 
that the range of behaviours or psychological states that these categories cover is expanding 
to encompass milder forms of the depressive experience (that many are inclined to think of as 
normal rather than pathological).  This is abundantly clear in the move from DSM-II to DSM-
III. In the DSM-II, there were four ways in which one’s depression was considered 
pathological.  If there was an obvious psychosocial stressor preceding the depressive episode, 
then the depression must be either “excessive,”8 in which case it is an instance of ‘depressive 
neurosis,’ or it must “[impair] reality testing,”9 which is ‘psychotic depressive reaction.’ If 
there is no obvious preceding stressor, then depression might be either ‘involutional [onset 
late in life] melancholia,’ which involves severe insomnia, or ‘manic-depressive illness, 
depressed type,’ which requires severe psychomotor retardation.  Notice what these 
categories entail.  Either the person must be obviously sadder than most other people would 
be, given the same life experience(s) (implying that the behaviour of ‘most people’ is not 
pathological), or it requires clear and extreme somatic symptoms, either delusions, insomnia, 
or obviously slowed movement and cognition. 
In the DSM-III, no such distinction is made between depression that is or is not preceded 
by a clear stressor.  This is because “there is no compelling evidence that once a major 
depressive episode has developed, its course and response to treatment are affected by 
whether or not its onset was associated with a stressor.”10 Instead the patient needs to have 
 
8 APA 1962, 40. 
9 Ibid. 38. 
10 APA 1980, 376.  This passage will be relevant later.  In DSM-III, major depressive disorder may be further 
specified to have psychotic features (i.e.  delusions, hallucinations), be in remission, or be linked with 
melancholy (generally more severe). 
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had depressive symptoms for some minimum amount of time, and experience some 
minimum number of symptoms from a checklist.  For a diagnosis of the umbrella category, 
major depressive disorder, for example, the depressive symptoms must have been present 
every day, almost all day, for at least two weeks, the person must be generally dysphoric, and 
she or he must have four symptoms from a possible eight: 
(1) poor appetite / weight loss or increased appetite / weight gain 
(2) insomnia or hypersomnia 
(3) psychomotor agitation / retardation 
(4) decreased pleasure in typically pleasurable activities, including sex 
(5) fatigue 
(6) negative self-assessment 
(7) trouble concentrating / indecisiveness 
(8) suicidal ideation 
 
Notice what this list now permits.  First, there is no longer any acknowledgement that 
psychosocial stressors may have normal depressive responses.  Further, one need not have 
externally observable somatic dysfunction at all in order to qualify; having the symptoms in 
(4)-(7) will suffice.  These four symptoms seem to fall clearly within the bounds of normal 
responses to stressful events, and even the two-week requirement still permits many 
individuals who would never have been diagnosable under DSM-II to now have a bona fide 
mental disease.  DSM-III’s dysphoric disorder is similar.  In this case, the symptoms must be 
largely present for a period of two years, but never be severe enough to qualify as major 
depressive disorder, and the individual must have three of a list of 13 symptoms, including 
manifestations like decreased productivity at work and pessimism about the future.  Again, 
pathologisation is possible of symptom-profiles that never would have counted as disorders 
under DSM-II.
The same trend is seen in the move from DSM-III to DSM-III-R, although not as extreme.  
For example, new subcategories are provided that permit seasonal depressive symptoms to 
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count toward either major depressive disorder or dysthymic disorder, thus permitting the 
waiving of the minimum time period requirement.  DSM-IV also continues the creation of 
new sub-categories, including, for example, a specification that a person mourning 
someone’s death is a candidate for a mental disorder if their grieving lasts longer than two 
months.  The end result is simply that more people count as pathologically depressed now 
than did 40, or even 10, years ago. 
The obvious question is, what has fuelled this remarkable expansion?  I think any 
assumption that this is simply the result of better diagnostic skills is too facile.  Instead, I 
wish to argue that the primary fuel for progressively larger diagnostic categories has been the 
advent of exciting pharmacological responses to milder forms of depression.  A 
pharmacological treatment is of course exactly what Medical Model A would endorse.  It is 
the availability of a ‘cure’ for certain mood states – I will call this the ‘response to treatment’ 
criterion – that has led to the permissibility of designating them pathological, rather than 
simply as one of the normal responses humans might demonstrate.  The importance of 
therapeutic drugs in the research of depression is acknowledged by Randolph Nesse.  He 
writes with enthusiasm about how much researchers know about the neurotransmitters 
involved in depression, and is clear that this knowledge is largely a result of clinical 
observations of the effects of various drugs.11 
Here is the argument that I believe practitioners within Medical Model A implicitly 
endorse: 
1.  The ‘response to treatment’ criterion is a suitable test of the existence of a 
(diagnosable) disorder. 
2.  Mild depression is materially treatable. 
Therefore 3.  Mild depression is a disorder. 
 
11 Nesse 1999, 895. 
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4.  Materially (i.e. pharmacologically) treatable disorders must have material causes. 
Therefore 5.  Mild depression is materially caused. 
6.  Clinical understanding of materially-caused disorders should not focus on non-material 
reasons. 
Therefore 7.  Clinical understanding of mild depression should not focus on non-material 
reasons. 
 
In section 4, I will argue that in the current medical climate, mental health practitioners do 
indeed consider the ‘response to treatment’ criterion to be grounds for its pathologisation 
(premise 1).  In section 5, I will argue that the recent advances in pharmacological treatment 
of depression represent a change that mapped on to the ‘response to treatment’ criterion 
(premise 2).  I take premise 4 to be fairly uncontroversial and will not devote time to 
establishing either its truth or that clinicians hold it to be true.  In section 6, I will attempt to 
establish that clinicians do indeed believe that where one has a materially-caused disorder, 
the focus should not be on non-material reasons. 
 
4.  Medical Model A acceptance of the ‘response to treatment’ criterion 
Before showing that the ‘response to treatment’ criterion has been influential in the 
development of depressive diagnostic categories, I must make an admission.  There have 
been several explicit acknowledgments among clinicians that the ‘response to treatment’ 
criterion is problematic.  Robert Spitzer, the psychiatrist who spearheaded the creation of 
DSM-III,12 and some of his colleagues have overtly argued that this criterion is not one that 
should be employed.13 The main concern is the criterion’s circularity.14 Clinically, a 
 
12 Alex Spiegel has written an interesting article in The New Yorker detailing the way that Robert Spitzer’s 
vision has shaped the DSM and all psychiatric classification.  (Spiegel 2005.) 
13 Zimmerman and Spitzer 1989. 
14 Frances 1994, vii. 
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‘disorder’ is typically understood as some unpleasant state X (in this case, mental state) that 
should (ideally) be treated.  This characterisation of disorder cannot be clinically useful if 
what makes X a disorder in the first place is that X is treatable. 
Further, reliance on a ‘response to treatment’ criterion contravenes the tenets of evidence-
based medicine, the current dominant theoretical standpoint of North American medicine.  
The aim of evidence-based medicine (EBM) is to make medicine more scientific.15 Within 
EBM, treatments are not generally administered until their efficacy is established, and this 
can only happen if the disorder being treated is well- defined prior to experimental drug 
trials.  A therapy’s success can only be measured if there is clarity about the disordered state 
that is to be alleviated.  But despite the awareness of some practitioners that the ‘response to 
treatment’ criterion is invalid, I remain confident that it has been an unstated influence on 
practitioners’ views about permissible diagnostic categories.  I am not alone in this belief.  
Peter Kramer’s book, Listening to Prozac, is an extended analysis of just this phenomenon.  
He worries that both clinicians and society at large “permit the material technology, 
medications, to define what is health and what is illness.”16 
Evidence for this claim is found, in part, in an examination of the DSMs, both the 
diagnostic entries and theoretical commitments.  Making a case for the importance of 
treatment opportunities in determining the diagnostic categories of the DSMs is a little 
complicated.  The DSMs do not discuss treatment, as they are intended to function strictly as 
diagnostic companions.  Despite this silence, it is interesting to note the experience of Andrea 
Jacobson and William McKinney, who prepared a treatment guide to accompany the DSM-
 
15 See e.g. Paris 2002, 130. 
16 Kramer 1993, 16. 
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III. They note that psychopharmacological methods bear an “…easy correspondence … to 
DSM-III categories, e.g. antidepressants to major depressive disorder.”17 I am confident that 
this easy correspondence is not mere good fortune or coincidence. 
The DSM-III is the first to explicitly acknowledge the interconnectedness between 
treatment and diagnosis, its authours claiming that “planning a treatment program must begin 
with an accurate diagnostic assessment.”18 The influence of the ‘response to treatment’ 
criterion is seen in the diagnostic profile that appears only in DSM-III-R, for Major 
Depression, Melancholic type.  Here, one of the possible symptoms of this disorder is 
“previous good response to specific and adequate somatic antidepressant therapy, e.g., 
tricyclics, ECT, MAOI, lithium.”19 
In a focus group with primary care physicians, Patricia Carney et al. discovered that every 
participant accepted that the presence of depression could be indicated by response to 
selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors, or SSRIs.20 Harold Pincus, director of research for 
the American Psychiatric Association, said in an interview that so-called subthreshold 
disorders (e.g., minor depression) ought only to receive disorder labels after treatment had 
been shown to influence the natural history of the condition.21 Recall, too, the earlier quote 
that explained why the central DSM-II distinction — between depression that was preceded 
by a stressor and depression that was not — was eliminated for DSM-III. It was because 
 
17 Jacobson and McKinney 1982, 184. 
18 APA 1980, 1. 
19 APA 1987, 224. 
20 Carney et al. 1999, 971. 
21 Brody 1997, C2. 
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there was no difference in their respective responses to treatment.  In the absence of 
treatment response, the distinction was considered to do no work. 
It must be acknowledged that the ‘treatment response’ symptom of ‘major depression, 
melancholic type’ has been removed for DSM-IV. I propose that this is because, in this 
instance, the criterion was explicit, and there is some awareness that it is problematic.  It still 
seems clear to me, however, in light of the evidence that I just cited – DSM diagnostic 
categories, Carney’s research into clinician attitudes – that the ‘response to treatment’ 
criterion has been employed as an indicator of disorder status – sometimes explicitly, 
sometimes implicitly.  I further believe that this acceptance has had a pervasive influence on 
the diagnosis of depression. 
 
5.  How the ‘response to treatment’ criterion relates to new treatments of depression 
Now I must show that newly developed pharmacological anti-depressants were indeed 
different enough to spark the transformation that I am describing.  The medications I have in 
mind are the second generation of anti-depressants, the selective serotonin reuptake 
inhibitors, or SSRIs.  They have been a rallying point for those wanting to include less-severe 
instances of depression in categories of mental disorder, but their actual effects are difficult 
to disentangle from their hype.  Irving Kirsch et al. used the “Freedom of Information Act” to 
access all the SSRI study results that were submitted to the Food and Drug Administration.  
Astonishingly, they found that SSRIs do not have a clinically-significant different effect over 
placebo on depression.22 There have not yet been that many studies of SSRI treatment 
specifically of depression that is considered by clinicians ‘sub-threshold.’  Sub-threshold 
 
22 Kirsch et al. 2002. 
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depression is a case where the clinician feels that the phenomenon is the same phenomenon 
as found in depression proper, but the symptoms either are less severe or have existed for a 
shorted time, and so the patient does not qualify to be diagnosed with depression.  This 
category is comprised of cases of what I am calling ‘normal low mood.’  James Barrett et al. 
found a difference between placebo and paroxetine for dysthymia patients, but concluded 
that “watchful waiting” was still the best approach with this patient population.23 This hardly 
seems to warrant the level of excitement that Prozac and its brethren have elicited. 
But there are two ways in which the SSRIs have been revolutionary.  First, the smaller 
side-effect profile of the second generation of antidepressants has meant that they could be 
more comfortably administered to people who were suffering less.  When a medication has a 
lot of serious, unpleasant side-effects, a physician will be restrained in giving it to people 
who are not that sick.  But reduce the side effects, and that frees up the doctor to try it out on 
people who are not in particularly dire straits but who are suffering some degree of 
discomfort that is similar to the kind of discomfort for which the medication is indicated. 
This is exactly what happened in the use of SSRIs.  Standard medical practice demands 
that new treatments may only be used for a patient population once there is evidence that the 
new treatments are likely to be more effective than current treatments.  In the case of SSRIs, 
it did not seem to matter that these medications had not been proven more effective than 
other alternatives in the treatment of minor depression.  What was especially clinically 
significant was that people with apparently minor depression could, without much sacrifice, 
take them.  In an analysis of the prescribing patterns of physicians from 1985 to 1994, Harold 
Pincus et al. found that psychopharmacological agents were prescribed initially to 53.5% of 
 
23 Barrett et al. 2001. 
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the depressed patients who visited a psychiatrist.  This percentage rose to 70.9% by the end 
of the study time frame.  This rise is accounted for entirely by SSRI prescriptions.24 This 
means that people who would not typically have been administered pharmacotherapy were 
now receiving it. 
The second way that SSRIs were revolutionary, in this ad hoc experimentation, is seen in 
the reports that started coming in from people for whom the SSRIs did work, and the reports 
were glowing.  Patients’ enthusiasm for the SSRIs and their life-transforming effects far 
outstripped any response to the earlier anti-depressants.  This tendency is clearly seen, for 
example, in Debra Elfenbein’s collection, Living with Prozac. This book was intended to be 
a presentation of a wide variety of personal accounts of what taking Prozac was like.  There 
are, however, very few negative perspectives offered.  Instead, most of the entries read like 
the testimony of people who have been saved.  Janet Thacker, for example, writes that, since 
taking Prozac, “[i]t has been like opening the dark, dirty windows of my life and allowing 
myself the fresh air and freedom to be alive.”25 
I have just been arguing that recently developed pharmacological treatments for 
depression were in part responsible for the shaping of new diagnostic categories of 
depression.  In opposition to this position, there are those who might argue that exemplary 
pharmacological responses to depression have always been available, that Prozac is nothing 
new.  The simple truth — that emotions, mood and personality have physiological 
underpinnings that can be tampered with — has, of course, been known for some time.  
Emotions, mood and personality have been altered for quite a while through the ingestion of 
 
24 Pincus et al. 1998, 530.   
25 Elfenbein 1995, 27. 
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drugs that now typically are called ‘recreational.’  Making a principled distinction between 
prescribed versus recreational drugs is difficult.  Pharmacological treatments are often used 
recreationally, and persons with psychological problems who take recreational drugs — 
alcohol is especially common — are often considered by their doctors to be ‘self- 
medicating.’ Thus, if I am attempting to explain new diagnostic features by appealing to the 
new possibilities that come with SSRIs, my critics will insist that I am making a mistake. 
While it is certainly likely that physiological ways of responding to depression have 
existed almost as long as there has been depression, I still think there are substantive 
differences between previous somatic intervention possibilities and the new generation of 
anti-depressants.  The obvious one, of course, is that SSRIs, notably Prozac, were created by 
medical researchers for the explicit purpose of being used as a therapeutic agent.26 But 
beyond their favourable situation within the network that defines mental disease, there are 
other differences that facilitate clinicians becoming comfortable with allowing Prozac and its 
ilk to guide their diagnostic efforts. 
There is a potentially-invoked difference between old (e.g. bourbon) and new (e.g. 
Prozac) somatic treatments of depression that does not work for my purposes.  It might be 
claimed that recreational drugs are mood-altering in a way that masks the original, pre-
pathological self, whereas antidepressants, especially the SSRIs, are self-revealing.  Implicit 
in this assertion is that SSRIs restore a natural order, whereas recreational drugs impose an 
unnatural one.  Here, I think, empirical evidence is both relevant and fairly decisive.  Often, 
when Prozac works, it does not just restore patients to their pre-pathological states (assuming 
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that such states even exist).  It restores them to a level of well-being they have never 
experienced before.27 The self on Prozac is often not a self that the patient has ever met. 
An overwhelming majority of mental health practitioners and philosophers are willing to 
grant that all mental events require brain events, in some fashion or other (although the 
nature of this requirement is not easy to spell out).  It seems likely that this requirement is 
quite far-reaching.  Larry Siever and William Frucht, for example, claim that “we are 
beginning to know, in a specific and detailed way, that personality styles as well as mental 
disorders have physical and chemical origins.  All are rooted in the brain.  In a sense, even 
our “selves” are grounded in the brain’s biology.”28 Recreational drugs and SSRIs both work 
on brains.  Why would the brain tampering that happens with Prozac be self-revealing, while 
the brain tampering of alcohol or uppers/ downers is self-altering?  Certainly alcohol effects 
different brain events than Prozac does, but it would require much more argument to 
establish that the Prozac-processes are the ‘self-processes’, but the alcohol-processes are not.  
All psychological events find expression in brain events, and everything people experience, 
e.g. exercise, diet, emotional turmoil, effects brain physiology to some degree.   
A better-motivated difference between old and new somatic treatments of depression is 
the aforementioned ‘cleanness’ of the new antidepressants, e.g. generally, no hangover, no 
interference in motor coordination, no withdrawal symptoms, no cravings.  They are also less 
toxic.  This means that should the depressed person attempt suicide by taking an overdose of 
SSRIs, they are less likely to be lethal that other medications (e.g. lithium).  They also 
provide a stability of mood over long periods of time that few recreational drugs can match.  
 
27 Kramer 1993, 126. 
28 Siever and Frucht 1997, viii. 
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Maintaining a steady level of a drug like alcohol, such that one’s depressive symptoms are 
continuously alleviated over months or years, with almost no ups and downs, is essentially 
impossible, particularly without doing oneself serious harm in the process.29 
Perhaps a more important difference is that while alcohol/ marijuana/ opium/ heroin/ etc. 
do alleviate certain symptoms of depression, primarily the psychic pain, they also interfere 
with the pursuit of personal and professional goals.  They stunt, in certain respects, one’s 
emotional and cognitive development.  Prozac not only does not seem to interfere with the 
pursuit of goals and interpersonal relationships, it also seems to actually foster their 
development.  Prozac manages to alleviate the burden of psychic pain without reducing the 
individual’s motivation to pursue productive life projects, and often even enhances it.  Thus, 
the rejection of recreational drugs as fruitful treatment might be said to arise because they 
prevent people from meeting their obligations, both to others and to themselves.  With the 
new breed of antidepressants, however, almost the reverse is true.  Initially, for the depressed 
person, depression interferes with their ability to form and maintain meaningful relationships.  
It is only in virtue of taking Prozac that they are able to resume a place within their 
community. 
If I am right about medications being a strong influence of diagnosis of depression, then 
the timing of their introduction and the publication dates of the DSMs should correspond, and 
this does indeed seem to be the case.  The first pharmaceutical specifically intended as an 
antidepressant (the tricyclic, imipramine) was introduced for general use sometime around 
1959.  If the tendency to pathologise that which was pharmacologically treatable had greatly 
 
29 One possible exception to this claim is marijuana.  While the treatment profile of marijuana is rather scanty 
— doing research on the clinical effects of dope on human depression has been rather difficult in the present 
political climate — it is impressive.  See e.g. Williamson and Evans 2000 for a brief overview of the literature. 
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influenced the creation of the DSM-II (published 1968), then there should have been an 
expansion of its depressive diagnostic relative to the DSM-I (published 1952).  There are, 
however, almost no significant differences between the two manuals.30 Although the reason 
for this consistency is beyond the scope of this thesis, a suggestion can be made based on the 
wording of the symptoms of the depressive diagnoses in the DSM-II. Depressive neurosis, 
for example, was considered to be “an excessive reaction due to an internal conflict or to an 
identifiable event.”31 The psychoanalytic undertones of this diagnostic category imply that 
the availability of pharmacological treatment would not have been tremendously important in 
its classification. 
It is in the introduction of DSM-III in 1980 that the most interesting changes are seen.  
Imipramine gained tremendous popularity in America during the 1970’s, along with a 
number of other antidepressants.  In 1980, as I have shown, the depressive diagnostic 
categories greatly expanded with the publication of DSM-III. Few changes in antidepressant 
therapy happened throughout the early 1980’s, and there are not many substantial changes or 
expansions seen in the depressive diagnostic categories in the DSM-III-R (published in 
1987). 
The introduction of the first SSRI, Prozac, happened in December, 1987, with two other 
important SSRIs, Zoloft and Paxil, following in 1991 and 1992, respectively.32 In 1994, 
DSM-IV introduced ‘minor depression’ as an important research diagnosis.  This indicates 
that not enough time had elapsed for clinicians to be confident that they could treat minor 
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depression with the SSRIs, but enough anecdotal reports of successful treatment had come in 
that they felt that minor depression should be singled out for special mention.33 In the 
intervening six years, despite the still relative paucity of strong empirical evidence showing 
that minor depression responds consistently to antidepressants, most mental health 
practitioners insist that it warrants its own diagnostic category, based largely on clinical 
experience.34 
In light of this evidence, this dissertation offers an empirical prediction: in DSM-V 
(currently being prepared and due to be released in 2010), minor depression will have joined 
the ranks of the regular diagnostic categories.  Its symptom profile will emphasize anhedonia, 
low self-esteem, and fatigue, and its time requirements will fall somewhere between major 
depressive disorder (two weeks) and dysthymia (two years), with intermittent symptoms 
explicitly permissible. 
If my analysis thus far is correct, it means that ultimately, if pharmacological intervention 
can ‘treat’ (i.e.  make go away) the mood state that comes, for example, when someone is in 
a hopeless situation, when someone loses a spouse, or if they experience mild low mood in 
light of disappointing events, then these experiences will be categorised as a disorder.  This 
claim will no doubt evoke protest, as it seems clear that such mood instances are not 
expressions of a disease, they are simply normal reactions to hardship, loss or 
disappointment.  There is still a strong intuition that there is a difference in kind between 
normal low moods (especially if it is mild) and pathological depression (especially if it is 
major).  On what grounds is this distinction to be made?  Ultimately, I think our efforts to 
 
33 Pincus et al. 1992, 116. 
34 See Kramer 1993, pages 47-66, for an extended discussion of the development and introduction of 
antidepressants. 
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clear space for non-pathologisation of some cases of low mood require taking these moods as 
possible intentional states.  Current medical practice, however, does not pursue that kind of 
engagement. 
For the practitioner within Medical Model A, to make the distinction between mild low 
mood and depression, a physiological difference would need to be found between the two.  If 
such a difference could be found, then it might serve as a barrier that could stop the 
encroaching tide of pathologisation.  It might be possible simply to stipulate that the brain 
states associated with what we think of as normal low moods are themselves simply normal 
brain states.  Although the existence of such a clear physiological distinction is being debated 
among researchers, thus far, none has been found.  Researchers have spent considerable 
resources looking, but with limited success.35 They have encountered no genetic differences, 
as extrapolated from twin studies,36 no difference in brain activity,37 and no qualitative 
difference in reported phenomenology.38 
The lack of difference is especially highlighted by the two characteristics central to 
current medical practice: impairment of functioning and treatability.  Both major depression 
and low mood impair functioning in similar ways, as their sufferers work less and consume 
more health care resources.39 Both are also amenable to treatment by antidepressants.40 
35 Vrendenburg et al. 1993. 
36 Kendler and Gardner 1998. 
37 Kumar et al. 1998. 
38 Kessler et al. 1997. 
39 Spitzer et al. 1995. 
40 See e.g. Paykel et al. 1998 and Szegedi et al. 1997. 
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Pharmacological treatment of low mood (that appears to be the result of some recent 
psychosocial stressor) has been shown to be as efficacious as treatment of major depressive 
disorder and dysthymia.41 
Hope that a difference in kind between normal low mood and pathological depression 
would be found by rigorous empirical examination of physiology has not been borne out.  
Instead, it seems quite possible that there is no such difference in kind, and that many forms 
of depression exist along a physiological continuum, with major depression at one end, and 
mild low mood at the other.42 Since both normal low mood and pathological depression are 
treatable by pharmacological interventions, they must have a physiological cause.  In fact, as 
far as medical practitioners are concerned, since they are (roughly) treatable by the same 
drugs, they likely have (roughly) the same physiological underpinnings.  In this picture, it 
becomes straightforward to see how the distinction between the two would become blurred – 
normal low mood works much like and is treatable much like many clear cases of 
pathological depression.  It thus fits comfortably into current categories of diagnosable 
mental disorders. 
This trend should, I believe, raise some concerns.  There exists a naïve hope that ‘normal’ 
moods are easily recognisable, that psychopathology will make itself known.  But recent 
research is establishing the details of what we have long known.  All moods – the normal, the 
pathological, and everything in between – arise in conjunction with changes in brain 
chemistry.  They all have the potential to effect functioning.  In the case of depression, there 
are no physiological or functional markers that set the pathological states apart.  And the 
 
41 See e.g. James et al. 1999, and Robinson et al. 2004. 
42 See e.g. Angst and Merikangas 1997. 
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common clinical attitude that response to treatment can help to identify the pathological will 
be no help in this context.  All moods are alterable – i.e. treatable – through a wide range of 
environmental influences (e.g. sunlight, food, alcohol, drugs).  Typically, treatment is 
considered to be a return to a state of normalcy, but of course that idea, in this context, just 
goes in a circle.  Once the standards for the normal and the pathological evaporate, the door 
is opened for pathologising what is now considered a normal low mood.   
Let me now return to the Medical Model A argument I presented in section 3.  I have 
argued that some clinicians hold the view that “the ‘response to treatment’ criterion is a 
suitable test of pathology” (premise 1).  In my account of how this view has played out in the 
case of depression, I presented data that “mild depression is materially treatable” (premise 2) 
– or least evidence that clinicians take mild depression to be materially treatable.  This leads 
to the view that “mild depression is a disorder” (premise 3) which I argued is revealed in the 
expanding diagnostic ranges of depression.  It further seems to me that the belief that 
“materially (e.g. pharmacologically) treatable disorders must have material causes” (premise 
4) is uncontroversial.  Pharmacological treatments, in that they are material substances, act 
on other material substances, namely, physiological conditions.  This means that any 
pharmacologically treatable symptom profile must have some kind of underlying 
physiological cause.  So now, my task is to show why clinicians might also hold the view 
that “clinical understanding of materially-caused disorders should not focus on non-material 
reasons” (premise 6). 
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6.  Medical Model A understanding of materially-caused disorders does not focus on non-
material reasons 
Within Medical Model A, there is a basic belief that physiological diseases are not, at least 
clinically, best understood or approached in terms of their intentional aspects.  Before I begin 
this section, however, I must admit (an admission similar to the one I had to make in section 
4) that many clinicians explicitly deny that they hold this view.  But I think that this belief 
shows itself implicitly in the treatment that clinicians most commonly make available.  It 
seems to me that if clinicians took seriously the possibility that patients’ depression might be 
intentional, then psychotherapy that grappled with intentional features of depression would 
be considered part of an appropriate course of treatment.  Indeed, there are several important 
studies that establish that the best treatment of depression includes psychotherapy and so a 
great deal of lip service is paid to including psychotherapy in a good treatment plan.43 
The treatment data, however, tell a different story.  Despite treatment recommendations to 
the contrary, exclusive pharmacotherapy is the most widely used treatment for depression.44 
In a recent survey of treatment in the United States from 1987 to 1997, outpatient treatment 
of patients’ diagnosed with depression increased from 0.73 to 2.33 per 100 persons.  
Antidepressant prescriptions went up from 37.3% to 74.5%, while the proportion of patients 
receiving psychotherapy went down from 71.1% to 60.2%.  Moreover, the number of patients 
who received their care from primary care physicians went up, which is also linked to a 
reduction in use of psychotherapy. 45 
43 See e.g. Mynors-Wallis et al. 1995, Pirraglia et al. 2004, and Schulberg et al. 2002. 
44 Robinson et al. 2005. 
45 Olfson et al. 2002. 
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This trend may simply be a pragmatic response to a variety of clinical challenges.  Joel 
Paris claims that psychiatrists get distracted when they try to keep track of all the 
physiological and psychosocial factors that may go into a particular individual’s problem.  
Thus, he contends that “by reducing complex syndromes to target symptoms that can respond 
to specific drugs, we can often treat patients more effectively.”46 Historically this approach 
has been very successful.  In the past, many unpleasant physiological phenomena have been 
understood in terms of reasons.  For example, in the 18th century, sufferers of tuberculosis 
were thought to be experiencing extreme forms of nostalgia.  The thought was that if 
someone: 
… lose[s] all hope of returning safe and sound to their beloved homes and country, 
they become sad, silent, listless, solitary, musing, and full of sighs and moans, and 
finally quite regardless of, and indifferent to, all the cares and duties of life … the body 
gradually pines and wastes away.47 
As, however, the causal mechanisms of tuberculosis have become better understood, talk 
of “loss of hope” – or any other intentional element, for that matter – is no longer accepted as 
relevant to clinical responses to the disease. 
A more recent example is peptic ulcers.  Until very recently, peptic ulcers were thought to 
be brought on by stress.  Not just any stress, either – it typically involved anxiety about 
performance, and was thought to be linked to particular cognitive styles.  On my view, these 
environmental and personal features might have been thought of as intentional objects.  Now, 
however, possible intentional objects for peptic ulcers are no longer taken as clinically 
relevant.  This is in large measure due to the discovery that a bacterium plays a crucial causal 
role in forming peptic ulcers.  Once this causal story was better understood, therapy could be 
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more effectively undertaken.  Intentional features for ulcers are, in this new clinical light, 
seen as a fiction, created to mask our actual ignorance.  I believe that depression is seen in a 
similar light – and clinicians see themselves, in eliminating intentional talk from depression 
therapy, as effecting the same kind of transition as gastroenterologists have accomplished in 
eliminating ‘intentional object’ talk from treatment of peptic ulcers.   
Once, depression was considered to be related to intentional objects that occasioned a 
mood of depression.  Those occasioning intentional objects could be thought about, 
understood, and used to prompt changes in one’s life.  In fact, there are many people who 
consider themselves to have been successful in some of these endeavours.  Now, however, 
according to Medical Model A, it appears that this was all a convenient fiction.  Once the 
brain physiology is worked out, intentional objects do not do any explanatory work.  For 
them, depression is simply all in the brain, and thinking about a mood’s intentional objects is 
not the right way to bring someone to better brain physiology. 
If the preceding analysis is on the right track, I think I have established that at least some 
practitioners within Medical Model A endorse the argument that I laid out in section 3 of this 
chapter.  This means that in some clinical settings, mild intentional depression – e.g. a low 
mood in response to disappointing events – is implicitly seen as a disease.  Additionally, this 
disease will be approached by some clinicians purely as expressions of brain pathology, 
rather than intentional, meaningful responses to life events.  I think that this result is 
intuitively disturbing for many, but I would also like to devote some effort to spelling out 
some of what I think is wrong with that conception.  In the next section, I will offer another 
(perhaps more nuanced) characterisation of the medical model, that I will call the ‘reason-
63
inclusive medical model.’  I still think, however, that this model includes too limited an 
understanding of depression.   
 
7.  Medical Model B:  The endogenous / reactive version of the low mood / depression 
distinction 
 
It is important to note that the medical model practitioner need not occupy as narrow a 
position as I have thus far indicated.  My construal to this point has been something of a 
caricature.  The medical model often employed clinically does not necessarily entail the 
elimination of reasons – this is Medical Model B.  Physicians working within the medical 
model should not – and many do not – limit the causes of psychopathology to the central 
nervous system, as material causation can ultimately be seen as an infinite sequence. Every 
event has a cause, but so too does every cause have a cause. This means that although 
variance in neurotransmitter levels may be responsible for depression, something must be 
responsible for the neurotransmitter variance. 
Any physical analysis of neurotransmitters will quickly establish their genetic link 
(depression has a pretty clearly established genetic pedigree).48 Genes are expressed in 
environments, and these environments have tremendous influences on how genes are 
expressed. How, precisely, material aspects of the environment act materially on the brain is 
not very well-established, but many researchers are confident that answers suited to their 
medical model analyses will soon arise. Paul Gilbert is a proponent of the idea of interaction 
between environmental and physiological forces leading to depression, describing it as “a 
 
48 Gazzaniga 1992, 168 and Klaus Lesch 2004. 
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negative life event/ uncontrollable stress — biological change — negative cognitive style 
relationship.”49 
This really is an acknowledgement that medical model practitioners have to make. It is 
their contention that depression is built on a physical foundation, but it is well established 
that talk and behavioural therapy can make a therapeutic difference.  In fact, efficacy rates 
for talk therapy alone or SSRIs alone are roughly the same.50 The efficacy of talk therapy is 
not simply an effect of conversation or human contact, as some critics have speculated, and 
not every type of talk therapy is equally successful in treating depression.51 That different 
types of talk therapy can do this kind of work at all points to the necessity of thinking in 
terms of causes beyond the brain. 
Medical Model B opens the door to a commonly employed, clear and simple way to make 
the distinction between normal low mood and pathological depression. Normal low mood has 
a reason ascertainable in an analysis of the environment, whereas pathological depression 
does not. The less apparent or direct the environmental reason, the more pathological the 
case. Edwin Wallace is a proponent of this view. He writes that “psychiatrists [cannot] 
continue inadequately to acknowledge the impact of cultural, socioeconomic, and political 
ambience on process, form, and content of psychopathology … weighing cultural factors and 
adaptational values in local contexts is important in distinguishing psychopathology from 
institutionalized experience, belief, and behavior.”52 The two states arising from this 
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distinction are typically called reactive depression and endogenous depression. Endogenous 
depression, in this context, does not, of course, mean uncaused depression.  It just means that 
its causes will not be the ones traditionally considered to be causes of depression, e.g. stress, 
tragedy, etc. They need to be investigated, but causes of endogenous depression may end up 
being related to diet, or viruses, or some other environmental entity unconnected to stress or 
emotional trauma. 
Given genetic considerations, it can even be argued by these researchers that depression 
can be valuable.  In chapter I, I presented D’Arms and Jacobson’s view that emotions can be 
assessed for appropriateness in three different respects.  Paul Griffiths adds a fourth, and 
argues that emotions and moods (Griffiths explicitly includes moods here) can be evaluated 
as appropriate or not in light of evolutionary considerations.  (L. Sloman et al. and Michael 
Gazzaniga all argue for this claim.)  This view is motivated by a commitment to considering 
genetic phenomena as adaptive.  If human beings are genetically hardwired to become 
depressed, then there are likely good reasons why this is the case. Michael Gazzaniga 
speculates that depressed behaviour might serve to elicit certain kinds of responses from 
one’s community, citing evidence from animal studies that depressed infant monkeys receive 
more attention than their non-depressed peers.53 Sloman et al. hypothesises, also based on 
primate studies, that depression is a response to being a lower rank in a social hierarchy.54 
This possibility has been labeled “learned helplessness.”  The conjecture is that a lower-
ranked animal might become depressed and this will be less likely to challenge higher-ranked 
animals.  This tendency to be non-challenging may result in increased survival.  This 
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adaptive consideration, when paired with the endogenous / reactive distinction, allows us to 
speculate that reactive depression is depression that is doing is genetically-selected-for job 
(which may, in our current environment, not be adaptive), while endogenous depression 
indicates a problem with the depression system. 
Nesse likens the treatment of neurotransmitters in isolation, as though they alone were the 
problem, to treating physical pain in itself without wondering about its aetiology.55 
Typically, clinicians do not advocate making someone’s pain go away without trying to 
figure out where the pain originates (certain ubiquitous pains, e.g. headaches, serve as an 
obvious exception). It would be absurd to assume that pain simply arises out of dysfunction 
in the thalamus and treat that in isolation. Like pain, depression as a phenomenon itself can 
be seen as a symptom and pharmacological treatment of symptoms while ignoring higher-
order causes of those symptoms is short-sighted. 
Proper treatment, one that really fixes things, necessarily involves confronting the primary 
underlying instigators of the problem. Treating the neurotransmitters without addressing the 
psychosocial reasons behind their imbalance is only a stopgap measure.  It is quite open to 
clinicians in this context to say that even if pharmacological treatment of certain instances of 
depression is possible, pharmacological treatment alone is not appropriate because brain 
chemistry is not the sole cause of the depression. Other causes, including psychosocial 
factors ought to be responded to. Thus, psychosocial influences can be very important in a 
physicalist causal analysis of depression. 
But, as with the earlier physiological distinction, the endogenous/ reactive distinction 
supported by Medical Model B does not seem to have strong empirical support.  In analyses 
 
55 Nesse 1999, 897. 
67
of apparently clear cases of pathologically depressed people who did not obviously seem to 
be reacting to any particular negative event, researchers have found that these individuals do 
in fact have what looks like non-physiological origins for their depression.  For example, 
several studies have found that apparently pathologically endogenously depressed persons 
have suffered greater loads of psychosocial stress over their lifetimes,56 or that their 
childhood experiences were more traumatic than those of non-depressed persons.57 Even if 
many depressed people have not experienced extreme stressors immediately preceding their 
depressive episodes, there do appear to be grounds for thinking that a great deal of depression 
arises in conjunction with some kind of environmental pressures.  It looks like, even in cases 
with a large consensus that the depression is pathological, non-physiological phenomena 
have played a role in the creation of that person’s depression. 
This lack of empirical support gains additional bite when we consider the limited skills 
that medical practitioners appear to have in ascertaining these complicated non-physiological 
phenomena. That suburban housewives are disproportionately considered to suffer 
groundless depression is worrying, for example.  It seems plausible to me that being isolated 
in a house with the kids all day, while one’s husband goes off to work and to interact with 
others, might serve for some women as a source of depression.  That a clinician cannot 
immediately see what looks like a reason does not mean that the search should be called off.  
The visibility of certain kinds of reasons for depression will be greatly affected by who is 
doing the observing.58 Numerous feminist and cultural observations can be made about ways 
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in which aspects of the lives of women or minorities are invisible to traditional medical 
personnel.59 
An alternative view might be that pathological depression is present when the sufferer 
herself cannot identify an environmental origin for her depression, but this, too, is a worrying 
criterion. Given the efficacy of psychoanalytic treatment premised on the active role of the 
unconscious in our mental states,60 it seems possible that many such non-physiological forces 
will not necessarily be transparently accessible to the person for whom they are operant. 
 
8.  The normative element of depression 
Despite these problems, I believe that there are many strengths of the reason-inclusive 
Medical Model B I just outlined.  There may even be an inclination to suppose that the 
endogenous / reactive distinction eliminates the need for worries about the pathologisation of 
normal low mood.  Some non-physiological sources for both having low moods or for being 
depressed have been established as relevant, and at least some normal low mood states will 
not be medicalised.  Further, an embrace of environment-physiology interaction in treatment 
can be part of a richer therapeutic interaction between clinician and patient.  This model 
accepts the evidence that a combination of medication and some kind of talk therapy is the 
most effective treatment for depression.  In turn, this therapeutic attitude will better meet the 
ethical obligations that exist between clinicians and their patients. 
Despite these positive aspects of this line of analysis, I wish, however, to argue that 
environmental sources of depression, as they are understood in the reactive/ endogenous 
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distinction, are construed non-intentionally.  I believe that this approach does not engage 
with the potential intentional element of depression – it simply leaves it out.  Suppose that 
good evidence could be garnered that pathological depression is indeed endogenous, not 
caused by typical environmental prompts for being depressed, and that which is considered a 
normal low mood always is always preceded by such an environmental prompt.  For most 
medical practitioners, environment in this context is simply understood as operating as a 
material cause for certain brain states.  A clinical interaction that places emphasis on this 
kind of causation will not treat sufferers of depression as suffering intentionally. 
In looking beyond physiology, I am looking for intentionally-underwritten reasons for 
depression.  The force of construing depression as a response to good reasons necessarily 
involves a normative element. When terrible things happen to someone, these stresses lead to 
depression in a normatively permissible way.  The stress functions as an occasioning 
intentional object.  Sometimes, we might want to go even further and say in some cases that 
there is a very compelling fit between a potential occasioning intentional objects and 
depression.  This might mean that the person should become depressed, and a failure to do so 
indicates a negatively-evaluable lack. 
For example, in some cases of the death of a loved one (e.g. through homicide that the 
survivor believes she might have prevented), we might think that a failure to manifest what 
would now count as pathological depression (e.g. her low mood would last longer than 2 
months, it would be of great intensity, it would include beliefs about the worthlessness of life 
and a negative self-evaluation) would indicate that something was wrong with that person.  
In many situations, what is important is not that people just do become depressed, but rather 
that they should – or, at least, becoming depressed is an appropriate and understandable 
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response. George Graham writes that “were a person immune to depression in justifiably 
depressed circumstances, I think we should be inclined to think of him as psychologically 
deficient. Such an individual would either be self-deceived about his situation . . . or 
expressing some emotional confusion, or in some other way impaired.”61 
An important difference between material and intentionally-linked causation is 
highlighted by the infinity that comes with material causation. Effects have causes, but 
causes must have causes, which must also have causes, and so on. Reasons operating as 
material causes, as they do in the aforementioned description, entail further causes. But 
reasons in the normative sense do not; they come to an end.  When someone is depressed 
because (in the normative sense of ‘because’) her dog died, there is no more explaining to do. 
The causal analysis is complete.  And this completed, normative causal chain can then be 
evaluated in a very different manner than material causal chains.  We can ask, “Should she 
have become depressed in those circumstances?”  This question makes no sense if we are 
discussing materially-caused effects as such.  In some cases, we can sensibly endorse her 
reasons, even as we strive to avoid the result.  Graham believes that, “[g]ood reasons may 
warrant a person to be depressed, even while reason warns of its possible harmful effects.”62 
If the response that depression has received serves as a model, then it is likely that we will 
see broad erosion of acceptance of possible intentional accounts and normative evaluations of 
our affective responses.  Insisting that a mechanism for determining whether or not some 
unpleasant affect is a disease-state is that it is pharmacologically treatable is basically to miss 
the point. Recent research is establishing the details of what we have long known. All affect 
 
61 Graham 1990, 419. 
62 Ibid., 419. 
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— normal, pathological, and all gradations in between — arises in conjunction with changes 
in physiology (e.g. neurotransmitters, brain structure, etc.).  Under the approaches I have 
been describing, all affective responses are potential candidates for pathologisation.  
These kinds of intentional causes cannot be easily integrated into either Medical Model A 
or B.  Medicine clearly (and with many good reasons) has dedicated itself to the material/ 
physiological analysis of the world.  Once material causes become established as the central 
explanatory mechanism for a particular disease, there is little impetus to investigate the 
possible intentional aspects of that disease.  It seems to me, however, that this constitutes a 
substantial loss. Depression is often a response to meaningful events in its sufferers’ lives.  
This responsiveness can only be appreciated as long as the intentional objects that bring 
about depression continue to have a place in its description. The placement of depression 
strictly in the realm of the material does violence to an important element of our 
understanding of affective responsiveness.  I think considering and engaging with 
depression’s intentional aspects will help us better understand and respond to the differences 
between pathological and normal low moods.  I will argue for this position in the next 
chapter. 
CHAPTER III 
THE INTELLIGIBILITY OF DEPRESSION 
 
In the previous chapter, I argued against two current medical models that I think implicitly 
deny that depression is intentional.  In this chapter, I will present my positive view that 
moods, especially depression, are at least potentially intelligible.   To see someone’s 
depression as intelligible is to understand its potentially discrete pieces – its intentional 
objects, its surrounding environmental conditions, its physiological responses, its affective 
valence, etc. – as a unified phenomenon.  A crucial element of this potential intelligibility is 
that depression can and often does have an intentional object.  I will explain this notion of 
intelligibility more fully in sections 2 and 3. 
Once depression’s potential intelligibility becomes apparent, normative engagement 
becomes possible.  Cases of depression can be explored by assuming the role of what I call 
an ‘affective interlocutor.’  Affective interlocution facilitates making the distinction between 
depression that should be pathologised and depression that should not be pathologised.  
Then, in section 4, I will argue that just as there are moral emotions, so too can there be 
moral moods.  Depression’s (potential) intelligibility leads to the possibility that depression 
can be a ‘moral mood’ and can play an important role in our moral lives.  In the final section, 
I will explore some of the implications of seeing depression as potentially intentional, 
intelligible, and moral.  That current medical approaches implicitly deny the depression can 
have an intentional object means that they turn a blind eye to this valuable feature of 
depression. 
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1.  Why we still need to make the low mood / depression distinction 
Thus far, I have considered several routes found within current medical practice for 
motivating the distinction between a normal state of low mood and pathological depression 
and have found them all wanting.  There are, however, clear cases of both.  On the one hand, 
there is the person who spends several hours unable to enjoy herself because of some new 
awareness she has of some negative feature of the world, who then returns to feeling 
cheerful.  On the other hand, there is the person who spends several months in progressively 
worse crying jags, and finally she ends up in a comatose state, unresponsive to almost all 
environmental stimuli.  Any substantive account of depression will have to say something 
about the vast differences between these two cases. 
There is no denying the unique negative aspects of depression. The most obvious is, of 
course, the increase in morbidity due to suicide associated with depression. (There is an 
estimated 15% suicide risk associated with recurrent depression.1) But the damaging effects 
are more than this. First, depression is, in its very nature, negative.  I believe that depression, 
like pain, should be paid attention to once someone suffers from it, but I do not advocate that 
it ought to be either sought or clung to.  Persons who are depressed are also less motivated,2
have difficulty performing some kinds of complex tasks, and have been shown to engage in 
self-defeating behaviour.3 They tend to alienate the people close to them at the very hour 
they need them most, primarily through insecurity and excessive demands.4 It seems 
 
1 Pancner and Jylland 1996, 118. 
2 Lyubomirsky et al. 1999. 
3 See e.g. Potthoff et al. 1995 and Huprich and Frisch 2004. 
4 Stice et al. 2004. 
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appropriate to insist that even if some degree of depression is endurable and valuable, at 
some point all of its sufferers rightly strive to extricate themselves from it. 
Beyond these sensible reasons to resist and avoid much of the potential depression that 
could be experienced, there is also the simple truth that most people do not experience 
particularly severe depression. Even given large stress levels, most people do not think about 
suicide, don’t have difficulty getting out of bed in the morning, and moreover, they do not 
have to try very hard to prevent sliding into those kinds of affective states.  It seems that, 
whatever the deeply depressed person is experiencing, it is substantially and importantly 
different from what the person in the somewhat low mood is experiencing. 
And so this analysis is, in a sense, right back at the beginning, except in worse shape.  
With the medical model there is confidence that criteria consistent with medical 
commitments will be found for making a distinction between pathological depression and 
normal low mood.  These will either be found, in the case of Medical Model A, in physiology 
or, in the case of Medical Model B, the ability to recognize when someone’s depression is 
groundless.  It seems to me, however, that there are no such criteria.  But there is still a 
strong intuition that a distinction has to be made. 
I believe that a distinction can be made, although on slightly different lines than the 
proposals I have considered thus far.  My proposal comes out of a commitment to grapple 
with the normative feature of the possible intentional causes for depression.  I will argue that 
many – in fact, most – instances of depression are intelligible.  As we explore the 
intelligibility of a particular case of depression, we can find insight into the appropriateness 
of pathologising the case and we can find guidance about how to appropriately respond.   
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2.  Intelligibility as applied to emotions 
What does it mean for something to be intelligible?  Intelligibility permits a unifying kind 
of understanding of events that are presented separately, discretely and sequentially - it sees 
them as a whole.  Affective states, both emotions and moods, are comprised of many 
elements.  I think, for an affective state to be intelligible, these elements have to constitute a 
single whole.  Because most of these pieces of a whole emotional experience are normatively 
evaluable, it is possible for others to engage with the emotion-experiencer about her 
particular emotion.   I call this assuming the role of ‘affective interlocutor.’  Through 
affective interlocution, the degree of intelligibility of someone’s affective state (on my view, 
either an emotion or mood) can be determined. 
In determining whether or not an affective state is intelligible, questions of fit between 
aspects of the affective state are primary.  (It is possible, however, to explore through 
affective interlocution any of the three normative axes laid out by D’Arms and Jacobson – fit, 
prudence, or morality.)  We can ask of someone's affective state, which includes emotions 
and moods, whether or not the conditions that aroused it are of the right kind.  We can ask 
whether the intentional object of a person's affective state is appropriate.  As her affective 
state persists or fades away, we can ask whether it should do so.  As the affect-experiencer 
responds to these questions, both she and we, her interlocutors, can learn several things.  We 
can potentially learn about both the world and the affect-experiencer herself. 
What does it mean to say that depression is intelligible?  For this task, I think it will be 
helpful to start with a description of the intelligibility of emotions.  For the sake of clarity, I 
will be considering an emotion’s intelligibility in light of its occasioning intentional object.  
To begin, emotions have several components.  These include affective states, physiological 
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elements, cognitive elements, intentional objects, and motivational tendencies.  Different 
types of emotions have different combinations of these components.  Emotions are also 
diachronic.  They follow a pattern of coming into existence, persisting, and passing out of 
existence.  They are aroused under certain environmental conditions.  These arousal 
conditions reveal the intentional aspect of emotions – emotions are directed toward or are 
about something external to the emotion-experiencer.  Once arousal happens, there is 
typically a set of bodily responses, both physiological and behavioural, along with an 
affective component (which often has a typical affective-intensity arc).  There are often 
motivational/ behavioural consequences.  And finally, the emotion fades and disappears.5 In 
the majority of cases I think that we are able to link these potentially discrete emotion 
elements into a whole, thus rendering the emotion(s) intelligible. 
There are some differences in this pattern for different emotions.  Additionally, many 
emotions are almost always experienced along with other emotions (e.g. excitement is often 
joined with happiness or fear, joy often accompanies love).  This can sometimes make full 
understanding of emotions – either our own or others' – very complicated.  In the vast 
majority of cases, however, I think that we are able to link these potentially discrete emotion 
elements into a whole, thus rendering the emotion(s) intelligible.  
Let us apply affective interlocution to the case of Kate.  Imagine that Kate became angry 
because while driving she was cut off.  She is angry at the other driver.  The other driver’s 
behaviour is the occasioning intentional object of her anger.  Let us further imagine that we 
cannot understand why that event would lead her to be angry.  One of the common fitting 
arousing conditions for anger is an act of being threatened.  Kate perhaps could tell us about 
 
5 An extended discussion of these features of emotions can be found in Craig Delancey 2003. 
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the rules of the road and the problems that arise with cutting off other drivers.  She might link 
her anger’s intentional object (the other driver’s behaviour) with the occasioning conditions 
of her anger and argue that by cutting her off, the other driver was essentially threatening her.  
She would say that through this behaviour, the other driver is an appropriate target of her 
anger. 
As she explained, we would knit the discrete pieces – the arousing conditions, the 
occasioning intentional object, the intensity of the affect, its duration, the physiological and 
behavioural elements – of Kate’s recounting into a single intelligible whole.  We would 
appreciate the fit that exists between the many elements of Kate’s emotional state.  We would 
thereby have learned that the 'cutting-people-off' event in the world is the kind of thing that 
entitles one to become angry, we would see the person who engages in 'cutting-people-off' 
behavior as a suitable object of anger and we would consider Kate’s emotional response to be 
intelligible.  In this case, we would fundamentally be learning something about the world – 
that being cut off is linked in an intelligible way with becoming angry. 
But now let us imagine that when we encounter Kate, she is angry about being cut off 
while driving more than a month earlier.  She could explain about how she felt threatened by 
the other driver's behaviour.  And we might be able to understand all of these elements.  But 
in this case, as we began to put the pieces together – the events in the world, the elements of 
Kate’s emotion – we would likely have a further question.  Why is Kate still angry?  And if 
all she could give in response were the same reasons that she provided to explain how her 
anger was occasioned, we might not be satisfied.  While we might grant that being cut off is 
the kind of thing that fits with becoming angry, we might not think that it does so for very 
long.  We would be unable to integrate the duration of Kate’s anger with the other elements 
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of her emotion.  One part of her emotion simply does not fit with the other elements.  This 
evaluation denies that Kate's longstanding anger is fully intelligible.  The initial arousal, the 
early responses - all of these make sense.  But Kate's current anger might be baffling and 
remain baffling despite her efforts to explain by appealing to the threatening nature of being 
cut off.  In a case like this, we might feel that what we learn about is Kate herself.  Kate is the 
kind of person whose anger persists longer than it should. 
 
3.  Intelligibility as applied to moods 
To make my case for the potential intelligibility of depression, I need to show that this 
analysis of emotions also extends to moods.  As I discussed in chapter I, moods have many 
of the same components as emotions.  They may include affective states, physiological 
elements, cognitive elements, and motivational tendencies.  Moods, too, are diachronic.  
They come into existence under certain environmental conditions, they persist, and they 
ultimately disappear.  But, as I discussed in chapter I, there are two substantial differences.  
First, moods almost always take immediate intentional objects, unlike most emotions.  
Second, moods almost always do not have a single discrete occasioning object, unlike most 
emotions.  Instead, their arousal typically happens only gradually, in response to several 
occasioning intentional objects, or multiple exposures to a single occasioning intentional 
object.  Sometimes their experiencer cannot even initially identify an occasioning intentional 
object.  In this light, it is difficult to say that moods are intentional.  If the originating events 
cannot be determined, it is hard to understand the mood as fully directed at any particular 
person or environmental conditions.  This characteristic poses a challenge for my claim that 
moods can be intelligible. 
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Intelligibility, on my analysis, permits an understanding of potentially discrete affective 
elements as part of a whole.  The intelligibility that I am concerned with is open to normative 
evaluation through affective interlocution.  I think a central part of this understanding 
requires being able to identify an intentional object that causes the affective state to come 
into existence in the first place.  I just said, however, that the eliciting conditions for moods 
are not easily discernible, and that sometimes even the mood experiencer cannot identify an 
occasioning intentional object for her mood.  Ultimately, however, I think that this is simply 
a difference of degree.  Moods may not have a single and easily identifiable eliciting event.  
They may be the result of several small events that have built up for the mood experiencer.  
These are the mood’s occasioning intentional objects.  Many people (maybe most of us) are 
not especially skilled at consciously looking back and recalling each of these small events 
and tracking the affective build-up those events left in their wake.  But I do think this build-
up can come into focus through affective reconstruction. 
This reconstruction is often a key activity of supportive relationships.  With someone else, 
we can often go back over the events of the preceding days/ weeks/ months/ or even years 
and recall instances that in themselves were not arousing enough to bring us into a strong 
emotional state. When added up, however, they can be seen as grounds for having a 
particular mood, that is, the mood can be seen to fit its occasioning intentional objects.  
Often, no one event serves as a suitable single occasioning object for a particular mood, but 
when these events are seen in combination, intentional objects can emerge.  As this happens, 
the reconstruction efforts can develop into a more general engagement.  The person who was 
acting as a reconstructive aid can become the affective interlocutor I described earlier, raising 
questions about the appropriateness of the different elements of the person’s mood.   
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This simply means that, on my analysis, the intelligibility of a mood – that is, whether or 
not its elements fit together – can be considered both in terms of its immediate (apparent) 
intentional objects and its occasioning intentional objects.  I will start by discussing the 
possibility of fit between depression and immediate (apparent) objects.  There is a commonly 
employed claim about depression that lends itself to the view that depression fails to be 
intelligible with respect to its immediate (apparent) intentional objects.  This is the claim that 
depression is irrational. 
Recall from the previous chapter that depression is associated with several beliefs, 
primarily comprised of a negative assessment of both the world and the self.  Those who take 
depression to be irrational focus on these beliefs (independent of the other elements they are 
associated with through the depressed mood6).  Then they argue that the beliefs are irrational 
– that is, the beliefs do not fit with their intentional objects – and thus depression as a whole 
is irrational.  The cases they consider all involve depression already in existence and how it 
effects how the depression-experiencer sees the world, so they are working with immediate 
(apparent) intentional objects. On my account of intelligibility, a broad failure of fit between 
depression-linked beliefs and their objects would also mean that the depression as a whole is 
not fully intelligible. 
Let me first point out that even if these analysts are correct that depression is irrational 
with respect to its associated beliefs and immediate (apparent) intentional objects, this would 
not establish that depression as a whole is non-intentional.  For this to be the case, there 
would need to be the further step that depression is irrational with respect to its occasioning 
 
6 I argued against doing this in chapter I.  I think considering any of the several elements of a mood wholly 
independently of the others can result in the mischaraterisation of the mood in question, in this case, depression.  
In order to engage with the proponents of the irrational view of depression, however, I will focus on 
depression’s associated beliefs in this section.  
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intentional objects.7 I believe, however, that the view that depression is irrational with 
respect to its immediate (apparent) intentional objects relative to non-depression can be 
rebutted in two ways.  First, I will review some compelling data that persons suffering with 
depression are actually more rational than typically thought.  Then, I will review some data 
that non-depressed persons are less rational than typically thought, a phenomenon I will call 
“cheerful denial.” 
As demonstrated in the current diagnostic criteria for depression listed in chapter II, 
depression is fundamentally associated with beliefs the sufferer holds about the world and 
herself.  The claim that the beliefs associated with diagnosable depression fit with their 
objects, that is, that depression is rational, may initially appear to be highly implausible.  
Clearly depression sometimes qualifies as a psychopathology, and the folk psychological 
hallmark of psychopathology is an absence of rationality.  In fact, this certainty that 
depression is significantly irrational is often used as possible distinguishing criterion between 
normal and pathological depression.  The claim is that the beliefs associated with low level 
depression meet everyday requirements of rationality, whereas pathological variants of 
depressed cognitive processes are distinctly irrational.  The main proponent of this view is 
Aaron Beck, who argues that depression as disease state is, at its core, irrational, and that it is 
this irrationality that permits its designation as pathological.8 On Beck’s analysis, both the 
beliefs that the depressed person arrives at about the world (e.g. that life is deeply unpleasant 
and that there is little that one can do about it) and the judgements that follow from these 
 
7 I should point out that people who argue that depression is irrational are not trying to establish that depression 
is non-intentional.  But because I think that this is a consequence of their analyses, I feel that I should address 
their arguments. 
8 Beck 1979.  Beck’s substantial contributions to how depression has been understood are discussed in Graham 
1990: 411-12. 
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beliefs (e.g. that a life so-characterised is not worth living) are arrived at irrationally.  But 
there is evidence that, in some respects, sufferers of depression demonstrate greater 
rationality than non-depressed people, resulting in a phenomenon called “depressive 
realism.”   
For example, rationality is, in part, an ability to see the world as it really is, to take one’s 
perceptions of one’s surroundings and through reasoning use them to arrive at plausible 
characterisations about the state of the world.  Interestingly, there is strong empirical 
evidence that demonstrates that this is precisely what people suffering from depression do.  
Lyn Abramson and Lauren Alloy performed a study that indicated that the problem with 
depression is not that its sufferers are irrational.9 In fact, quite the opposite appears to be the 
case.  In their study, depressed individuals seem to have a better grip on reality than their 
non-depressed peers.  The basic form of the experiments was that depressed and non-
depressed students were asked to push a button and observe a light that went on and off.  
Pushing the button had a greater or lesser controlling effect on the light going on or off, 
depending on the trial.  The depressed students accurately assessed the degree of control that 
they had in different experimental trials, while their non-depressed counterparts both 
overestimated and underestimated their degree of control. 
The experimenters had hypothesized that the depressed students would make lower 
estimates of control than the non-depressed students.  This was only partly borne out.  
“Although the depressed students were surprisingly accurate in judging degree of [control], 
nondepressed students showed both illusions of control and no control depending on the 
 
9 Alloy and Abramson 1979.  For confirming earlier results, see Golin et al. 1977. 
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particular experimental situation.”10 In trials where there was a low degree of control, if 
there was a higher rate of positive responses (e.g., the light would go on more frequently) 
then the non-depressed students thought that they had a higher degree of control than they 
actually had.  When there was a lower rate of positive responses (e.g., less frequent light), the 
non-depressed students thought that they had a lower degree of control than they actually 
had. 
The degree of control that the non-depressed students thought they had corresponded to 
how successful they thought they had been.  If they thought that things had gone well, then 
they felt that they were in control.  If they thought that things had gone poorly, they 
attributed this to a lack of personal control.  Thus, the depressed students provided lower 
assessments of control than the non-depressed students in some instances, when the number 
of positive responses was higher.  But when the number of positive responses was low, the 
depressed students’ assessments of control were higher than the non depressed students’.  
Further, the experimenters had thought that the non-depressed students’ assessments would 
be roughly correct and the depressed students would think that they had less control than they 
really did, and this was distinctly not the case.  These results, and others like them,11 have 
given rise to the label ‘depressive realism,’ whose proponents maintain that depression, 
however debilitating, is not best characterised as irrational.  Depression does not seem to 
distort perception of how things are, certainly not to the degree previously assumed. 
Not only does depression seem to be rational, there are also indications that absence of 
depression typically involves less than fully rational behaviour.  Non-depressed people, for 
 
10 Alloy and Abramson 1979, 477.   
11 See, for example, Taylor and Brown 1988 for an early review of the literature. 
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example, tend to de-emphasise their negative attributes in times of stress, although in other 
contexts they acknowledge that these negative characteristics do exist.12 They also 
overestimate how well-liked they are.13 S.  Taylor and J. Brown argue that it is illusions that 
maintain the well-being of non-depressed persons.  As Michael Ignatieff puts it, “[i]n 
melancholia we are dragged beneath the flat surface of our contentment to encounter the 
harsher truth of life which our illusions conceal from us.”14 
I think this ‘cheerful denial’ feature of non-depression is further seen in animal studies 
used to assess the effects of anti-depressants.  A common experimental protocol for assessing 
anti-depressant efficacy is to drop rats into basins of water from which they cannot escape.  
The length of time the rat keeps swimming is considered to be a measure of its ‘depression’ 
— that is, non-depressed rats will swim longer.  I do not intend this discussion to be taken as 
an attempt to establish rat rationality.  It is simply my contention that typical rat behaviour in 
these experiments can serve as a kind of analogue of possible human responses (this premise 
is of course what motivates the experiments in the first place). 
Returning to the experiment, I am happy to grant that it takes a less ‘depressed’ rat to keep 
swimming.  But it seems possible to argue that this is not the more ‘rational’ rat, at least on 
some accounts of rationality.  To persist in swimming even in the absence of indications that 
swimming can accomplish anything, seems, at least in some lights, the more irrational 
behaviour.  Of course, when the depressed rat stops swimming, she drowns.  But in this 
experiment, all the rats drown, depressed and non-depressed alike.  On some analyses of 
 
12 See e.g. Showers et al. 1998. 
13 See e.g. Glass et al. 1993.   
14 Ignatieff 1987, 940. 
85
rationality, it is always irrational to do anything that does not prolong living.  This strikes me 
as too strong.  Surely at some point, giving up, even though it meant terrible consequences, 
would be considered rational (or at least be among the possible rational responses).  In 
humans, after a certain point, behaviour that prolongs an extraordinarily difficult life with no 
prospect of improvement would be considered crazy by many (although not necessarily un-
admirable). 
The anti-depressant medications currently on the market are all drugs that make rats keep 
swimming longer.15 I am not sure that these results should be heartening.  This research 
reinforces the possibility that grasp of certain truths about the world goes hand in hand with 
depression.  The rat that ‘sees’ the futility of its situation is inclined to give up.  This provides 
a first glimpse of the normative role that depression plays in conjunction with rationality.  In 
certain hopeless situations, depression may simply be among the more rational responses 
available. 
Care must be taken, of course, to not make unwarranted assumptions about the direction 
of causation in any of these experiments.  As Alloy and Abramson observe, “[a] crucial 
question is whether depression itself leads people to be “realistic” or whether realistic people 
are more vulnerable to depression than other people.”16 But in either instance, these studies, 
and others like them, indicate that the insistence that depression is irrational relative to non-
depressed states and that this irrationality constitutes part of its pathology is on shaky ground. 
I think what happens with the irrationality thesis is that its proponents equivocate between 
fitting appropriateness and prudential appropriateness.  The term ‘rationality,’ like the term 
 
15 Or, in the test where they are suspended by their tails, the medications keep the rats struggling longer.  See 
Willner 1994: 298-300, for a literature review. 
16 Alloy and Abramson 1979, 480. 
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‘appropriate’ has several meanings.  The adjudication of rationality might require an 
assessment of fit between a belief and its object or it might require an assessment of whether 
or not the person should hold the belief, all things considered.  There is good evidence that 
sufferers of depression experience some good fit between their depression-linked beliefs (e.g. 
the world is a negative place, I am a person deserving of negative appraisal) and the 
immediate (apparent) intentional objects which bolster those beliefs (e.g. assessments of the 
control that I have in the world, views about me held by others).  Rather than a failure of fit, 
it is more plausible to argue that it is not prudentially appropriate to hold those beliefs and 
see the world in that light.  Even if the depressed beliefs are accurate, it may not advance 
your interests to be aware that people around you do not like you very much.  This is an 
important consideration, one worth attending to.  But it should be kept distinct from the 
question of whether or not the depression-linked beliefs fit with their immediate intentional 
content. 
Let us now consider the fittingness of depression with respect to its occasioning objects.  
For this, we will return to Kate, who is now depressed and she is not sure why.  To determine 
whether or not Kate’s depression has an occasioning intentional object, we should assume the 
role of affective reconstructors and ask her about her life of late.  Perhaps we would learn 
that she started a new job recently.  In her previous job, she was surrounded by a group of 
people who formed an enthusiastic group of supporters.  In her new job, she is more isolated.  
Moreover, she is being given a number of significant responsibilities but she does not have 
the training or resources to adequately discharge them.  As she recounts the difficulties she is 
facing, Kate slowly realises just how difficult she finds this situation and she comes to see 
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these features of her work environment as the occasioning intentional object of her 
depression. 
At this point, we might shift from the role of reconstructors to affective interlocutors.  We 
would now ask how these features of her job fit with the features of her depression.  Assume 
that Kate’s depression includes the negative appraisal about both the world and the self found 
among the list of current diagnostic criteria for depression.  In what way do the features of 
this job fit with Kate thinking and feeling negatively about the world?  In what way do they 
fit with Kate thinking and feeling negatively about herself?  In her responses, she might be 
able to persuade us that the situation does in fact fit with the depression that she is 
experiencing.  Her depression would become intelligible. 
The intelligibility of depression can also be seen in contrast.  A person who finds herself 
in a terrible situation, knows that things are bad, believes her own worth as a person to be 
compromised but does not feel depression seems to suffer from some kind of affective 
insensitivity. Consider for a moment the person who drinks to distract herself from 
depression. There are many reasons for considering this coping strategy inappropriate (e.g. 
impaired function, compromised dignity). On my view, however, these side effects of 
drinking are not the only, or even the central, problem.  I think a key problem with 
alcoholism is that one becomes the kind of person who does not feel bad, even in bad 
situations. The drunk is the one who laughs inappropriately when nothing funny is going on, 
or who is suddenly morose for no reason. 
Consider now the case of Prozac, one of the SSRIs that I discussed in the previous 
chapter.  The person on Prozac doesn’t feel bad in bad situations either.  But in an important 
respect, the person on Prozac is in worse shape than the drinker. Insofar as the alcohol 
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successfully alleviates the drunk’s depression, she does not feel bad because she does not see 
the terrible things around her. The alcohol makes her blind to her situation. When this 
blinding feature of the alcohol fails, and the individual remembers how dire things are, the 
bad feelings come rushing back in.  But with Prozac, a common endorsement of the product 
is, “I still see my problems, they just don’t bother me that much anymore.”17 This is 
supposed to be good, because medication should not render patients blind automatons. But 
on another level this feature is disturbing. The person on Prozac knows that things are bad, 
but the knowledge does not bring about a depressed response.  Not being depressed when the 
truths associated with depression — that life is miserable, that one’s own life is 
disappointing18 — are visible, seems to potentially constitute a compromise of one’s 
emotional intelligibility. 
 
4. Depression as moral mood 
It is now reasonably well established that at least some emotions can play an important 
and valuable role in our moral lives.  Emotions are often either elicited by events that are 
moral violations or they motivate us to pursue moral behavior.  I believe the same is true for 
some moods, notably depression.  I will argue for depression's place as a moral affective 
state, employing several examples to motivate my position. 
Jonathan Haidt claims that there are four categories of moral emotions:  “the other-
condemning family (contempt, anger, and disgust), the self-conscious family (shame, 
 
17 See for example Henry Hernandez’s testimony in Elfenbein 1995, 65. 
18 The lack of emotional intelligibility assumes, of course, that the person does not have certain other beliefs 
that might warrant an overriding cheerfulness - e.g. "Despite the miserableness of life, there are also many 
offsetting, wonderful features" or "Despite the disappointments of my life, there are also many successes to be 
savoured." Beliefs about the afterlife might be an important source of such countervailing reasons. 
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embarrassment, and guilt), the other-suffering family (compassion), and the other-praising 
family (gratitude and elevation).”19 Some moods can also be characterized along these moral 
dimensions.  In the case of depression, I believe its belief and judgement components are too 
mixed to allow it to be placed in a single family.  Typically depression incorporates both a 
negative view of the world and a negative view of the self.  Thus, I will argue that it both 
falls into the other-condemning family and the self-conscious family.  I will motivate this 
claim by considering a few examples, one a fictional character, Sophie Zawistowska from 
William Styron’s Sophie’s Choice,20 and the other, the mid-twentieth century philosopher, 
Simone Weil. 
The character of Sophie is a woman who lived in Poland during WWII.  She and her two 
children were deported to a concentration camp.  While in the camp, Sophie was presented 
with a choice by a camp doctor.  She had to choose one of her children to be killed.  If she 
refused, both of her children would be killed.  Sophie chose her daughter to die, and her son 
was allowed to live.  During their time in the camp, Sophie’s son also died.  When the camp 
is liberated, Sophie moves to America.21 
The novel is set in 1947 in Brooklyn.  Her description clearly meets every diagnostic 
criterion for depression.  But it is clear that her depression is not simply the outgrowth of 
grief for her dead children.  Sophie refuses to let go of her awareness of her own culpability 
in their deaths.  I know that many people think that Sophie is not culpable, that the choice she 
was presented with was no choice at all.  But Sophie does not see it that way.  In those few 
 
19 Haidt 2003. 
20 Styron 1979. 
21 I will be presenting a greatly simplified version of Sophie’s situation. 
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moments when faced with the choice, Sophie actually made two choices.  She first chose to 
choose between her children and then she chose her daughter.  In that moment she learned 
something terrible about herself – that she is the kind of person who can and will choose 
between her children.  She did what no person may do – especially not a mother. 
Sophie can neither bear the world that put her in that position, nor can she bear herself and 
the role she played.  Many will protest that her other option – refusal to choose – would also 
have been a choice.  I agree.  My analysis does not imply that had Sophie chosen otherwise, 
she would have been better off.  She likely would simply have had a different and no less 
terrible burden of guilt.  But given where she is, Sophie judges herself to have committed an 
unforgivable sin and judges the world as intolerable.  And she refuses to be consoled or to 
turn away from this awareness.  Under this description, I think Sophie’s depression clearly 
finds a place in both the other-condemning and the self-conscious families of moral affective 
responses.  To me, her depression is entirely intelligible.  I think there is a fit between the 
occasioning intentional objects of her depression and the features of her particular 
depression.  More than intelligible, I find her depression morally admirable.  There would be 
a kind of strength in a person who was able to overcome the tragedy that Sophie faced.  But I 
think Sophie’s unflinching gaze at the horror of her past is incredibly strong. 
Most of us, I think, have no problem forgiving Sophie.  Many of us do not even think that 
Sophie did anything that needs forgiveness.  But Sophie will not relinquish what she knows – 
that she did an atrocious thing and the world pushed her to do it.  Her depression makes clear 
that she rejects the cheerful denial that so many of us rely on.  Her attitudes pass judgement 
on her own past and also on the rest of us who wish her to think differently and feel better.  
Had antidepressants been available to Sophie, I suspect she would have refused them.  She 
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made an effort to go on with her life.  But she never becomes persuaded that what she knows 
about herself and the world is not true, or that its importance fades, or that it becomes less 
worth attending to.  In the end, Sophie kills herself. 
Simone Weil provides another example of depression that I would like to examine.  
Although she wrote a great deal about her thoughts and feelings on a wide range of issues,22 
there is, with any actual person an opacity that we do not face when dealing with a fictional 
character.  I will present a brief account of her life and motivations but she was, of course, 
considerably more complicated than my brief portrait will show. 
Weil was born in Paris in 1909.  She pursued studies in philosophy and had a life-long 
interest in resisting oppression.  Simone Weil judged the world to be, in many respects, 
intolerable.  There was plenty of evidence for this view in the world around her, notably in 
the First World War and the Spanish Civil War, and then finally in the Nazi atrocities she 
learned about during the Second World War.  It seems to me that her judgement about her 
own worthlessness was grounded in her sense that she failed to live up to the moral example 
set by Christ.  Like Sophie, Weil refused to let go of her awareness of these truths and her 
long depression was surely deeply grounded in these beliefs. 
Weil and her family managed to escape from Paris as the Nazis invaded.  They fled to 
America, but Weil viewed this as an intolerable betrayal of her country and citizens.  She 
later went to London to work for the Free French.  While there she decided to live on the 
official rations that were allocated to residents of Paris by the Nazi occupying force.  These 
rations were not in fact enough to survive on.  People in Paris were forced to supplement 
 
22 Weil 1965. 
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their rations with food obtained through black market channels.  Weil refused to do anything 
similar, and she ultimately died from tuberculosis complications related to malnutrition. 
 
5. Implications 
What does these characterisations of Sophie’s and Weil’s depressions entail for how 
others ought to treat them?  I will start by considering Sophie.  First, I am not arguing that we 
should stand by and do nothing as Sophie takes her own life.  But I also think that we should 
not respond to her as merely sick in the head.23 If she were being treated today, according to 
the depression diagnostic criteria, Sophie is very sick.  She would almost certainly be 
institutionalised.  And while institutionalised, she would be the recipient of countless hours 
of group and individual therapy.  But this therapy might or might not include the kind of 
engagement that I want to advocate. 
I think that those around Sophie – those who take on the role of affective interlocutor – 
should challenge her own assessment of her worth and the worth of the world that is implicit 
in her depression.  I would want them to try to persuade her to change her assessment of her 
history and her current moral status.  I actually think Sophie makes a terrible mistake in 
thinking about her wrongdoing.  I think she has an expectation that mothers protect their 
children, independent of circumstances.  I would like Sophie’s affective interlocutors to 
challenge that conception of motherhood.  But I would also want the people around her to 
take seriously the possibility that first, Sophie’s depression is intentional.  It is indeed about
these past events.  Second, I would want them to consider the possibility that there is a good 
 
23 In the case of someone with Sophie’s history, I do not actually believe that the medical community would 
simply give her some pills and send her on her way.  This is, however, what happens with many people 
currently diagnosed with depression. 
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fit between the intentional objects of Sophie’s depression and the specifics of the mood she is 
experiencing.  I think the fit that exists between Sophie’s depression and intentional objects 
constitute what might be called a good reason,24 and not simply good reasons for Sophie to 
be depressed – they are good reasons for anyone to be depressed.  Simultaneously, however, 
I would want Sophie’s affective interlocutors to be open to being persuaded themselves that 
Sophie’s affective state reflects her beliefs and values and that to give it up would cost too 
much.  Where would this kind of engagement have led?  Perhaps Sophie could have changed 
her affective stance.  Perhaps given some more time and love and understanding, she would 
have been willing and able to put aside her depression to some meaningful degree.25 But also 
perhaps not. 
Weil’s example also provides a clear example of what would now count as a diagnosable 
depressive disorder (with an eating disorder as well).  She, like Sophie, would almost 
certainly be institutionalised, and subjected to a great deal of therapy.  And as with Sophie, I 
would like to advocate that her depression ought to be considered as a potential intentional 
state, and an effort made to locate its occasioning intentional objects.  I include Weil’s 
example in this analysis, however, because I think we might ultimately decide to resist the 
assessments that undergird her depression.  In particular, I think Weil’s beliefs about her own 
worthlessness may not fully fit with any occasioning intentional objects.  I suspect that it 
would be difficult to knit the pieces of Weil’s depression – the originating conditions, her 
affective state, her physiological responses, her behavioural motivations – into one 
 
24 In general, I am avoiding talking about ‘reasons’ for moods to avoid over-cognitivising moods, a worry I 
mentioned briefly at the end of chapter I. 
25 In the novel, Sophie was surrounded by men who glamorised and fetishised her depression.  Their absence 
might have helped a lot. 
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intelligible whole.  I am not sure if such an assessment would result in a sense that there was 
actually no occasioning intentional objects, that is, that Weil’s depression was not actually 
intentional at all.  I think this would have to be determined in light of more details than I can 
present here. 
Now we are finally in a position to see how depression’s intelligibility can help in 
responding to the distinction – normal low mood versus pathological depression – that has 
been vexing us.  On my analysis, the distinction should be made by considering different 
appropriate third-person responses.  In this way, it becomes a three-fold distinction.  One 
category is for clearly pathological cases of depression that (mostly) simply require 
physiological treatment.  This category will likely include cases of depression that are wholly 
non-intentional, like those caused by medications like steroids.  In some instances, a person 
who is administered steroids becomes quickly and deeply depressed, and discontinuation 
quickly reverses these symptoms.  This category will also include cases of patients whose 
affective and physiological responses are so extreme that the affective engagement I endorse 
is not really possible.  With these cases, the question of intentionality cannot really be 
addressed until some of the patient’s symptoms are alleviated.  The other clear category will 
encompass cases where response on the part of the medical community is not especially 
warranted, as no physiological treatment is needed.  This will include cases where the 
person’s depression is intentional, intelligible and not especially severe. 
But the largest and most complicated category will be cases of depression that are at least 
partly intentional and intelligible and involve a moderate to extreme degree of suffering.  I 
believe that clinicians rightly attempt to alleviate suffering.  Currently there are 
pharmacological treatments that facilitate clinicians lifting a person’s low mood without 
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entering into the role of affective interlocutor, without engaging with the intentional features 
of a person’s depression at all. 
Most diagnosed depression in North American is now being treated by physicians other 
than psychiatrists and most people so-diagnosed receive exclusively pharmacological 
treatment (with no talk therapy of any kind).  This response from the medical community 
constitutes the implicit denial of the possibility of depression being intentional.  This means 
that most current pathologising responses to depression further implicitly deny depression’s 
intelligibility.  This makes depressed individuals dependent on medical experts to tell them 
how they are.  Without appeal to intelligibility, it is not open to people to insist that their way 
of being is appropriate or even not pathological.  That which counts as painful symptom 
warranting treatment and investigation is up for grabs, up to and including the painfulness.  I 
take these worrying features to be ultimately grounded in the abandonment of ‘reasons’ talk 
as related to depression. 
This, of course, is what I think should not happen.  On my view, while the 
pharmacological treatments that ease suffering should be employed with this third group, 
they should be accompanied by the engagement that I have described and endorsed.  In 
practice, I believe that there are clinicians who do this, but I worry that they are becoming an 
increasing minority.  Moreover, I believe that in the broader North American culture, there is 
less and less encouragement to pursue this sort of response. 
Eliminating this kind of engagement raises real concerns in the context of social justice. 
This concern crystallises in considering the current situation of women in North America, 
who are twice as likely as men to experience a diagnosable depressive illness.26 Worse still, 
 
26 Kessler et al. 1994. 
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once diagnosed, they are more likely to be prescribed pharmaceuticals than men.  I am not 
wanting to encourage clinicians to respond more paternalistically to women and insist that 
they live with their depression, rather than providing them with some measure of 
pharmaceutical relief.  Instead I want to encourage everyone, as they accept that medication 
can be helpful, to not thereby abandon what I consider an obligation to try to understand why 
so many women in this culture have this response. 
As I argued earlier, when we engage with the intentional features of someone’s 
depression, we potentially learn about the sufferer and about the world.  I think close 
attention to intentional features of women’s depression, in particular the occasioning 
intentional objects of that depression, will reveal that the world as it currently is, is the kind 
of place in which women’s depression is fitting.  In my account of depression as a moral 
mood, I characterised it as belonging to both the other-condemning family and the self-
conscious family.  I find the depression-informed negative appraisal of the world and 
negative self-appraisal that women manifest highly intelligible.  The kind of devaluation that 
women often experience in this culture can make sense of both.  I think it serves as both a 
fitting and morally appropriate source of a negative view of the world.  I also think it serves 
as a fitting but morally inappropriate source of a negative view of the self.27 But if 
depression is not seen as potentially intentional and intelligible, then it cannot be engaged 
with normatively, and there is no possibility to even raise these questions. The social 
consequences of this silence strike me as deeply worrying. 
If I am right that depression is part of our repertoire of intelligible responses to the world, 
then its placement in a narrow medical model of disease constitutes a radical change.  I am 
 
27 I will attempt to tease out this kind of concern a little more in my discussion of borderline personality 
disorder. 
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convinced that there ought to be protest at the thought of losing the possibility of talking 
intentionally about one’s depression.  I believe that my analysis highlights some elements of 
depression’s value, which seems to be obscured by those who medicalise and pathologise it. 
They respond to depression as physiological disorder and think fundamentally in terms of 
physical causation.  This phenomenon is exacerbated by a philosophical stance that considers 
moods to be non-intentional.  Members of both the medical and philosophical communities 
are often not interested in the ways that depression sometimes functions as an intelligible 
response to the world.  But it is only when we consider depression as an intelligible response 
that we can see the role it plays role in moral agency.  Once this role is seen, however, I 
believe it becomes clear that we should not permit depression’s wholesale pathologisation. 
CHAPTER IV 
MEDICAL APPROACHES TO BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER 
 
As I have argued in the preceding chapters, moods are affectively charged states that can 
come into existence in virtue of exposure to occasioning intentional objects, typically many 
such objects, over an extended period of time.  (Moods can also be exclusively 
physiologically caused, with no intentional occasioning features.)  As they persist, their 
effects are typically far-reaching for their experiencer.  Most significantly, moods take many 
immediate intentional objects, greatly affecting how the mood-experiencer perceives both the 
world and herself.  The mood, its occasioning intentional object (if it has one), and its 
associated immediate intentional objects affect how she feels and thinks and what she is 
likely to do.  In particular, an intentionally-laden mood can play an important role in a 
person’s moral life.   In contrast, most accounts of moods do not consider the possibly 
intentional origins of moods, and some deny that moods can have intentional features at all.
When it comes to psychopathological states, there is further denial of intentionality, because 
within current dominant medical practice, a designation of being psychopathological results 
in treatment that implicitly denies that mental state intentionality. 
Both of these pressures are brought to bear on instances of Borderline Personality 
Disorder.  BPD is a psychopathology, and as such it is subject to non-intentional medical 
approaches.  Further, moods constitute a significant element of the phenomenon, and so it is 
likely to be seen as non-intentional through that lens as well.  Ultimately, I will argue that 
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moods – understood intentionally – can play an important role in understanding BPD, 
potentially explanatorily bridging the origin of the disorder and the symptoms that BPD 
sufferers manifest.  In this chapter I will first present a very brief history of the diagnosis of 
BPD, along with its current diagnostic criteria.  Then I will explore the clinical picture of 
BPD, where the significance of mood to BPD can be appreciated.  Finally, I will explore the 
ways that BPD has been designated pathological.  I will argue that, once pathologised, the 
phenomena associated with BPD are typically taken to be non-intentional within clinical 
responses.  In the following chapter, I will argue that BPD can be intentional, in contrast to 
both dominant pathologising practice and philosophical accounts.  I will go on to briefly 
explore how the potential intentionality of moods shows the moral significance of BPD.  
 
1.  What is BPD?  The Diagnostic Picture 
Borderline Personality Disorder is a relatively new diagnostic category, first appearing 
between 1979 and 1980.  To see why BPD became a diagnostic category when it did, we 
need to know where the diagnosis of BPD fits in psychiatric taxonomy, as well as something 
about the disorder.  To appreciate BPD’s place in psychiatric taxonomy, we need to know a 
little bit of the history of psychiatric diagnoses.  The label “borderline” is a leftover from 
Freudian terminology.  Early in the twentieth century, as part of Freud’s legacy, all mental 
illnesses were understood to fall on a continuum between neurosis and psychosis.  There was, 
however, a sense that some people were crazy but didn’t fit clearly onto a single point along 
the spectrum – they blended symptoms from both ends (e.g. some patients were primarily 
neurotic but with occasional psychotic outbursts).  These patients were the original 
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‘borderlines.’129 The patients who were labeled ‘borderline’ within this schema were 
typically women, the patient population Freud would most likely have designated 
‘hysterical’.130 In the 1950’s and 60’s, the ‘borderline’ category shifted slightly and was seen 
as a subtype of schizophrenia, but this was always an uneasy fit.131 While some patients 
designated ‘borderline’ did experience hallucinations, the majority did not.132 Additionally, 
‘borderline’ patients perform well on reality testing tasks, 133 unlike prototypical 
schizophrenics. 
Starting in the 1950’s, mental illness was increasingly being described in behavioural 
terms, rather than psychological ones.  Behaviour is directly observable, in a way that 
psychological states are not, and thus was considered more amenable to analysis through the 
scientific method.  But with this shift from discussion of psychological phenomena to 
behavioural phenomena, there was a sense that some pathologies could not be reduced to a 
single pathological behavioural manifestation, but were instead only pathological in light of 
patterns of behaviour.  Thus, there arose a need to explain what were seen as character traits 
rather than specific behaviours.  Personality disorders were created in the 1970’s to meet this 
need.  They are understood as stable tendencies to act and see the world in certain 
pathological ways, as contrasted with more discrete episodes of crazy behaviour (associated 
 
129 Louw and Straker 2002. 
130 Kroll 1988. 
131 Crowe 2004a 
132 Links et al. 1989. 
133 Marmer and Fink 1994. 
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for example with depression).  Borderline patients had not had a stable diagnostic home for 
much of the 20th century. The creation of “Personality Disorders” looked suitable. 
The diagnostic category, “Borderline Personality Disorder,” officially came into existence 
with the publication of the DSM-III in 1980.  Although schizophrenia and bipolar disorder 
(previously known as manic depression) are both more familiar diagnoses, BPD actually has 
a higher prevalence rate – approximately 2% of the population is considered to suffer from 
BPD.  (Conversely, schizophrenia’s prevalence rate is between 0.2-0.4%,134 and bipolar 
disorder’s is about 0.7-0.9%.135)
The DSM symptoms of BPD include affect lability, poor impulse control, and unstable 
interpersonal relationships.  Here are the criteria found in the current edition: 
Diagnostic criteria for 301.83 Borderline Personality Disorder:136 
A pervasive pattern of instability of interpersonal relationships, self-image, and affects, 
and marked impulsivity beginning by early adulthood and present in a variety of contexts, 
as indicated by five (or more) of the following: 
 
(1) frantic efforts to avoid real or imagined abandonment. Note: Do not include suicidal or 
self-mutilating behavior covered in Criterion 5.  
(2) a pattern of unstable and intense interpersonal relationships characterized by 
alternating between extremes of idealization and devaluation  
(3) identity disturbance: markedly and persistently unstable self-image or sense of self  
(4) impulsivity in at least two areas that are potentially self-damaging (e.g., spending, sex, 
substance abuse, reckless driving, binge eating). Note: Do not include suicidal or self-
mutilating behavior covered in Criterion 5.  
(5) recurrent suicidal behavior, gestures, or threats, or self-mutilating behavior  
(6) affective instability due to a marked reactivity of mood (e.g., intense episodic 
dysphoria, irritability, or anxiety usually lasting a few hours and only rarely more than a 
few days)  
(7) chronic feelings of emptiness  
(8) inappropriate, intense anger or difficulty controlling anger (e.g., frequent displays of 
 
134 Goldner et al. 2002. 
135 Soldani et al. 2005. 
136 APA 2000. 
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temper, constant anger, recurrent physical fights)  
(9) transient, stress-related paranoid ideation or severe dissociative symptoms 
 
As I will explore later, and as I think these criteria demonstrate, no single mood can fully 
explain the phenomena associated with BPD.  This is in part because BPD is a personality 
disorder, and the symptomatic features that comprise it are very heterogeneous.  But 
additionally, the mood experiences characteristic of BPD are more mixed than a single mood 
label can capture.  In the next section, I will describe the clinical presentation of BPD.  Then 
I will argue that BPD sufferers commonly experience both irritation and depression.  On my 
view, it is this irritation / depression blend, and the mix of intentional objects associated with 
it, that underwrites many cases of BPD.   
 
2.  What is BPD?  The Clinical Picture 
Throughout the diagnostic wanderings of the ‘borderline’ patient population there were a 
substantial number of calls for its elimination as a diagnostic category altogether (that 
continues now, to some extent).137 But the move to eliminate ‘borderline’ was never 
successful.  I think its stability as a pathological diagnosis, despite its instability within the 
diagnostic taxonomy, is linked to several of its clinical features not included in its diagnostic 
criteria.  The main features that bolster its pathological status are: (1) therapeutic 
intractability; (2) the “PIA” factor; and (3) delicate self-mutilation. 
First, there is its therapeutic intractability.  The original borderline patients, and now 
patients with a BPD diagnosis, have always had one of the highest mortality rates of any 
patient population, largely due to successful suicide efforts  (approximately 9% of BPD 
 
137 See Magill 2004 for a discussion of this controversy.  See e.g. MacKinnon and Pies 2006 for an argument 
that borderline personality disorder has problems as a diagnostic construct. 
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patients kill themselves), but also as a result of a range of self-destructive behaviours.138 
BPD has also consistently been seen as an untreatable disorder.139 (It should be pointed out 
that this reputation is not because BPD patients do not change.  In fact, remission rates for 
BPD are substantial, or at least more substantial than many clinicians believe.140 But these 
remissions are not linked with any particular therapy.  They appear to be spontaneous.141)
This has been highly frustrating for clinicians working with this patient population, but I 
believe that this frustration was linked to a sense of clinical intrigue.  This, in turn, has 
ensured that clinicians continued to make space for borderline / BPD patients in their clinical 
practices and research programs. 
Second, a further factor that has gone into borderline / BPD’s stability as a pathology is 
due to another hidden diagnostic criterion – its sufferers are very difficult. Practitioners with 
borderline patients consistently report great difficulties working with these patients.  They 
have consistently been seen as confrontational and distinctly not treatment-compliant.  
Michelle Cleary et al. found, in a survey of over 500 mental health staff, that 84% of them 
judged BPD patients to be more aggravating to work with than any other.142 A former head 
of psychiatry at New York University put it succinctly: “Borderliners are the patients you 
think of as PIAs – pains in the ass.”143 This ‘difficult’ feature of BPD is even remarked upon 
 
138 Linehan et al. 2006. 
139 Livesley 2005. 
140 Zanarini Frankenburg Hennen Reich, and Silk 2005. 
141 See e.g Zanarini et al. 2003 and Sanislow and McGlashan 1998. 
142 Cleary, et al. 2002. 
143 Medical World News, 1983.  As cited in Potter 2003. 
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on the web site of the National Reserve Law Officers’ Association.  They have a specific 
page about personality disorders, where George Berlow rates BPD the worst personality 
disorder to encounter during a traffic stop.144 
This feature of borderline patients being PIAs is psychotherapeutically characterised as a 
problem of countertransference unique to BPD.145 Countertransference technically occurs 
when a therapist transfers her repressed emotions onto her patient, as a result of the dynamics 
occurring within their therapeutic sessions.  More generally, it is the sum of the emotional 
responses a therapist holds toward her patient.  It is called countertransference because 
transference is the process by which a patient transfers her emotions (typically those she 
holds toward her parents) onto her therapist.  Transference is actually one of the aims of 
many types of psychotherapy.  The hope is that these patient emotions, once elicited in the 
safe confines of therapy, can then be productively explored.  But countertransference is not 
an aim of psychotherapy, although it is probably unavoidable.  Psychotherapists are supposed 
to work at managing their countertransferential experiences.  There is a substantial literature 
discussing how BPD evokes powerful negative countertransference reactions from therapists 
and offering different strategies for dealing with this therapeutic challenge.146 I think the 
problem of countertransference – a cleaned up way of saying that BPD patients are enraging 
and resented by clinicians – plays a significant role in the pathologising of BPD. 
 
144 Berlow 2005. 
145 Bradley and Westen 2005. 
146 See e.g.  Zanarini et al. 1990, Becker 1997, or Clark 2006. 
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Third, sufferers of BPD deliberately hurt themselves in a number of ways, in particular 
through deliberate self-injury, called by some the “borderline’s behavioral specialty.”147 This 
typically involves cutting, but burning is also common.  This behaviour is often referred to as 
‘delicate self-mutilation.’  It is seen as unique to borderline patients, and highly pathological.  
Whenever a clinician finds someone who has deliberately injured herself in this manner, 
BPD is the first diagnosis that comes to mind.  Clinicians are generally very disturbed by 
deliberate self-injury.  They see it as a highly manipulative action, a method to emotionally 
extort empathy and caring from those around her.148 (Clinical disdain is, I think, mirrored in 
the term ‘delicate self-mutilation.’)  Because it is so bothersome to clinicians, it receives a 
great deal of attention both anecdotally and in the medical literature.149 This symptom and 
the attention it garners is, by itself, likely significant in ensuring that borderline phenomena 
are robustly viewed as pathological. 
 
3. BPD and moods 
BPD can be partly understood in light of moods. 150 In fact, I think once the possible 
intentionality of moods is appreciated, considering BPD in light of its mood states can be 
illuminating.  In the case of BPD, I will argue that its central mood state is a blend of 
irritation and depression.  Irritation is a negative mood associated with a sense of violation.  
 
147 Gunderson and Ridolfi 2001, 61. 
148 Potter 2006. 
149 See Paris 2005b for a summary of this literature. 
150 I would like to acknowledge that when discussing patterns of moods (especially in the case of personality 
disorders like BPD) it would be very worthwhile to consider the link with temperament or character.  I think it 
is possible that temperaments / characters are themselves intentional, in a manner very similar to the 
intentionality of moods.  Unfortunately, however, this examination is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
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Depression is a negative mood associated with a sense of low self-worth and more general 
disappointment.  (Being a personality disorder, the phenomenon of BPD encompasses many 
different features, not just moods.  I also think that BPD is intentional in other respects, 
notably in its associated beliefs and behaviour, but I will not be exploring those issues here.)  
Unlike depression, however, BPD is not a mood disorder, so my first responsibility is to 
make clear where and to what extent moods constitute BPD phenomena. 
I will begin by considering the way that the DSM symptoms of BPD are underwritten by 
moods.  First, I would like to note that in the DSM-III-R, the first criterion for BPD was: “A 
pervasive pattern of instability of mood, interpersonal relationships and self-image” (italics 
added).151 In the current DSM, the word ‘mood’ has been replaced with ‘affects.’  For 
medical practitioners, ‘affect’ is a term that encompasses both moods and emotions.  This 
change allows emotions to be included as central to the BPD experience, but still grants 
moods a place of prominence.  In addition, the two moods that I think make up the core BPD 
mood blend, irritability and dysphoria (which I have labeled depression), are specifically 
named as factors in symptom 6.  I think, however, this irritation / depression mood blend 
underlies several other listed symptoms.  I will motivate this claim by appeal to a feature of 
moods that I discussed in chapter 1. 
Recall that one of the intentional theories of moods Eric Lormand presented was the 
Precondition Theory, according to which moods are precursors of emotions.  The feature of 
moods that Precondition Theories capture is characterised variously as altering the threshold 
for experiencing an emotion, or having a pre/disposition to experience an emotion.152 While 
 
151 APA 1987. 
152 As cited earlier, see e.g. Nowlis 1963, Parkinson et al. 1996, Ekman 1994, and Morris 1999 for versions of 
Precondition Theories. 
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there are problems with this theory as a total account of moods, there is no doubt that being 
in one mood or another inclines us to experience certain emotions more often and more 
intensely.  A person who is in a cheerful mood will typically become happy more easily and 
more intensely about something that happens.  In the case of BPD, this feature of moods 
helps to make sense of symptom 8.  Borderline patients become angry more often and more 
intensely.  Both irritation and depression can often lead to anger outbursts.  Further, in part 
due to their quickly entered anger experiences, BPD sufferers behave in angry ways.  Thus, 
the mood blend produces anger outbursts which lead to impulsive and damaging behaviour, 
which links the irritation / depression blend to symptoms 4 and 5. 
In addition, borderline patients’ irritation and depression is connected with symptoms 2 
and 3.  These symptoms are about large vacillations in a BPD sufferer’s sense of either 
another person or herself.  She alternates between idealization and devaluation.  Although it 
is not mentioned in the diagnostic criteria, this vacillation does not happen randomly, without 
prompting events.  In particular, the devaluation of another person is typically the result of 
the BPD sufferer’s becoming frustrated with or disappointed by the person over some minor 
slight, a further indicator of a standing mood blend of irritation and depression.153 I also 
think the mood blend, especially the irritation, underlies the “PIA” feature of BPD.  BPD 
patients are so unwelcome for clinicians (and police officers) precisely because they manifest 
their mood-laden sense of victimisation and disappointment so clearly. 
 
153 I think that the BPD sufferer’s tendency to idealise others is best explained by psychoanalytic considerations.  
In particular, I think the defense mechanisms of ‘displacement’ and ‘reaction formation’ are significant 
contributors to the tendency of BPD sufferer’s to idealise.  (Displacement involves the redirection of feelings 
from one person on to another.  Reaction formation occurs when a person takes herself to be experiencing 
feelings opposite to those she actually experiences.)  This explanation, however, is less directly linked with 
moods, and so I will not be exploring it here.  I do not think this appeal to non-mood-related considerations is a 
problem for my account as I am not arguing that all features of BPD can be understood by thinking primarily 
about moods. 
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In my discussion of the diagnostic and clinical features of BPD, I have tried to make the 
case that moods are important to BPD-associated phenomena.  This case can only be indirect, 
as I can find no research specifically examining the link between mood and the DSM 
symptoms of BPD.  In addition to the indirect evidence I have offered, I would also like to 
point out that my position that mood is significant to BPD is also borne out by a current 
clinical debate.  There are many researchers who argue that BPD ought to be characterised as 
a mood disorder, rather than a personality disorder.  Jerome Kroll, for example, argues that 
BPD is basically an atypical affective disorder, as its key diagnostic criteria as affective 
instability and dysphoria. 154 Additionally, there is a substantial debate about whether or not 
BPD ought to be considered an instance of bipolar disorder (a mood disorder).155 While I 
cannot contribute to that clinical debate about diagnostic categories, this dispute confers 
legitimacy on my focus on mood in characterising BPD.  The considerations presented above 
and my own clinical experience lead me to conclude that mood, in particular the blend of 
irritation and depression, is routine for the BPD sufferer and central to the phenomenon of 
BPD. 
 
4. Nonintentional philosophical / psychological accounts of moods 
Further evidence that mood is significant in BPD comes from exploring one further 
clinical feature of BPD in light of some theories of moods.  As I mentioned in chapter 1, 
most current theories of moods are non-intentional.  According to Lormand, positing their 
non-intentionality responds to the Intentionality Condition that he argued for as a constraint 
 
154 Kroll 1993. 
155 See Birnbaum 2004 for a summary of this debate.  See Smith et al. 2004 for an argument in favour of BPD 
being subsumed as an instance of bipolar disorder.  See Paris 2004 for a rejection of this position. 
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on theories of moods.  Of these non-intentional accounts, most aim to explain what Lormand 
called the Pervasiveness Condition.  The Pervasiveness Condition arises out the feature of 
moods whereby they influence and affect our experience very broadly.  Metaphorically, 
when we are in a mood, it ‘colours’ everything we experience, typically resulting in selective 
attention, particularly to phenomena that reinforce the extant mood.  I agree that this is a key 
feature of mood phenomena.  Concern for this feature has influenced a number of 
philosophical and psychological theories of moods. 
Lormand, for example, characterises moods as ‘sieves’ for our entire experience.  For him, 
moods determine upon which of our intentional states (beliefs, desires and emotions) we 
dwell.156 Using a computer metaphor, Paul Griffiths argues that moods are higher-order 
functional states that determine which lower-order states (e.g. emotions and cognitions) the 
person is in.157 Laura Sizer offers a similar ‘computational’ theory of moods arguing that 
moods bias our cognitive operations.158 Consistent with these philosophical views is the 
“mood congruency hypothesis,” argued for by a number of psychologists, notably Gordon 
Bower and Matthias Siemer.   They characterise moods as enhancing the processing of other 
affects or cognitions that are congruent with the original mood.159 
This feature – of biases or dispositions toward certain congruent affective or cognitive 
states – is precisely what is observed with BPD.  Consider the research performed by Lauren 
 
156 Lormand 1985. 
157 Griffiths 1997, 248-257. 
158 Sizer 2000. 
159 Bower 1981 and Siemer 2005. 
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Korfine and Jill Hooley.160 They investigated the extent to which subjects diagnosed with 
BPD would show biased information processing, relative to controls.  Subjects were exposed 
to three types of words: borderline, neutral, and positive.  ‘Borderline’ words are words that 
are supposed to be especially salient to persons diagnosed with BPD, e.g. words associated 
with abandonment or rejection.  (See symptom 1 for confirmation of the centrality of these 
themes with BPD.)  Of course, if I am right that BPD is connected with the irritation / 
depression mood blend, then it should come as no surprise that abandonment and rejection 
are BPD themes.  With each word exposure, the subjects were instructed to either remember 
or forget the word.  While there was no difference in remembering rates for words subjects 
were instructed to remember, subjects diagnosed with BPD showed a significantly greater 
tendency to remember the borderline words they were instructed to forget.  This selective 
attending, associated with greater recall, is just what we would expect if BPD is importantly 
associated with moods, and moods have the features discussed above, that is, pervasive, 
mood-congruent effects on how their experiencer perceives the world.   
Further evidence for this analysis comes from Arnoud Arntz’s lab in the Netherlands, 
where a team of researchers are exploring the unique cognitive and affective features of 
BPD.  From this large research project, Sieswerda et al. have also found evidence of 
cognitive biases in BPD.161 They asked subjects to play a video game.  Within the game, 
they created scenarios that were more or less bad for the subjects’ game representative.  
Subjects diagnosed with BPD were more likely to see their situations as negative compared 
with control subjects.  The researchers characterised the BPD subjects as having a ‘negative 
 
160 Korfine and Hooley, 2000. 
161 Sieswerda et al. 2005. 
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evaluative style.’162 Also from the Arntz lab, Veen and Arntz exposed research subjects to 
film clips with different emotional themes.163 Some of these themes were characterised as 
BPD themes (as with the Korfine and Hooley research, these include abandonment and 
rejection).  Subjects diagnosed with BPD showed emotional reactions that were more 
extreme that control subjects. 
It seems to me that the theories of moods that are responsive to the pervasiveness of 
moods – Lormand’s ‘sieve’ theory, Sizer and Griffiths’ computational theories, Bower and 
Siemer’s ‘mood congruency’ hypothesis – capture something important about moods.  
Moreover, BPD sufferers routinely experience the same phenomena that these mood theories 
aim to explain.  Their experiences are ‘coloured,’ ‘filtered,’ ‘framed’ and ‘biased’ in 
particular, negative, directions.  The direction of bias is consistent with the mood blend of 
irritation / depression I have posited.  I think this provides another indirect piece of evidence 
that moods are significant in BPD – sufferers of BPD experience what experiencers of these 
negative moods would experience.  But of course, all of these theories just discussed take 
moods to be non-intentional.  Given that I am arguing for an intentional account of moods, it 
might seem that I should not invoke these non-intentional analyses.  Recall, however, from 
my first chapter that I argued that these theories of moods were not, in fact, incompatible 
with intentionality.  Although their proponents start from a non-intentional position, the bulk 
of their analyses are consistent with the intentional position that I am arguing for.  On my 
view, these theories are concerned to explain the way that moods take immediate (apparent) 
intentional objects of moods (given that these theories are non-intentional, they would surely 
 
162 This characterisation was endorsed earlier by v. Ceumern-Lindenstjerna et al. 2002. 
163 Veen and Arntz 2000. 
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resist the possibility that intentional objects are involved).  The intentional account I will be 
offering focuses instead on occasioning intentional objects and is compatible with theories 
that describe the effects of moods once those moods come into existence. 
 
5. How BPD is currently understood - The Medical Model(s) 
In my discussion of depression, I explored the ways that medical practice aimed to find 
and keep a distinction between pathological cases of depression and non-pathological cases 
of normal low mood.  One of my concerns was with ‘diagnostic bracket creep’ and the 
pathologisation of increasingly normal mood variants.  There is some possibility that similar 
concerns could be raised with BPD.  Today, instances of BPD-like symptoms are 
pathologised that previously would have been considered normal.  In the 1980 and 1987 
versions of the DSM, the diagnostic list included 8 symptoms (of which 5 must be present for 
a diagnosis) that could be combined to make a diagnosis of BPD.  This meant that there were 
93 different ways that a patient could count as having BPD.  In 1997, DSM-IV the diagnostic 
list was increased to 9 symptoms (again, of which 5 must be present for a diagnosis).  That 
means that there are now 151 different ways that a person can ‘have’ BPD. 
Despite these diagnostic expansions, however, there is no concern with BPD comparable 
to that with depression to maintain a distinction between the normal and the pathological 
instances of phenomena associated with BPD.  The features of BPD are overwhelmingly seen 
as atypical and extreme, and so there is little concern that a diagnostic category for BPD 
threatens to pathologise very normal human responses.  (As I discussed earlier, the main 
clinical concern with BPD has more to do with ascertaining and improving diagnostic 
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validity.164) I find BPD is robust in its designation as a pathological state.  Purely clinically, 
spending time with BPD patients inspires tremendous confidence that something is really 
unique and really wrong. 
As with the depression case, however, I think there is a tendency to see BPD as non-
intentional, once the designation of ‘pathological’ is established.  Again, as with the 
depression case, there is nothing about a state being pathological per se that entails anything 
with respect to intentionality.  The schizophrenic’s delusions of alien mind control are no less 
intentional for being pathological.  But as I argued in the depression case, I think that a 
pattern of clinical engagement that includes no acknowledgement of a disorder’s 
intentionality and that purports fully to explicate the disorder is tantamount to an implicit 
denial of intentionality.  In this section, I will explore medical responses to BPD, in particular 
in light of Medical Model A and Medical Model B, which I outlined in my analysis of 
depression.  In the end, as with depression, I will argue that the implicit denial of 
intentionality associated with medicalisation is revealed through the treatment methods 
employed with BPD. 
Let us start with Medical Model A.  Recall that Medical Model A is the theoretical stance 
occupied by clinicians who wish to characterise disorders in exclusively physiological terms.  
This model does not seem to have any advocates with respect to BPD.  There have been 
attempts to find unique physiological markers for BPD, but they have not succeeded.  
Neurological studies have found some differences between normal controls and people 
diagnosed with BPD, but the differences have been slight, the number of subjects has been 
small (e.g. most have a sample size, n < 10), and the results have been mixed.  To begin, 
 
164 The challenge of diagnostic validity for BPD is reflected in the taxonomic wanderings.  See Paris 2005a for a 
summary of the debate. 
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computed tomography (CT) scans from a while back did not find differences between BPD 
patients and normal controls.165 More recently, an MRI study did find some non-statistically-
significant differences, but the results were confounded by co-morbidities.166 Johnson et al. 
summarise a number of imaging studies using positron emission tomography.167 The results 
were largely negative, that is, there were no brain activity differences between BPD patients 
and normal controls. 
There are differences in brain activity in the pre-frontal cortex between normal controls 
and BPD patients with marked aggressive tendencies.  Especially aggressive BPD patients 
show differences in their serotonergic system.  Some researchers are enthusiastic that this 
might be a signal of a unique form of BPD.  But it is not clear that these differences are really 
responding to BPD-specific phenomena, as similar differences are found with non-patient 
populations in tasks where they are asked to imagine being aggressive.168 With BPD patients 
not selected for their aggressive tendencies, Zaboli et al. found a link between BPD and a 
rate-limiting enzyme in the serotonergic system, but it was not large.169 
Perhaps the biggest problem with understanding BPD within Medical Model A is the 
failure of pharmacological treatments for BPD.  This is in marked contrast to the case of 
depression.  Part of what has given Medical Model A a foothold with respect to depression 
has been the development of certain pharmacological treatments.  As I argued in my 
 
165 Synder et al. 1983. 
166 Driessen et al. 2000. 
167 Johnson et al. 2003. 
168 See Pally 2002 for a summary and examination of this literature. 
169 Zaboli et al. 2006. 
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discussion of depression, there is a willingness among many clinicians to employ a ‘response 
to treatment’ criterion, whereby a phenomenon that goes away when treated is a diagnosable 
disorder.  Further, if the treatment that works is purely physiological, then the disorder 
should be approached in purely physiological terms. 
The ‘response to treatment’ criterion never really gets off the ground with BPD.  There are 
a small number of clinical trials demonstrating some BPD symptom relief.  SSRIs have some 
efficacy with affective lability features of BPD.170 Antipsychotic medications that work on 
the dopaminergic system make some difference to symptoms of impulsiveness.171 But the 
most that has happened is some mitigation of isolated symptoms, with the status of the 
overall disorder unaffected. Use of drug ‘cocktails’ (mixtures of different pharmaceutical 
therapies) are commonly employed with BPD, typically combining an SSRI with an 
antipsychotic, but there is no evidence that such combinations are effective.172 At this point, 
there is no pharmaceutically obtainable remission of BPD.  And even in the cases where 
symptom relief is obtained through administration of drugs, there are as yet no developed 
causal explanations for why or how they work.  The only (and very recent) systematic review 
of pharmacologic treatments in BPD concludes that “pharmacological treatment of people 
with BPD is not based on good evidence from trials” and recommends that future 
pharmacological treatment happen exclusively within the context of randomised controlled 
trials, rather than happening in the clinic, as it does not.173 
170 Rinne et al. 2002. 
171 Friedel, 2004. 
172 Lieb et al. 2004. 
173 Binks et al. 2006a, 2. 
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Despite these difficulties with employing Medical Model A, there does seem to be a 
genetic connection for BPD.174 Twin studies have been done, with fairly definitive results, 
despite their very small sample sizes.175 But no one argues that this genetic effect is 
uninfluenced by environment.  This brings us to Medical Model B.  Recall that Medical 
Model B employed the endogenous / reactive distinction with depression.  Reactive 
depression is the result of stress or emotional trauma.  Endogenous depression arises in the 
absence of ascertainable environmental reasons.  The endogenous / reactive distinction is not 
employed with BPD.  But I think the same kind of concerns found in Medical Model B in the 
case of depression – environmental effects are considered important in the development of 
the disorder – also arise in medical responses to BPD.  Basically, there is a strong consensus 
that previous experiences are significant in most cases of BPD.  In particular, BPD is 
associated with a history of childhood trauma.  Childhood sexual abuse is a particularly 
significant factor, but emotional and physical abuse are also important.176 Zanarini et al. 
demonstrate that parental neglect also contributes significantly to the development of BPD.177 
The significance of childhood abuse to the development of most cases of BPD is, to the best 
of my knowledge, uniformly endorsed. 
 
174 Of course, it is curious that a genetic link has been found in the absence of any other physiological markers.  
There are a couple of possible explanations for this.  One is that the twin studies themselves are flawed, likely 
as a result of confounding factors.  If this is the source of the error, then that would mean that there is little to no 
genetic component of BPD.  It could also be the result of our current imaging technology, which produces very 
coarse images.  If this is the source of the error, eventually we are likely to see neurophysiological differences 
as the imaging technology improves. 
175 Torgerson et al., 2000. 
176 See Ogata et al. 1990 and Shearer et al. 1990 for representative analyses. 
177 Zanarini et al. 1997. 
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On my analysis, this history of childhood abuse constitutes an occasioning intentional 
object for the mood blend that underlies many cases of BPD.  But, as with the depression 
case, there is a question whether this Medical Model B interest in environment reflects a 
willingness to see BPD or its underlying mood as intentional.  Ghzal Zaboli et al. imply that 
they see environment as causal with respect to BPD, not intentional:  
Several environmental and genetic factors are considered predisposing elements… 
Environmental factors such as sexual abuse or situations of abandonment are proposed 
to induce dysfunction behaviors and psychosocial conflicts, which in turn might cause 
emotional dysregulation and impulsivity.178 
On their analysis, if childhood trauma occurs to a person with the right predisposing 
genetic make-up, it causes BPD.  They are not interested in this childhood trauma as a reason 
for BPD.  But of course this quote alone does not establish that Medical Model B 
practitioners take BPD to be non-intentional, even implicitly.  To make that case, we need to 
turn to the dominant therapies currently employed with BPD. 
 
6. The treatment of BPD 
Psychotherapy is the blanket term for all the many types of talk therapies.  Two main (and 
perhaps opposing) camps are: psychodynamic psychoanalysis and cognitive therapies.  
Within each of these camps, there are multiple subtypes.  Psychodynamic psychoanalysis has 
three main theoretical orientations: ego psychology, self psychology, and object relations.  (I 
will not be discussing the features of each of these three orientations.)  What all of these 
psychodynamic approaches have in common is a focus on the patient / therapist interactions.  
In addition, each is committed to engagement with the intentional aspects of the patient’s 
 
178 Zaboli et al. 2006, 1-2. 
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problems (although this need not be exclusive).  The label ‘cognitive therapies’ is slightly 
misleading as cognitive therapies have now subsumed behavioural therapies.  There are 
many types, including pure cognitive therapy (CT), cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT), 
and dialectical-behavioural therapy (DBT).  What each of these therapies has in common is a 
commitment to the idea that the dysfunctional symptoms manifested by patients are 
maintained by dysfunctional beliefs (some variants of cognitive therapies also take 
environmental elements to be important in symptom-stabilisation).  The aim of cognitive 
therapies is to identify and dismantle the maintaining beliefs (or change the environmental 
elements), with the ultimate goal of symptom elimination.179 
Cognitive therapies are now the dominant form of psychotherapy. 180 I think this 
dominance is the result of a better fit between cognitive therapies and current medical 
models, as well as the preference health care payers have for cognitive therapies.  The fit 
between cognitive therapies and current medical practice is no accident.    It was first 
developed by Albert Ellis as a reaction against what he saw as the excessively humanistic 
and insufficiently scientific psychoanalytic therapies.181 They have many features that make 
them a more scientifically-based practice.  
First, cognitive therapies are clear.  They are clear about the goal of treatment – make the 
symptoms go away.  Cognitive therapies accept current mainstream medical approaches to 
psychopathology, and so symptoms themselves are presumed to be obvious, since the DSM 
lists them.  This assumption is distinctly not found within psychoanalytic practice, which is 
 
179 Levenson et al. 2000. 
180 Robins et al. 1999. 
181 Ellis 1975. 
119
not especially concerned with DSM criteria.182 Cognitive therapies are also clear about 
length of treatment.  They typically have a week-by-week plan of exercises.  In the end, with 
their clear-cut step-by-step approach to symptom management, cognitive therapies have a 
much shorter course of therapy than psychodynamic therapy. 
Second, the features just mentioned help cognitive therapies better meet evidence-based 
medicine standards, relative to psychodynamic psychoanalysis.  Evidence-based medicine is 
the dominant overarching framework within medicine today.183 This practice endorses a 
hierarchy of medical research data.  Ideally, clinicians should follow the treatment options 
supported by the results from a systematic review of data from randomised control trials.  
There has, however, only been one such review of psychotherapy for BPD.  Its authors 
concluded that there were insufficient data from which to draw conclusions.184 Cognitive 
therapy, however, because it has a well-defined and shorter course of treatment, lends itself 
to more readily to randomised control trials than do psychoanalytic therapies.  Although there 
have not as yet been many more studies of cognitive therapies that psychodynamic therapies, 
there is an expectation that such a difference will emerge in the next few years.  Cognitive 
therapies are more easily quantified and their efficacy rates more easily measured than those 
of psychoanalytic treatment.  The (relative) simplicity of the treatment also means that it is 
easier to train people to provide it.  The result of all of these features has been a much greater 
embrace of cognitive therapies by medical schools.  Currently, cognitive therapies are also 
dominant in psychology programs as well – more than half of the current training systems 
 
182 Louw and Straker 2002, 191. 
183 Mace and Moorey 2001. 
184 Binks et al. 2006b. 
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now have cognitive therapies as their major theoretical orientation.185 Training to provide 
psychoanalysis is no longer a routine part of current medical psychiatric training.  This has 
meant that there are now many more clinicians who are trained in providing cognitive 
therapies.  
These features of cognitive therapies, especially offering shorter courses of therapy and 
having more clinicians trained in their provision, make cognitive therapies cheaper and easier 
to implement.  This, in turn, means that health care providers prefer them.  Some critics have 
focused on the United States, taking the dominance of cognitive therapies to be a product of 
managed care corporations.  But other types of health care providers, e.g. Canada’s single-
payer system also has a strong preference for the less-expensive therapy, and has emphasised 
cognitive therapies over psychodynamic therapies.186 Some critics have lamented this 
emphasis on the bottom line, but I do not see why health care providers should not aspire to 
spend as little money as possible to provide good care.  These features of cognitive therapies 
also often reduce the time and money that patients must provide, which also seems like a 
benefit.  Further, the transparency of cognitive therapies has lead to standardisation of 
treatment and credentialing, both of which likely serve patient interests.187 
The current guidelines for the treatment of BPD offered by the American Psychiatric 
Association recommend either psychodynamic psychoanalysis or psychotherapy 
(supplemented with some pharmacological treatments, depending on the patient’s symptom 
profile).  According to their summary, both psychodynamic psychoanalysis and cognitive 
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therapies have roughly equal amounts of evidence to support their use, although neither has 
anything approaching definitive evidence of efficacy.188 Despite the paucity of evidence 
favouring cognitive therapies over psychoanalytic therapies for BPD, the preference of 
medically-grounded clinicians for cognitive therapies is made clear by John Oldham.  
Oldham is actually the author of the APA treatment guidelines that advocate the use of either 
psychoanalysis or cognitive therapies.  But in his most recent paper, he argues for a hierarchy 
of treatment. 189 First, the therapist should respond to suicidal and self-mutilating behaviours.  
Second, she should deal with behaviours that lead to serious interruptions in the continuation 
of therapy.  Third, she should pay attention to non-suicidal symptoms linked with depression, 
substance abuse, panic or anxiety and dissociation.  According to Oldham, each of these 
problems should be targeted from a purely behaviour-management perspective.  Once all this 
is complete, then the therapist can move on to consider more psychodynamically-significant 
symptoms.  This hierarchy prioritises cognitive therapies. 
Michael Stone endorses a very similar treatment hierarchy.190 He argues that the evidence 
indicates that cognitive therapies (in conjunction with appropriate pharmacological 
treatments) should be pursued first, to deal with some of the thornier symptoms of BPD that 
appear not to benefit from more psychoanalytic approaches.  But he does not have any data 
to back up this treatment ranking.  In both Oldham and Stone’s accounts, they make room for 
psychoanalytic, intentional therapeutic engagement.  It only comes, however, after most of 
the symptoms of BPD have been eliminated through cognitive therapies.  Although they are 
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not explicit about it, Oldham and Stone ultimately only support psychodynamic approaches 
for patients who would no longer be diagnosable with BPD.   
DBT is an interesting case of a cognitive treatment that has garnered a large amount of 
positive clinical attention (over psychoanalytic treatment), even in the absence of solid 
evidence of efficacy.  The use of DBT over the last 15 years has been based on a single 
study.  It purported to show that DBT reduces suicidal behaviour, a particularly troubling 
BPD symptom for clinicians.  This does seem to have been the case at the 6 month mark in 
treatment, but that effect seemed to go away by month 12.191 A more recent, and slightly 
larger study, showed a slight improvement in suicidal behaviour after12 months of DBT, 
relative to other forms of psychotherapy, but there are a number of confounding factors.192 
This is not especially heartening, so it is curious that DBT has been greeted with such 
enthusiasm. 
I think the answer is because DBT not only has specific protocols for patients, but also for 
therapists employing the therapy.  In particular, DBT emphasises therapists setting 
boundaries with BPD patients.  Within DBT, patient threats of suicide result in less access to 
the therapist, rather than more, as is traditional with other forms of psychotherapy.193 I think 
this therapeutic accommodation makes it very attractive to therapists, independent of 
 
191 Linehan et al. 1991. 
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considerations of efficacy.194 As a final nail in the psychodynamic coffin, DBT is now the 
treatment of choice for BPD under managed care.195 
Given that the features emphasized by the DSM criteria are primarily affective and 
behavioural, this preference for cognitive therapies might come as a surprise.  One should 
keep in mind, however, that because it aims to be a diagnostic tool that can be used based on 
easily observable symptoms, the DSM very rarely includes cognitive features in its diagnostic 
profile.  (Recall that even with depression, no cognitive symptoms are included in the 
symptom list.)  Clinically, though, there are many cognitive elements found in BPD, just as 
there are with depression.196 I touched on some cognitive elements of BPD earlier, in my 
discussion of the cognitive biases associated with BPD. 
But in addition to these biases, BPD is also linked with what clinicians call 
“assumptions.”  Arntz et al. have identified 20 stable assumptions linked with BPD.197 They 
are: 
1. I will always be alone. 
2. There is no one who really cares about me, who will be available to help me, and whom I can 
fall back on. 
3. If others really get to know me, they will find me rejectable and will not be able to love me; and 
they will leave me. 
4. I can’t manage it by myself, I need someone I can fall back on. 
5. I have to adapt my needs to other people’s wishes, otherwise they will leave me or attack me. 
6. I have no control of myself. 
 
194 Bot 1997. 
195 Tyrer 2002, 116.  See also Cigna Healthcare Coverage Position 2005. 
196 These cognitive features are a relatively recently recognized phenomenon.  In the 1990 edition of their now 
classic textbook, Cognitive Therapy for Personality Disorders, Aaron Beck and Arthur Freeman argued that 
BPD was unique among personality disorders, as it did not include stable cognitive features (Beck Freeman and 
associates 1990).  For them, this meant that BPD was not a candidate for the cognitive therapies now dominant.  
I assume this will not be the stance they adopt in the next edition of the book.  As the evidence has mounted that 
BPD does include stable cognitive elements, Aaron Beck is now part of a team doing research using cognitive 
therapy with borderline patients.  See e.g. Wenzel et al. 2006. 
197 Arntz et al. 1999. 
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7. I can’t discipline myself. 
8. I don’t really know what I want. 
9. I need to have complete control of my feelings otherwise things go completely wrong. 
10. I am an evil person and I need to be punished for it. 
11. If someone fails to keep a promise, that person can no longer be trusted. 
12. I will never get what I want. 
13. If I trust someone, I run a great risk of getting hurt or disappointed. 
14. My feelings and opinions are unfounded. 
15. If you comply with someone’s request, you run the risk of losing yourself. 
16. If you refuse someone’s request, you run the risk of losing that person. 
17. Other people are evil and abuse you. 
18. I’m powerless and vulnerable and I can’t protect myself. 
19. If other people really get to know me they will find me rejectable. 
20. Other people are not willing or helpful. 
 
James Pretzer characterises the core characteristic BPD beliefs as: (1) the world is 
malevolent and dangerous; (2) they [the BPD sufferers] are powerless and vulnerable; and 
(3) they view themselves as unacceptable.198, 199 Although mood was not explored in 
conjunction with identifying these assumptions, it seems clear to me that these are just the 
sorts of assumptions that one would expect to accompany a mood blend of irritation and 
depression that I have argued is characteristic of BPD. 
It might appear that if Medical Model B endorses cognitive therapies for BPD and 
cognitive therapies focus on assumptions like those above, then BPD must be seen as 
intentional.  These assumptions include clearly-intentional beliefs about a range of issues, 
particularly about the BPD sufferer herself.  Derek Bolton takes this position, and argues that 
this new preeminence of cognitive therapies is very positive because it relies on the idea that 
intentional mental states can themselves be causal.200 In the case of BPD, cognitive therapies 
 
198 Pretzer 1990. 
199 It is worth noting that the moods associated with BPD are not reducible to this assumption set.  Arntz et al. 
1999 found that the assumption set and the intensity with which its elements were endorsed did not vary over 
mood-alteration conditions (p. 551). 
200 Bolton 2004. 
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focus on the associated beliefs (e.g. I will always be alone) and explore the way that belief 
causally hooks up with unpleasant symptoms of BPD (e.g. a patient flying into a rage when 
her lover cancels a date).  The hope is that dismantling the belief about always being alone 
will lead to fewer rages about cancelled appointments.  As I just discussed, there is reason for 
this hope, although it is still only a hope, and not established as effective.  Bolton 
characterises the history of psychiatry as a battle between psychoanalysts, understanders of 
narratives, and physiologists, explainers of causes.  He sees cognitive therapies as bridging 
the gap between these two approaches, which he lauds.  Given my interest in preserving the 
importance of intentionality, on Bolton’s analysis, I should be an enthusiastic proponent of 
cognitive therapies. 
 
7. How cognitive therapies implicitly deny intentionality 
In some respects, I am pleased with the advent of cognitive therapies.  Cognitive therapies 
have been clear about the objectives of therapy, clear about what therapy entails, and there 
has been a concerted effort to determine whether or not these objectives are met.  I think this 
is a tremendous virtue, as patients should be able to know before entering therapy what they 
are getting into, and clinicians should aspire to provide their patients with treatment that 
actually meets patient goals.  Psychoanalysis has not provided patients with this kind of 
information.  But I do not believe that cognitive therapy actually does integrate the 
intentional into its practice.  The basic premise of cognitive therapies includes intentional 
states, but closer examination of the details of the treatment reveal very little, if any, 
engagement with these intentional features. 
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Practitioners of cognitive therapies aim to make symptoms go away.  That is the goal of 
cognitive therapies. And if cognitive therapists identify assumptions or feelings that stabilise 
the symptoms, then those assumptions and feelings should be eliminated.  This elimination is 
aimed for, independent of considerations of the appropriateness of those assumptions and 
feelings.  This is particularly the case with the possibility of appropriateness of fit between 
the assumptions / feelings and the intentional object(s).  When I look at the list of 
assumptions Arntz et al. developed, it seems possible to me that it might be highly fitting for 
some people to hold those assumptions.  As we know, most sufferers of BPD have had 
terrible past experiences of the world.  Most of their earliest experiences include a variety of 
types of abuse.  Further, it seems potentially fitting for patients to hold those assumptions in 
the mood-laden manner that I have described – a blend of irritation and depression.  Given 
that sort of past experience, it seems highly presumptuous to me to insist that someone ought 
to abandon her assumption, say, that “If I trust someone, I run a great risk of getting hurt or 
disappointed” (number 13).  I also think it would be presumptuous to ask such a patient to 
give up feelings of irritation and depression that are part of that assumption.  But the possible 
fittingness of a BPD sufferer’s assumptions and associated moods is not engaged with as part 
of cognitive therapies. 
Consider the most common therapy for BPD: dialectical behavior therapy, or DBT.  The 
focus in DBT is primarily occurrent.  It is not part of DBT to discuss any of the historical 
traumatic events that might constitute occasioning intentional objects for her assumptions or 
moods.  Patients are encouraged to pay attention (practice “mindfulness”) to their thoughts / 
feelings.  They should attempt to notice connections between these thoughts / feelings and 
their symptomatic behaviour.  As they become more skilled at identifying these connections, 
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they should practice breaking those connections.  How do therapists help their patients do 
this?  Not by arguing with the assumption holder or presenting counter-evidence.  Instead, 
there are a number of efforts to show the assumption holder that continuing to hold and 
endorse the BPD assumptions and feelings is not helpful to her.  Her life goals are not 
advanced by holding that belief.  If the BPD sufferer ceases to endorse her BPD assumptions 
and feelings, she will be better able to minimise her symptomatic behaviour.  This is an 
argument from prudence, not an argument from truth.  This is, of course, a powerful 
consideration, but it does not constitute intentional engagement. 
Once this is appreciated, one can see that, within cognitive therapies for BPD (part of the 
Medical Model B perspective), the assumptions associated with BPD are not engaged with 
intentionally.  Of course, the assumptions themselves (and, on my view, their associated 
moods) are intentional.  This is not how clinicians within Medical Model B see the 
assumptions and moods associated with BPD.  They are not grappled with through their 
intentional content, but instead are tackled through cognitive / affective / behaviour 
modification.  On my view, childhood trauma constitutes the occasioning intentional object 
of the moods (and broader cognitive states) that end up being seen as the symptoms of BPD.  
But within mainstream medical practice, those cognitions / affects/ and behaviour are seen, at 
most, as a causal byproduct of that childhood trauma. 
For non-psychoanalytic clinicians that wish to engage with the historical experiences of 
BPD sufferers, they now will actually avoid diagnosing the patient with BPD, precisely 
because current understandings of BPD do not consider this history significant with respect 
to treatment.  Instead, they will diagnose the person with post-traumatic stress disorder, or 
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PTSD.201 The diagnostic criteria and the dominant accepted treatment for PTSD more 
commonly make room for intentional analyses. I think this pattern of treatment (and reactive 
diagnosing) shows that, under the current dominant medical understanding of BPD, what I 
have called Medical Model B, BPD is a non-intentional state. 
Before moving on to my positive case for BPD and its associated mood’s intentionality, I 
need to acknowledge a problem for the intentionality proponent.  Above, I discussed several 
reasons for the dominance of cognitive therapies.  But one reason I cannot ignore is that 
cognitive therapies are now used because of the significant failures of traditional 
psychoanalytic therapies.  For each positive reason I provided in favour of cognitive 
therapies, psychoanalytic approaches have a corresponding negative reason – they have not 
been part of studies that lend themselves to efficacy assessments, they are not transparent 
about either length of therapy or therapeutic goals, and they do not accept or work with the 
constraints of medical systems especially with respect to financial issues. 
Given my analysis of cognitive therapies, psychoanalytic therapies are the only therapies 
that consistently take psychopathologies like BPD and their associated moods to be 
intentional states.  (Cognitive therapies could incorporate these kinds of considerations, but 
typically do not.)  Within psychoanalysis, therapist and patient consider the intentional 
origins of a patient’s affective states and encourage the patient to think about and understand 
those origins, as well as their personal significance.  If the single therapy that consistently 
takes BPD to be intentional does not work to eliminate the symptoms of BPD (which I grant 
are terrible for the BPD sufferer, as well as those around her), does that not mean that BPD 
should be approached as a non-intentional state? 
 
201 Becker 2000. 
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First of all, it should be pointed out that psychoanalytic approaches have not been shown 
ineffective with BPD.  There still remains the possibility that psychoanalytic techniques will 
be shown to work with BPD symptoms.  Further, the problems I just cited with respect to 
psychoanalysis are not problems with intentional engagement, but more pragmatic.  It is 
possible that adjustments could be made, such that psychotherapy could spell out goals of 
treatment and treatment length, and greater efforts at meeting financial constraints could be 
pursued.202 But even if this does not work, the failure of psychoanalysis to lead to the 
elimination of BPD symptoms does not establish that BPD is largely a non-intentional 
phenomenon. 
As I discussed in chapter 1, moods are extraordinarily complicated.  Although I am 
primarily interested in considering their intentional aspects, that is not the total of what a 
mood consists in.  This is even more true in the case of a personality disorder like BPD, 
which incorporates much more than just moods.  It may turn out that once a set of BPD 
symptoms has come into existence to be diagnosed, reducing or eliminating those symptoms 
cannot be accomplished through attention to the intentional features.203 The various 
cognitive and affective barriers, along with physiology and behaviour may converge, so that 
intentional analyses cannot change how the person thinks / feels / and acts with respect to the 
disorder.  But this does not establish that intentional features do not exist.  In fact, it does not 
even establish that focus on those intentional aspects is meaningless.  In the next chapter, I 
 
202 John Gunderson and Glen Gabbard 1999 recognise these pragmatic problems with psychoanalysis, and argue 
that there is an obligation to respond to them. 
203 Lucia Imbesi 2002 argues that personality factors make insight (the core therapeutic method of 
psychoanalysis) impossible for some BPD patients. 
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will explore what I think can be gained through intentional analyses of BPD, even in 
instances where those analyses do not result in symptom elimination.
CHAPTER V 
THE MORAL DIMENSION OF BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER 
 
One of my strongest complaints against the non-intentional analyses of moods currently 
on offer is the thinness of their characterisations of moods.  I will aim to avoid this tendency 
in my exploration of BPD.  In my case study, I will explore what is gained by considering the 
mood states of BPD intentional.  I think this approach provides a rich explanatory force.  I 
will argue that a non-intentional account does not have the resources for the same kind of 
insight.  Thus, my argument for the intentionality of a BPD-associated mood blend will be a 
kind of ‘argument to the best explanation.’  I hope to show how attractive the intentional 
account is, given that the non-intentional accounts leave so much unexplained. 
 
I.  A case of BPD 
Consider Lilah,1 a woman in her 30’s who has been diagnosed with BPD and who meets 
almost all of the diagnostic criteria for BPD.  She has had many intimate relationships with 
men.  A common pattern in those relationships is a beginning period of intense infatuation.  
On three occasions, she has gotten married within a month or less of meeting her partner.  
But several months into the relationship, things sour.  They begin fighting.  Lilah finds all of 
his behaviour intolerable.  He sometimes comes home later than he said he would, or he will 
 
1 I will be adapting a case provided Sidney Ornduff 2005. 
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fail to phone her when she expected a call.  In these instances, Lilah flies into a rage.  
Sometimes she acts out this rage by damaging property.  More commonly, Lilah responds to 
her rage by locking herself in the bathroom and cutting herself.  In addition to the more 
dramatic moments described above, Lilah is almost always unpleasant to be with.  It is hard 
to pinpoint exactly what she does that is so aggravating, but she is a person that most people 
wish to avoid.  She routinely takes herself to be irritated about most of the things in front of 
her, e.g. the volume of the television, the failure of her husband to phone about his brief 
lateness, and the draft in the room.  She escalates her distress in these situations by violently 
berating herself for her failings. 
Lilah has been compelled to accept therapy because of a suicide attempt.  She claims that 
she tried to kill herself because she has recently had new memories surface.  At her latest 
gynecological exam, her physician told her that she had genital scarring consistent with 
having been abused.  While considering this possibility, Lilah had several flashes of images 
of being violently vaginally penetrated by her father as a toddler.  She also has memories of 
her mother watching as her father exposed his penis to Lilah.  She has been very distraught 
about these memories.  Lilah has had very little contact with her father.  In the past he 
physically abused Lilah’s mother, and he left her and her mother before she started school.  
She has only seen him once since then.  He returned to the family home on the morning of 
her graduation from high school and climbed into bed with Lilah, ignoring her protests.  
Lilah’s relationship with her mother has also been difficult.  They fight often but are in 
regular contact. 
If Lilah enters a course of dialectical behavioral therapy, there will be no discussion of 
these childhood experiences or the newly-surfaced memories qua memories.  Instead, the 
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therapist will begin by giving Lilah exercises to help her identify which feelings and thoughts 
accompany her symptoms, particularly her suicidal behaviour and thoughts, along with her 
self-harm behaviours.  If Lilah begins to experience suicidal ideation, she will attempt to 
observe what was going on when she started down that internal path.  Were there particular 
environmental factors that acted as a trigger?  Then, as she identifies patterns in thoughts / 
feelings/ behaviours, she will attempt to dismantle those that lead to her suicidal and self-
harm thoughts and behaviours.  Let us assume that Lilah succeeds at all these tasks.  She 
figures out her environmental triggers and her feeling and thought patterns.  She comes to 
master them so thoroughly that her symptoms truly do go away – she no longer has thoughts 
of suicide, she no longer cuts herself, she is able to enjoy her relationships and maintain her 
job.  I think there is still a substantial gap in Lilah’s understanding of herself that is worth 
exploring.  I think this gap could be at least partly addressed through considering the 
intentional aspect of her feelings.   
 
2.  Intentional analysis with immediate (apparent) intentional objects 
What might an intentional analysis offer Lilah?  One of the advantages of considering a 
phenomenon intentionally is that a normative evaluation is possible.  With emotions, recall 
that D’Arms and Jacobson identify three axes along which emotions (assuming that emotions 
are intentional) can be assessed for appropriateness: fit, prudence, and morality.  There is 
also a fourth axis added by Griffiths – evolutionary fitness.  I think that the same four 
evaluative axes exist for moods, in cases where those moods are intentional.  Further, in light 
of my distinction between occasioning and immediate intentional objects of moods (and 
emotions), some instances of moods will have two sets of mood-object relationships to be 
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evaluated.  Lilah’s mood that I most wish to explore is her irritation / depression mood blend 
(that I argued in the previous chapter is a unique marker of BPD).  In this section, I will 
consider the case of the immediate (apparent) intentional objects of Lilah’s mood. 
I will start by exploring whether or not Lilah’s mood blend is fittingly appropriate in light 
of its immediate (apparent) intentional objects, e.g. husband lateness, television volume and 
draft.  In considering Lilah’s intense reactions to these objects, the intentional account 
immediately runs into difficulties.  The objects of Lilah’s irritation are so ubiquitous and 
nondescript and Lilah’s mood is so strongly negative that it is not plausible to observers that 
the TV, husband lateness and draft are true intentional objects of her irritation / depression.  
Some might not think they can count as intentional objects of her mood at all.2
From the outside, it seems clear that Lilah’s irritation / depression mood blend is 
considerably more longstanding than her exposure to the objects she cites as the objects of 
her mood.3 Her extant mood appears to be ‘directed at’ or ‘about’ everything, rather than any 
particular thing.  This is the feature of moods whereby they become attached to many 
different immediate (apparent) intentional objects, and demonstrates Lormand’s 
Pervasiveness condition.  Everything Lilah comes into contact with gets processed through 
her mood.  This global quality of her mood, such that it is about everything, reinforces the 
sense that her mood in fact is about nothing – that is, her mood appears non-intentional.  
Thus, although we began this section intending to pursue an intentional account of Lilah’s 
mood, problems of fit lead us quickly to a non-intentional account. 
 
2 I argued earlier that it is precisely this difficulty that lends nonintentional accounts of moods their plausibility.  
In chapter 1, I argued that there were good reasons to deny true intentionality to the relationship between moods 
and their immediate (apparent) intentional objects.  I will not revisit that issue here. 
3 Notice that implicit in this approach there is an insistence that a true intentional object be linked with the 
affective state’s occasioning. 
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This non-intentional account gives fuel to the particular pathologising efforts found in the 
current dominant medical models.  As observers, since we fail to identify an intentional 
relationship that makes sense of Lilah’s mood, we begin looking for non-intentional causes.  
The primary causal explanation that will likely be appealed to is Lilah’s BPD.  The disorder 
causes her to be irritated and depressed.  Lilah’s mood is now understood as a symptom of 
her BPD.  In fact, we will no longer consider Lilah to be primarily expressing a mood at all.  
Instead, her affective state will be looked at symptomatically, and characterised as “affective 
lability” (one of the prime symptoms of BPD).  Once this pathologising move has been 
made, explaining Lilah’s affective state will be taken up by medical practitioners.  Within 
Medical Model B, there will be a willingness to characterise Lilah’s pathological mood blend 
of irritation and depression as a causal response to childhood abuse.  But for treatment 
purposes, engaging with or even acknowledging the causal history is not important.  What is 
important is to make her symptoms – her affective lability – go away.  And the dominant 
view now is that this goal is best accomplished through cognitive / behavioural interventions. 
It is, however, possible to resist this exclusively non-intentional pathway.  The non-
intentional path argues that the relationship between Lilah’s mood blend and the immediate 
(apparent) intentional objects is so tenuous that it is implausible to see it as intentional at all.  
I would argue that in fact it is an intentional relationship where the failure of fit is only 
partial.  There are cases where a mood’s failure to fit an object is so pronounced that it can 
plausibly be claimed that there is a complete absence of an intentional relationship.  This is 
when a mood so grossly misrepresents the purported object of the mood that it appears to fail 
to represent the object at all.  If someone claimed that she was irritated about her husband’s 
sincere expression of love, in most cases we would simply say that her mood was not about 
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the love expression at all.4 This is not the case with Lilah’s mood.  Clearly, Lilah’s mood is 
very much like the mood that might often be linked with too-loud-TVs or late husbands.  A 
loud TV or a tardy spouse is often the prompt of irritation.  The main problem in the fit 
between Lilah’s mood to its immediate objects is its intensity.  In part, Lilah’s mood 
represents the draft and television volume, which are indeed bad, as worse than they actually 
are.  But her mood is still representing the draft and the television volume. 
Of course, Lilah’s mood is a more complicated mood blend of irritation and depression.  
Lilah’s mood blend represents the television volume and a draft as somehow connected with 
a depressed sense of negative self-evaluation.  This might seem, to some, to be a case of total 
misrepresentation.  It is hard to see how these objects could fit at all with depression.  In most 
cases, however, the depression follows on the heels of the irritation element, and is in fact 
more a response to the irritation.  That is, Lilah first has an intense flare-up of her irritation in 
response to something like the television or her husband.  Then, in taking herself to be 
feeling the wrong thing in being irritated so intensely, her depression is activated.  Thus, her 
total mood state actually has as its immediate (apparent) intentional objects both the 
television / draft / husband lateness and other components of the mood itself.  I do not think, 
however, it is accurate to say that Lilah experiences two distinct moods.  The various mood 
elements merge and reinforce each other, such that they constitute a single mood experience. 
Here, as with the irritation element of her mood state, there is a basic fit between mood 
and immediate (apparent) intentional object.  If someone takes herself to have done 
something wrong that she could have and should have avoided, some amount of depression 
 
4 Of course there could be a case where context could explain that the irritation was truly about the love-
expression.  But in most cases, it will be more plausible to deny an intentional relationship between the mood 
and love-expression. 
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might be fitting.  But again, as with the irritation component, there is a problem of intensity.  
Lilah’s depression is more pronounced than her transgression warrants.  This pattern of 
excessively intense mood states might be where part of Lilah’s pathology might be located. 
In addition to considering these questions of fit, it is also possible to evaluate the 
prudential appropriateness of Lilah’s mood in light of its immediate (apparent) intentional 
objects.  Here it seems clear that Lilah’s mood fails to be prudential.  Feeling this way – 
intensely and volatile-ly irritated / depressed – does not advance the interests of Lilah (or 
anyone else, probably).  It hurts her in many ways to feel that way about those features of her 
environment and her own mental states.  The mood states themselves are intensely negative.  
Sometimes the mood is so bad that it leads Lilah to cut herself. Additionally, these moods 
lead her to behaviour that alienates others e.g. yelling, physical violence.  Of course this 
failure of prudentiality is also a marker of pathology.  This is the primary concern of 
cognitive therapies like DBT.  They focus on alleviating the harms associated with this lack 
of prudence, and put aside entirely consideration of potential intentional objects.  They take 
the view that Lilah’s mood blend manifests such an extreme lack of prudence that it would be 
nonsensical to attempt to understand it intentionally.  I would like to reiterate, however, that 
there is nothing in pathologising itself that requires a non-intentional position.  That Lilah’s 
mood blend may reflect a pathological lack on a prudential level does not establish a lack of 
intentionality. 
Then there is the moral appropriateness question.  Again, it seems clear that Lilah’s mood 
– evaluated in terms of its relationship with the TV, her spouse and the draft – is not morally 
appropriate.  In responding to her husband’s lateness with such an intense negative affective 
experience, she does wrong to both herself and him.  In most cases, while observers might 
138
grant that her husband’s lateness fits with a slight amount of moral disapprobation,5 it is not 
seen as moral warrant for the violent berating to which Lilah subjects him.  Lilah’s violence 
against herself – the ‘delicate self-mutilation’- in response to the situation of her husband’s 
tardiness and her follow up to it is also, I think, clearly morally inappropriate.  Although 
Lilah’s behaviour toward her husband is truly wrong, self-cutting is not a morally appropriate 
response to perpetrating this bad behaviour.6
Finally, there is the issue of appropriateness of BPD’s associated mood blend in light of 
evolutionary considerations.  To my knowledge, there are no empirical investigations that 
determine whether BPD in general results in diminished reproductive fitness, but it seems 
plausible that it does.  The romantic relationships of BPD sufferers are more stressful and 
have more crises than those of persons without BPD.7 Sufferers of BPD also have problems 
with academic performance8 and vocational success.9 In one of the largest studies of the 
BPD functioning, persons diagnosed with BPD received a mean score of 38.9 on the Global 
Assessment of Functioning Scale (out of a total possible score of 100).10 This score indicates 
“serious impairment in several of the following: occupational or school functioning, 
interpersonal relationships, judgment, thinking, or mood.”11 They experience a higher 
 
5 The degree of moral disapprobation that this lateness warrants will, of course, be context dependent. 
6 It seems unlikely to me that self-cutting can ever be morally appropriate.  Even in cases where Lilah does 
something very bad, such that she deserves punishment, it is hard to imagine anyone endorsing self-cutting as 
the right kind of punishment. 
7 Daley et al. 2000. 
8 Bagge et al. 2004. 
9 Zanarini Frankenburg Reich Hennen and Silk 2005. 
10 Zanarini et al. 2006. 
11 APA 2000b, 32. 
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incidence of alcohol abuse, and have greater problems associated with that alcohol abuse.12 
They also are more likely to experience chronic illnesses and engage in more health-
threatening behaviour like smoking.13 Of course, there is also the simple fact that BPD is 
linked with higher mortality rates within childbearing years14 – this difference alone is 
enough to make the case that BPD has negative effects on evolutionary fitness. 
But in addition to this general issue of evolutionary fitness of BPD as a whole, there is the 
question of the evolutionary fitness of BPD’s mood blend – in light of its immediate 
(apparent) intentional objects.  This is an empirical issue for which there are no definitive 
data.  It does seem to me, however, that the data found in the preceding paragraph make it 
unlikely that evolutionary fitness could be seen to be enhanced from this perspective.  People 
typically think of BPD in terms of its immediate (apparent) intentional objects – Lilah’s 
response to the television volume garners a great deal of attention.  This attention is 
overwhelmingly negative for the BPD sufferer herself.  It seems likely to me that the mood 
blend of irritation and depression, understood in terms of its immediate (apparent) intentional 
objects, is a significant contributor to the many psychosocial problems BPD sufferers 
experience.  I suspect that these problems decrease evolutionary fitness. 
So – Lilah’s mood fails to be appropriate on any of the four evaluative measures we have.  
It seems possible that the manner in which Lilah’s mood is not appropriate in any of these 
dimensions is a reflection of pathological processes.  Although I have argued that it is 
possible to see Lilah’s mood blend as intentional, if we consider only the immediate 
 
12 Stepp et al. 2005. 
13 Frankenburg and Zanarini 2004. 
14 APA 2001. 
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(apparent) intentional objects available, her irritation / depression often appears to be 
unintelligible.  We cannot knit the pieces of Lilah’s mood into a single, coherent 
phenomenon.  The immediate (apparent) intentional object often does not appear to be a fully 
fitting object, particularly in light of the affective intensity.  The behaviour that accompanies 
her mood blend is almost incomprehensible.  At this point, it is not clear that the intentional 
analysis has brought us any new appreciation of Lilah’s situation and it has not provided any 
insight into her pathology either. 
 
3.  Intentional analysis with occasioning intentional objects 
I think that the advantages of an intentional analysis only appear when we consider 
Lilah’s mood blend in light of its occasioning cause.  With BPD, intelligibility is often only 
conferred when earlier events from the person’s history are considered.  In many cases of 
BPD, the occasioning cause of the typical mood blend of irritation / depression is the 
childhood abuse that most experiencers of BPD have undergone.  In the largest study about 
BPD sufferers’ childhood experiences, Mary Zanarini et al. found that  just over 60% of their 
BPD-diagnosed subject pool reported childhood sexual abuse, just under 60% reported 
childhood physical abuse, and over 90% reported abuse that included emotional, verbal, and 
neglectful abuse.15 These rates are considerably higher than rates found in populations of 
both normal controls and patients with other psychiatric diagnoses.  More recently, in another 
relatively large study, Mary Zanarini et al. found that severity of abuse correlated with 
severity of BPD symptoms.16 I think these data give us a starting point for examining the 
 
15 Zanarini et al. 1997. 
16 Zanarini et al. 2002. 
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intentionality of BPD’s associated mood state. As with cases of depression, to determine 
whether a particular case of BPD has an occasioning intentional object and whether a case is 
intelligible, affective reconstruction and interlocution will be required.   
In many cases of moods, the mood-experiencer is uncertain what the occasioning cause of 
her mood is.  This is where the process of affective reconstruction comes in.  Typically, one 
would begin by asking about the mood-experiencer’s recent life events.  In one sense, Lilah’s 
affective reconstruction is simple.  She is especially irritated / depressed right now because of 
her recent uncovering of memories of abuse.  But Lilah has a lifetime of complicated and 
unintelligible (with respect to their immediate objects) mood states that need explaining.  If 
the memories are veridical, then we might be able to say that the incidences of abuse are the 
long-standing occasioning intentional objects of Lilah’s longstanding mood blend. 
But in fact, we face a challenging question with respect to this potential occasioning 
intentional object.  Lilah does not actually know if she was sexually abused by her father as a 
child.  Whether or not the sexual abuse actually happened makes a tremendous difference.  If 
she was abused in the way she is now remembering, then it is possible that her mood is a 
response to this abuse as occasioning intentional object.  This in turn will effect how Lilah 
understands her childhood and herself as an adult.  The ‘memories’ that are distressing Lilah 
and pushed her into therapy are actually suspect with respect to veridicality.  They do not 
seem to have the attributes of typical childhood memory – they are too precise.  Given that 
they came only after an authority-figure (her gynecologist) suggested that perhaps she had 
been raped, it is possible that they are the result of suggestion.17 
17 Ornduff 2005. 
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To decide whether or not the abuse actually happened, we would have to pursue a very 
difficult form of affective reconstruction.  Childhood abuse does not typically leave evidence 
like many other traumatic life events.  Although Lilah has genital scarring, there is no way to 
determine with certainty from the scars alone what caused them.  It is further unlikely that 
Lilah will be able to find any physical items that would establish with any certainty whether 
or not the events occurred.  The best way to settle this question probably would be to ask her 
father and mother, but this may be too difficult a task for Lilah to take on.  Further, both her 
father and mother have reason to lie if the abuse did happen as Lilah remembers it.  Lilah 
will have to think about what sorts of reasons she has for taking her recent mental images to 
be memories.  She and her affective reconstructor and interlocutor should consider the 
possibility that those images reflect something other than memories.  Perhaps they are 
imaginings, metaphorical images for what she takes her father (and mother) to have done to 
her.  Perhaps not. 
From the standpoint of therapies that do engage with a patient’s history like, for example, 
standard psychoanalysis, this process of reconstruction and interlocution is fairly 
controversial.  Psychotherapists typically do not challenge the veridicality or appropriateness 
of a patient’s presentation of her history or how she feels.  Nancy Potter argues that, 
especially with patients diagnosed with BPD, therapists have a moral obligation to refrain 
from imposing their own views.18 Instead, she thinks that therapists must allow the patient’s 
own understanding of her history and her symptomatic behaviour to guide the therapeutic 
interactions. 
 
18 Potter 2003. 
143
I do not wish to part too substantially from Potter’s position.  I concur that respect for the 
patient on the part of the therapist is necessary, and part of respecting someone requires 
taking her assessment of her own life seriously.  With BPD patients especially, since they 
have likely been accorded very little authority over their own lives, it is important, in Potter’s 
words, to give their own analyses “uptake.”  But I am not convinced that respect entails 
endorsing someone’s description of their own history, if there are reasons for thinking that 
their description is mistaken.   
In the case of Lilah, mistakes might occur in two respects.  First, she might mistake 
wholly or partly imagined mental images to be veridical memories.  Second, she might take 
her affective state and her symptomatic behaviour to be appropriate in some respect – fit, 
prudence, morality – in instances where they are not appropriate.  In both senses, I think 
respecting Lilah includes the possibility of telling her about these possible errors.  Depending 
on the reasons her reconstructor / interlocutor has for thinking Lilah is mistaken, the 
reconstructor / interlocutor will have varying degrees of warrant to press Lilah to consider the 
possibility of error.  With respect to the memory / imaginings question, it will be difficult to 
know how much to press.  Although Lilah’s memories are somewhat suspect, a reconstructor 
/ interlocutor will almost never have grounds for anything approaching certainty, one way or 
another.  But whether or not Lilah was truly abused in the way she newly ‘remembers’ is 
important.  I think we owe Lilah some assistance with considering the possibility that what 
she now takes to be memories might not be.  In this regard, I am partly following Ian 
Hacking’s analysis of dissociative identity disorder (often known as multiple personality 
disorder).19 He argues that therapists do their patients a serious disservice by taking their 
 
19 Hacking 1998. 
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accounts of abuse as always and absolutely veridical.  With the errors associated with the 
appropriateness of Lilah’s affective state and symptomatic behaviour, a reconstructor / 
interlocutor will often be on firmer ground.  For example if Lilah takes her self-harm 
behaviour to be either fitting or morally appropriate, she is wrong.  Challenging these 
assessments is part of what we owe her when we engage with her. 
My analysis, however, leaves open the possibility that affective reconstruction and 
interlocution will not comprise an entire therapeutic engagement.  At the moment, there are 
no therapies that practice reconstruction and interlocution in the way that I have described 
them, although I do think that many clinicians incorporate some elements thereof into their 
practice.20 This means that the clinical effects of such interactions have not been 
documented.  Challenging affective reconstruction and interlocution could only be cautiously 
introduced into a therapeutic relationship.  Data would need to be collected about the 
consequences of this challenging.  Therapists rightly strive to aid their patients.  With 
sufferers of BPD, this surely means attempting to alleviate some of their distress.  It is 
possible that affective reconstruction and interlocution would not be helpful in alleviating 
distress, especially in the short term.  I think that this is a relevant factor to consider before 
pursuing affective reconstruction and interlocution.  These kinds of considerations are often 
involved in friendship, which is where I think affective reconstruction and interlocution are 
typically practiced.  A good friend will often challenge someone’s assessments of what has 
happened to them and which of their responses are appropriate.  But these challenges will 
 
20 Potter, personal communication. 
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often only be raised after the friend has provided non-challenging support.  Similar 
judgements are appropriate within a therapeutic relationship.21 
Within current medical and implicitly non-intentional accounts of moods, none of this 
makes any difference.  Whether or not Lilah was sexually abused by her father will not affect 
her course of DBT.  There, her only concern would be to change her behaviour right now.  
But this means that this therapy will not help Lilah to know if she is a person who 
experiences her mood blend in response to sexual abuse, or in response to some other kind of 
event.  This would tell Lilah something fundamental about who she is.  People who are 
abused in the way that Lilah remembers being abused – sexual penetration, boundary 
violation, not being defended and protected, being abandoned – respond in different ways.  If 
Lilah was abused, then she might come to believe that her mood states are a result of this 
experience.  She would have reason to think that she is the kind of person for whom irritation 
and depression arise as a result of that kind of abuse.  The BPD assumptions that she holds 
were likely informed by those abuse experiences.  In this scenario, the child she was learned 
many lessons as a result of that abuse.  The abuse taught her that she was not valuable.  It 
also taught her that the world was unjust.  But – if she was not abused, then her longstanding 
mood blend is not the result of that experience.  In which case, she developed her mood, 
gained those assumptions, and learned those lessons through some other route.  And this 
would reveal something else about her.  All of this is part of Lilah developing a full 
appreciation of her own history and as a consequence, an appreciation of the child she was 
and the woman she has become. 
 
21 I do not wish to suggest here that friendship and therapy are the same kind of relationship.  Therapists will 
face many different constraints than a friend. 
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As I discussed with regard to depression, one of the benefits of an intentional analysis is 
that it opens the door to considering whether or not the mood phenomenon is intelligible.  At 
the point when Lilah decides if she was or was not abused in the way she has recently 
remembered, then the affective interlocution can begin.  We can start asking whether Lilah’s 
irritation / depression fits with her experiences.  If she was abused in the way I described 
above, the answer is probably yes.  In this case, we might feel that we have an intelligible 
case of irritation / depression.  Moreover, the intelligibility we gain in considering Lilah’s 
occasioning intentional objects – the paternal abuse and maternal neglect – also help to 
confer greater intelligibility on at least some elements of Lilah’s mood with respect to its 
immediate objects.  Recall that Lilah regularly has problems with her relationships with her 
male partners / husbands.  That she responds ‘disproportionately’ in response to her husband 
coming home late without calling becomes more intelligible if we consider that Lilah has 
experienced profound abuse and neglect.  She ‘overreacts’ to not-very-bad behaviour in the 
present which bears some resemblance to the very-bad behaviour she experienced in the past.  
In the past she was abused, not only sexually but also with neglect and abandonment.  
Lateness might feel, to a person with these experiences, like a kind of abandonment.  When 
we considered Lilah’s response to her husband’s lateness in isolation from her past, we had a 
failure of complete intelligibility.  We can now come much closer to finding that complete 
intelligibility. 
On the other hand, if Lilah was not in fact abused in the way she remembers, then we 
probably need to continue with our reconstruction.  In that case, we still have no occasioning 
intentional object to help explain the origins of her mood blend.  We also need to explain 
why she has memories that likely are not veridical.  The origin of the non-veridical memories 
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may well be helpful in reconstructing the true occasioning intentional objects of her mood.  It 
should be acknowledged that Lilah may never truly know whether or not her memories are 
accurate.  This is particularly distressing, especially for someone who suffers additionally 
with BPD.  But even this great uncertainty tells her something about who she is. 
Appreciating the intentional origin of Lilah’s mood blend of irritation and depression can 
also help in making her ‘delicate self mutilation’ more intelligible.  This requires uniting 
three phenomena: the occasioning intentional object, the mood blend, and the self-injuring 
behaviour.  First I will discuss the fit between the mood blend and the behaviour.  To 
understand how these elements fit together, an affective interlocutor must appreciate that the 
BPD-associated mood blend is extraordinarily painful to experience.  In fact, Carolyn Zittel 
Conklin and Drew Westen found that community samples of BPD sufferers are primarily 
identifiable by their intense affective distress which they characterised as dysphoria, even 
though this is not one of the DSM criteria for BPD’s diagnosis.22 Unlike pure depression, the 
negative feeling BPD sufferers experience is not dampening of motivation for action.  
Instead, the irritation provides substantial fuel for acting out.  What motivates self-harm?  
Milton Brown et al. found the main reasons for self-injury among BPD sufferers is to provide 
affective relief and for self-punishment.23 These results are consistent with my own view 
that a strong depressed self-evaluation coupled with an irritated impulse to harm the object of 
negative evaluation leads quite intelligibly to self-harm behaviours. 
For many BPD sufferers, in moments when the irritation / depression blend are 
particularly triggered, cutting can be an extraordinary release.  The irritation component of 
 
22 Zittel Conklin and Westen 2005. 
23 Brown et al. 2002. 
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the mood demands action, lashing out.  The depression component insists on a negative self-
evaluation.  These elements merge to create a strong compulsion to self-harm.  On their own 
view, it is fitting that they should be cut and they experience pleasure, or at least lifting of 
affective distress, when that cutting happens.  Most sufferers of BPD report that they do not 
actually experience pain when they cut (or hurt) themselves.24 Moreover, those who do not 
experience pain are more likely to report more severe childhood sexual abuse.25 It looks like 
BPD sufferers experience such intense affective distress that the physical pain of cutting or 
burning distracts them from their affective pain, thereby providing relief. 
How does child abuse lead to a mood that is so painful to experience and is alleviated by 
self-injury?  It is worth pointing out that the child abuse that leads to severe manifestations of 
BPD, including self-harm behaviours, is not ‘merely’ sexual abuse or physical abuse in 
isolation over a brief period of time.  The physical and sexual abuse typically persists over an 
extended period of childhood, and it is almost always accompanied by serious neglect.26 It 
seems that this abuse combination is what confers a fit between the occasioning object, the 
mood blend and the resulting behaviour of self-harm.  People who have been abused in this 
way as children generally take themselves to have been given a powerful piece of evidence 
that they are not valuable.  This kind of abuse is also linked with a loss of a sense of control 
over both their own bodies and their experience more broadly.  The body is seen as a 
particular locus of badness and needing punishment. 
 
24 Bohus et al. 2000. 
25 Russ et al. 1993. 
26 Zananrini et al. 2002. 
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In light of these effects of the BPD abuse combination, let me provide a possible 
interpretation of self-injury in BPD.  In the minds of the abused, that the abuse happened 
signals that they were not good, not worthy of love, and not worthy of protection.  This 
becomes compounded when the child is neglected in addition to being actively harmed.  In 
Lilah’s case, if she was abused, it likely left her with feelings and assumptions like these, 
which combined with her experiences of neglect and abandonment.  When her husband 
comes home late, this experience fits with her more general sense that people are unreliable 
and likely to abandon her.  When Lilah’s mood then flares into rage, she also likely 
reexperiences feeling a terrifying lack of control.  Much as Lilah frightens those around her 
when she expresses how she feels, she is likely experiencing even greater fear herself, of
herself.27 When she cuts herself, a sense of control and balance is restored to her.  Being cut 
suits her own mood-laden self-assessment – is appropriately fitting – and puts her in charge 
of what is happening to her.  These experiences in turn lead her to feel better.  This is an 
incomplete way of understanding some of the features of BPD, and it is only one possible 
explanation of many.  It is, however, an example of the type of explanation that is available 
to us if we are willing to see BPD moods as intentional. 
When abuse is very bad and is accompanied by a significant lack of compensating 
affection, mood states like those found in BPD are an intelligible response.  I believe that this 
sense of being unworthy is not a belief that can be stripped away from the mood state.  The 
abuse sufferer takes herself to be unworthy in a depressed / irritated way.  There are many 
 
27 Fear might actually be a significant and underappreciated component of BPD.  Recall in the depression 
chapters that I discussed the phenomenon of ‘depressive realism,’ whereby depressed people have greater 
insight than nondepressed people, about some range of phenomena.  There is no similar feature of BPD.  BPD 
sufferers do not manifest greater insight about BPD-related feelings and events.  There is perhaps one exception 
– recognition of the facial expression of fear.  One study found that BPD sufferers were significantly better than 
normal controls at recognising fear expressions (Wagner and Linehan, 1999). 
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senses in which someone could consider herself unworthy – she could find it exclusively 
enraging, with no elements of depression.  It is likely that a person with this response to 
abuse would not end up cutting herself.   In a case like that, she might not be a sufferer of 
BPD. 
This characterisation of delicate self-mutilation also allows us to see the moral dimension 
of the BPD mood state.  The mood blend, and the behaviour it leads to, is distinctly morally-
valenced.  A BPD sufferer takes herself to be doing a morally praise-worthy thing when she 
cuts herself.  In part, the BPD’s position that self-harm is a good thing to do links with 
immediate objects (e.g. Lilah feels she was wrong to yell about the television, she should be 
punished).  But it gains its force through its links with occasioning objects (e.g. Lilah feels 
she is fundamentally deserving of punishment, because her badness is so pronounced that she 
was an object of abuse).  When we evaluate this mood and it’s associated self-harm, we 
disagree with the BPD-sufferer’s assessment.  We think she is wrong to consider cutting a 
virtuous act.  But it is clear that this moral element is present in many cases of BPD self-
harm.  Self-harm in these cases is not morally appropriate, but it is morally valenced. 
Of course, there are also the prudential considerations.  For observers, this is a 
straightforward assessment.  The moods, assumptions, and behaviours of BPD are rarely 
prudentially fitting, whether they are considered in light of their occasioning or immediate 
objects.  If the mood blend was clearly directed at the occasioning intentional object, that is, 
the abuse or abuser, then perhaps the BPD sufferer would experience some relief.  But 
instead, the BPD mood blend is overwhelmingly focused on immediate (apparent) intentional 
objects and the BPD sufferer typically has very little insight into its occasioning intentional 
objects.  Thus, it seems that the interests of the BPD sufferers are almost always harmed by 
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symptomatic BPD behaviour.  It is not clear to me whether or not BPD sufferers generally 
take their behaviour to be as obviously imprudent as their observers.  It seems possible that 
they might endorse their behaviour more often than observers.  In most of those cases, 
however, I (and most of us, I think) would likely take them to be mistaken.  Finally, too, 
there is the question of evolutionary fitness between the BPD mood-blend and the 
occasioning intentional object of child abuse.  This is again an empirical issue, but it seems 
likely that there is a diminished fitness associated with almost all BPD-specific phenomena. 
Perhaps the most notable aspect of the paradigmatic BPD mood in light of its occasioning 
intentional object is that most observers think the BPD sufferer mislocates her lashing out.  
She yells at her husband for lateness.  She cuts herself out of a rage- and depression-laden 
self-loathing.  She and her husband should not be the targets of her affective distress.  
Instead, we would want her abusers to be on the receiving end of her negative affective 
states.  In that case, for observers, there would be a full intelligibility, a full fit of mood with 
occasioning intentional objects across all evaluative axes.  To the extent that this mislocation 
happens, the BPD mood blend is not fully intelligible.  But even this mislocation can be 
better understood in light of its occasioning intentional object.  Abuse by parents or 
caregivers is difficult to accept.  Affective denial of these experiences has a fair degree of fit.  
It seems to me that the intentional analysis I just offered brings us closer to understanding a 
significant set of issues underlying cases of BPD. 
 
4.  A feminist interpretation of BPD  
In this section, I will argue that the pathologising of BPD combined with a failure to 
appreciate the intentional components of BPD should be resisted, in particular out of 
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concerns with gender inequity.  Of those diagnosed with BPD, more than 75% are women.  
This is a striking difference in diagnosis rates for a psychiatric diagnosis.28 Moreover, 
among BPD sufferers, women are more likely than men to engage in self-mutilation.29 There 
are several possible explanations for this gender asymmetry.  One is that women’s 
physiology makes them more likely to suffer from BPD (e.g. some clinicians argue that BPD 
is a form of premenstrual disorder).  Another hypothesis for the gender asymmetry is that 
men’s BPD goes unrecognized (e.g. men’s BPD is masked by substance abuse).30 
Both of these hypotheses are consistent with Medical Model B, and both do not require 
seeing BPD as an intentional response to its sufferers’ experiences.  The results of research 
into these hypotheses, however, have been unsatisfying.  I contend that if more women 
experience BPD-symptoms than men, then we have an obligation to think about what this 
might mean about the conditions of women’s lives.  In particular, I believe that another 
possible explanation – that women’s affective states are more likely to fit the BPD profile 
than men’s – is underexplored.  This greater fit happens in two respects.  One, women’s 
mood expressions are more likely to be seen as fitting the BPD symptom profile.  Two, it is 
possible that women are given more reasons to manifest BPD symptoms.  It is only by seeing 
BPD as an intentional response to the world that these concerns can come into focus. 
In the previous case discussion, I argued that there were insights available if BPD 
phenomena were considered in light of intentional moods.  In particular, I argued that we are 
better able to understand Lilah’s symptomatic behaviour.  By considering her mood blend as 
 
28 Skodol and Bender 2003. 
29 Starr 2005. 
30 Johnson et al. 2003. 
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potentially intentional, rather than seeing it exclusively in terms of her diagnosis, her 
affective states can be appreciated as having some elements of fit.  But Lilah’s analysis is a 
microscopic one.  I only discussed a single patient, and the insights available were primarily 
with respect to her life and experience.  I would now like to explore the possibility of 
pursuing a macroscopic analysis, particularly in light of the moral appropriateness of the 
BPD mood blend.   
In my analysis, I take my inspiration from Marilyn Frye, who argues that oppression can 
neither be seen nor understood through fine-grained analysis of individual phenomena.31 
Frye offers an analogy of the birdcage – close inspection of individual wires cannot explain 
why a caged bird does not simply fly away.  It is only by backing up and seeing the 
systematic relationship between all the wires that can make sense of the bird’s immobility.  I 
think it is profitable to back up and look at the symptomatic behaviours of BPD in a larger 
context.  As feminists have observed, communities in different places over different times 
have been extraordinarily creative in managing difficult women – often by creating roles in 
which the woman’s difficult-ness is pathologised.  The diagnosis of ‘hysteria’ seems a strong 
candidate for this type of interpretation.32 I believe that BPD is serving this same type of 
function now. 
First, let us consider how women’s mood experiences are more likely to be seen as fitting 
the BPD symptom profile.  In the previous chapter, I argued that one of the ways that BPD 
was associated with moods was linked with the BPD sufferer’s experience of anger.  BPD 
sufferers are quick to anger, which I think indicates an underlying mood that predisposes the 
 
31 Frye 1983, 1-16. 
32 Allison and Roberts 1994. 
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person to become angry more quickly and intensely.  This quickness to anger is important in 
the diagnosis of BPD.  Let us return to the symptoms of BPD.  Symptom (8) of the DSM 
diagnostic criteria reads, in part: “inappropriate, intense anger”33 (emphasis added).34 
Symptom (8) is the only place where a normative evaluation appears in a symptom.  I have 
argued that Medical Model B superficially acknowledges intentional states as part of BPD.  
This is evidence of that acknowledgement. 
But even though that acknowledgement can be found, the cognitive therapies endorsed by 
Medical Model B do not actually engage with those intentional features.  I think this 
symptom makes that non-engagement very clear.  I think this judgement of inappropriateness 
is similar to the position I described earlier that takes people from a starting intentional 
position about BPD moods over to a non-intentional position.  Earlier I talked about how 
there is often such a total lack of fit between a BPD sufferer’s mood blend and its immediate 
(apparent) intentional objects that most people end up feeling that there is, in fact, not 
intentional relationship at all.  I think that is what is being indicated here.  The BPD 
sufferer’s anger is so inappropriate that it does not really make sense to treat it as intentional. 
This is consistent with an analysis of anger offered by Frye.35 In the philosophical 
literature on the emotions, anger is one of the paradigmatic intentional states.  Anger is 
always about something.  To take anger seriously as anger – in Frye’s terminology, to give 
anger ‘uptake’ – is to acknowledge that it bears an intentional relationship to something.  
 
33 APA 2000. 
34 They use the term ‘anger’ which is a paradigmatic emotion term.  But in the clinical literature, very little care 
is taken to ensure that moods and emotions are clearly distinguished.  In this case, I think they mean both anger 
as an emotion and as a more diffuse and encompassing affective state better characterised as a mood.  In part, I 
take them to be referring to the same phenomenon that I am identifying with the term ‘irritation.’ 
35 Frye 1983, 84-94. 
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Frye argues that in this society women’s anger is not given uptake.  In a sense, women’s 
anger doesn’t even exist. It is just noise.  When a woman gets angry, rather than engage with 
the intentional relationship that comprises it (e.g. by asking what she is angry about), a 
common response is to see the anger as an indicator of who the woman is (e.g. she is such a 
bitch). 
The clinical process of diagnosing BPD I think makes this point.  When women respond 
affectively the way BPD sufferers do, they can not really be in an intentional affective state – 
anger being understood in a normative sense, requiring a relationship with an intentional 
object.  Women who act like they are that angry are not really angry, with an attendant 
genuine intentional object.  Instead, their anger is not about anything, it is simply the 
(exclusively physiologically caused) symptom of a disease.  Both the pathologising impulse 
and the non-intentional accounts of mood work in concert here to disengage with potential 
objects of women’s irritation.  
Now let us consider the possibility that women are given more reasons than men to 
manifest BPD symptoms.  For Lilah, her mood, including its associated assumptions, leads to 
a fit between her sense of who she is and cutting.  Cutting is what should happen to Lilah, on 
Lilah’s own view.  This fit is what allows her to experience tremendous affective relief when 
she cuts herself.  That she has this experience may not be very intelligible to many people.  
Even if we are willing to see Lilah’s mood state as intentional, if we keep our analysis on the 
microscopic level, we may simply take this facet of Lilah and chalk it up to her pathology. 
But one of the things that is available with an intentional relationship is the possibility for 
others to learn something about the world, particularly if we consider that intentional 
relationship macroscopically.  From someone’s depressed response, we outsiders can learn 
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that the experience is depressing, even if we do not, ourselves, experience depression in 
response to the same situation.  For example, in virtue of learning about the many graduate 
students who experience depression while in graduate school, someone might learn that 
being a graduate student is depressing, even if she herself did not have that experience.  The 
case for learning this lesson mounts as there are more instances of people who have 
experienced graduate school in that way. 
With BPD, one of the main lessons we might learn is that abusing and neglecting a child 
ends up providing a fit for that child herself to engage in self-injury.  This appears to be 
especially the case for girls.  That for many girls, there is a fit between that kind of abuse and 
the very particular mood blend of irritation / depression that is part of BPD.  This in turn 
leads to adult women who experience pleasure and relief at hurting themselves.  In the earlier 
analysis of Lilah’s case, there was nothing gender specific.  The explanation I offered could 
as easily be extended to a male sufferer of BPD.  The gender-biased pattern of diagnosis and 
suffering, however, gives us reason to think that this earlier explanation might not be the end 
of the story.  Perhaps there are additional components related to the place of girls in this 
society that combine with the occasioning intentional object of the abuse to provide a special 
kind of fit with the feelings Lilah experiences.  This is a different kind of insight from the 
possibility that child abuse non-intentionally causes affective lability and impulsivity, which 
are symptoms of a disease, which makes people engage in self-harm behaviours.36 
This fit-based insight is not available if we only consider individual cases of BPD, 
explaining them in terms of pathology.  It is also not available if we adopt a non-intentional 
framework for thinking about BPD.  Many BPD sufferers are unable to articulate an 
 
36 This is probably the dominant Medical Model B account of BPD, although there is still considerable debate.  
See Links et al. 2000 for a discussion. 
157
occasioning intentional object for their mood.  Affective reconstruction is not a typical 
component of current responses to BPD.  Thus, their BPD appears to not have any meaning.  
The aim of cognitive therapies is to simply make the BPD symptoms go away.  If I am right, 
however, the intentional facet of BPD’s underlying cause is (sometimes) being ignored.  In 
addition, the failure to appreciate BPD symptoms both intentionally and macroscopically 
means losing a particular impetus to address potential underlying inequality. 
One possible objection to the analysis I just offered is that a purely causal analysis could 
give us the same results.  Simply put, child abuse (under certain conditions) causes BPD.  
This causal connection would lend itself equally well to the macroscopic analysis I was 
discussing.  The details would need to be filled in why women are primarily affected by this 
consequence of child abuse.  One possibility is that more women than men are abused in the 
particular way associated with BPD.  Another possibility is that women have a relevant 
physiological difference, such that child abuse is more likely to cause BPD in them.  Or it 
could be that the socialisation of females provides the right sort of predisposing attributes, 
such that childhood abuse of a female is more likely to result in BPD.  Empirical research 
would be used to determine which of these is correct (and of course it is possible that some 
combination of these possibilities is at work).  Child abuse, particularly the kind reported by 
BPD sufferers, clearly warrants moral disapprobation.  It is wrong in itself.  And if it causes 
BPD (among other problems) then it’s wrong on consequentialist grounds too.  What is 
added through an intentional analysis at the macroscopic level? 
I think there is a difference between seeing BPD purely as a negative causal consequence 
of abuse (and possibly gender pressures), and seeing it as an intentional, fitting consequence 
of abuse (and possibly gender pressures).  This difference, I think, is similar to the difference 
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at the individual level (which I just discussed with the case of Lilah).  If the moods associated 
with BPD are an intentional part of a response to child abuse, we can ask normative 
questions about its appearance.  I am most interested in two of the four possible normative 
evaluations:  (1) the appropriateness of the fit between the mood blend in BPD and its 
occasioning objects; and (2) the moral status of the relationship between the mood blend in 
BPD and its occasioning objects.  Does the mood blend of irritation and depression fit with a 
particular form of childhood trauma?  Should people feel that way in response to child 
abuse?  Do women in particular have reason to respond in BPD-like ways to being abused?  I 
am torn in my responses to these questions.  Prudentially, the answer is clearly, “no.”  It is 
not helpful to a victim of abuse to respond to being abused by flying into rages years later.  It 
certainly does not help a victim to respond to being abused by cutting her own arms and legs 
so systematically that later, clinicians are unable to draw blood normally because of the large 
build-up of scar tissue.  It is heartbreaking to see people who have already suffered so much 
add so considerably to that suffering. 
But what about fit?  In some cases of BPD, is there a fit between the occasioning 
intentional object – child abuse – and the mood blend irritation / depression?  Here I think the 
answer is yes.  Recall from the previous chapter the assumptions associated with BPD.  I 
think it is crucial to appreciate – at a macroscopic level – that people in general, but girls in 
particular, will learn from being abused that the world is malicious, and that they are 
worthless.  They will come to feel a devastating mixture of irritation and depression, where 
the only way to mitigate these feelings is to live a life where they oscillate between lashing 
out at others and lashing out at themselves.  ‘Delicate self-mutilation’ is a female symptom.  
Men are already a minority of those diagnosed with BPD.  They are an even greater minority 
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in manifesting the symptom of self-harm.  We could offer a causal explanation.  Girls are the 
kinds of creatures who are more easily caused to do that to themselves.  Or we could think 
about it intentionally and ask whether girls have more warrant to cut themselves.  I want to 
take the causal story seriously, particularly to the extent that it is helpful in alleviating painful 
symptoms of BPD.  But I do not want those considerations to be the end of our investigation.  
The non-intentional view of the affects of BPD sufferers, especially female sufferers, means 
that we will not be learning anything meaning-laden about women’s lives in considering their 
BPD symptoms. 
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